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ABSTRACT 
The study was carried out to determine the transformation of the security 
institutions and related management bodies in Malawi from 1994 to 2014 as 
the country shifted from authoritarian rule to democratic governance.   
 
Transformation of the security sector (TSS) is the process by which a country 
in transitional democracy formulates or re-orients the policies, structures and 
capacities of security institutions, and private security groups in the security 
sector.  Such tasks in a newly democratic Malawi required new sets of values 
among political leaders, the legislature, security practitioners as well as the 
civil society.  TSS is sometimes expressed as Security Sector Reform (SSR), 
Security Sector Governance (SSG) and as well as Security and Justice Sector 
Reform (SJSR) (African Union 2010). 
 
The study employed qualitative method as the mainstay and partly some 
statistical data interpretation was employed using a Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) software for the purpose of data visualisation and to 
identify information in graphical presentation.  Forty participants were 
involved from security institutions and management bodies (army, police 
intelligence, prisons services), residing in Lilongwe, the Capital City of 
Malawi. 
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The findings reveal that the security sector and management bodies in Malawi 
failed to transform/perform sufficiently.  The opportunity for reform was 
significant however it was limited because the transition to democracy stalled 
due to continued abuse of power by the elected authorities.  This may have 
been a deliberate attempt by those in power in order to maintain a weak 
security sector and management bodies for own interests.  The current 
structure of the security sector in Malawi may be weak for the following 
reasons:  Lack of expertise by the elected authorities, lack of overall security 
reviews every year, non-existent of various security policies, lack of modern 
equipment and technology and last but not least, mean budgetary consideration 
and very low salaries to the security members. Furthermore, the basic security 
legislation should be reformed because Malawi inherited a legal structure from 
the colonial rule that requires modification. 
 
The results from this study suggest that the transition process calls for a 
comprehensive TSS/SSR or SSG of the entire security sector and management 
bodies.  The government should reinforce policy action across security 
institutions whereby the elected authorities, legislature, security practitioners 
and civil societies are involved in locally owned TSS.  An important fact is   
positive change in the level of responsiveness by the State to the rights, views 
and demands of its citizens. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 Introduction and Background to the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter one discusses the transformation of the security sector, the process by 
which most nations adapt their defence and security policies in light of  
modern trends following the end of the cold war era.  In recent times it is 
common practice to see states moving away from military or authoritarian rule 
as a result of growing globalisation of governance and security.  To this end, 
there is need for security actors and managers to reposition themselves well 
and rethink over their actions, management style and strategies in the face of 
an array of emerging changes such as legal system, human rights and access 
and right to information that continue to pose serious problems of 
Transformation of Security Sector (TSS) to many African nations in transition 
to democracy.   
 
Especially, the study examines the transformation process of security 
institutions and related management bodies in Malawi from 1994 to 2014 as 
the country shifted from authoritarian to democratic governance.  
Traditionally, the security sector, according to African Union (2010:5), 
“consists of armed forces (army, navy, and air force); Intelligence, Police and 
Immigration services and security management bodies (Ministries of Defence, 
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Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice Sector and Parliamentary Security 
Committees).”  
 
Supporting this view, the African Union (2010) claim that “components of the 
security sector vary from country to country, depending on each country‟s 
understanding.  In general terms, a security sector comprises individuals, 
groups and institutions that are responsible for the provision, management and 
oversight of security for the citizenry and the state” (African Union, 2010:5).   
 
Malawi‟s current composition and structures of the security institutions and 
related management bodies under multiparty democracy still reflects the nature 
of authoritarian rule design despite the amendment of the constitution of the 
Republic of Malawi in 1994, particularly the bill of rights (Chapter iv, section 
15 to 46) which guarantee the right to protection of human rights, equality, life, 
privacy, freedom of association and expression among others.  
Notwithstanding these important gains, the Malawi Police Service and the 
National Intelligence Bureau have continued to violate these rights in Malawi.  
Similarly, the failure of the state to stem the tide has adequately created a 
widespread perception that the security sector and other security agencies are 
unprofessional and ineffective (The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 
2004). 
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1.2 Definition of Transformation of the Security Sector/Security Sector 
Reform. 
 
Transformation of the Security Sector (TSS) or Security Sector Reform (SSR), 
according to the (OECD 2005), entails the reform of all security institutions 
and security management bodies.  This refers to the ability of restructuring the 
security institutions that have emerged from  an authoritarian past and post 
conflict regimes. Supporting this view, OECD (2005:16) contends that “it is 
also the ability of the state through its policies and programmes to generate 
conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed and 
to see to it that it uses a range of policy instruments to prevent or address 
security threats that affect society‟s well-being”.  The African Union 
Commission claims that:  
“TSS/SSR refers to the process by which countries formulate or re-
orient the policies, structures and capacities of institutions and groups, 
engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, 
efficient and responsive to democratic control and to the security and 
justice needs of the people.   
 
TSS is sometimes expressed as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security 
Sector Governance (SSG), Security Sector Development (SSD) as well 
as Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR)”  (African Union, 
2010:6). 
 
4 
   
Transformation of the Security Sector (TSS), or Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
definitions vary. The United Kingdom‟s Department for International 
Development (DFID) defines TSS/SSR “as helping developing countries 
improve accountability and transparency of the security sector. On the other 
hand, a recent contribution to security and defence issues defines TSS/SSR as 
right-sizing, re-orientation, reform and capacity building of national security 
organisations”. The overall objective is to create a secure environment that is 
conducive to democracy and development (Chuter, 2006).     
 
It must be noted, however, that the terms Security Sector Reform and 
Transformation of the Security Sector are interchangeably used in this study.  
Nevertheless, the main theme and focus is weighted on the term TSS.  Such a 
task in newly democratic states may require new sets of values among political 
leaders as well as throughout the ranks of security institutions (Chuter, 2006 
and OECD, 2005). 
 
1.3 Evolution of the Transformation of the Security Sector (TSS)/Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) Paradigm 
 
The TSS or SSR concept has been in existence for the past decade.  It refers to 
a relatively new but key process for developing a healthy political environment 
for countries emerging from post conflict and authoritarian rule.  Although the 
concept has  and continues to occupy a central place on the agenda of most 
African countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Godspeed, 2007). It must be noted, 
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arguably, that the concept has been influenced by the Western donor countries 
whose motives have been different.  In other words, the concept is still new to 
many African government officials and political leaders (OECD, 2005).   
 
In agreement with this view, Bendix and Stanley (2008) observe that the TSS 
process has been undertaken in order to improve earlier political constraints on 
security related issues derived from post-authoritarian rule as is the case with 
Malawi.  Supporting this view, Bendix and Stanley (2008:10) assert that “TSS 
is intended not simply to enhance the efficiency of the security institutions and 
security management bodies, but also to ensure that they conform to standards 
of legality, transparency and accountability in a democracy”.  At the same 
time, it ensures that there is a balance between security concerns, and the need 
for secrecy and the much needed access and right to information in a 
democracy.   
 
Hutchful and Fayemi (2005) observe that transformation of the security sector 
may well extend beyond the narrower traditional security focus on defence, 
intelligence and policing. According to them “the security system should 
include judicial and penal institutions, as well as the elected and duly 
appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight. Even where 
new concepts such as „transformation of security sector‟ and „security sector 
reform‟ are entering the security discourse, understanding by governments on 
how they can use these concepts remains a challenge.  It is therefore the 
responsibility of the state to transform the police, military, intelligence 
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services, the legal and judicial sector and the legislature.  Hence, the complex 
questions of a political and security nature must be dealt with in a 
comprehensive manner” (OECD, 2005:71).  Arguably, when the security 
sector is not transformed and is not well coordinated as a security entity, the 
executive is bound to make ad-hoc and disjointed security related decisions 
especially in times of crisis (OECD, 2005).  
 
Born and Fluri (2010:124) furthermore,  point out that, “an unreformed 
security sector lacks transparency especially in arms procurement, 
professionalism is non-existent and most often there is political abuse of 
security services. For instance, they can be used for domestic spying purposes, 
such as manipulating and targeting political enemies”. 
 
Contemporary studies of Sierra Leone and Uganda reveal that these frailties 
continue to take centre stage in Africa where ruling elites are still wedded to 
traditional security-oriented paradigms (Ngari 1995 & Danfulani 1998).  Other 
scholars argue that „security roles‟ cannot be viewed solely through the lens of 
state requirements and state interests.  In many instances, while the security 
sector of a country is charged with a responsibility of delivering services to the 
public, very little attention is directed by the state to understanding how the 
security institutions are affected when political changes take place 
(Matshabaphala, 2008).  As a result, those levels of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in the delivery of services to the society and the state have been 
negatively affected (Shemella, 2006). 
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Most security actors in African governments are still rhetorically committed to 
defence against outside threats and internal threats from dissidents. They are 
therefore still tempted to hunt for such threats. Chuter (2007) argues that 
changing this mental habit from the usual routine search for threats to the 
identification of tasks is hard. This does not just happen in a vacuum but may 
often be attributed to the organisational culture that pre-dominates the 
organisation and is also traced to the philosophy of leadership in the 
organisation.  Hence, security sector delivery-related concerns may also be as a 
result of leadership behaviour (Matshabaphala 2008). Shemella (2006) states 
that if a nation resolves to have effective security sector actors, the very next 
step should be to determine what roles such security actors should take as 
protectors of the society and the state.  Likewise the Malawian state has not 
managed to fulfil its security obligations since multiparty democracy in 1994 
as articulated in section 1.4. 
 
1.4 The Dynamics of Security Institutions in Malawi 
 
This section explores the historical background of security institutions in 
Malawi through different stages such as  the colonial, post independence, one-
party state and multi-party era.  This is deliberately provided to enhance 
understanding of the historical context of TSS, and in appreciation of the roles 
of the security institutions in Malawi. Malawi, previously called a British 
Protectorate and later Nyasaland, situated on the Eastern and Southern part of 
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the African continent, is surrounded by three large countries: Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Mozambique (See Appendix 6). The country has witnessed 
considerable conflicts and threats throughout its history, at the hands of  Arab 
slave traders, colonial rulers, and indigenous authoritarian rulers after attaining 
independence in 1964 (Mandiza 2002). 
1.4.1 The Colonial Era 
 
The origins of security institutions in Malawi (The Army, Police and 
Intelligence) date back to between 1891 and 1898 for the Nyasaland Army and 
1921 for the Nyasaland Police and Intelligence services.  During this period, 
security agencies in Malawi were mainly used to serve the interests of colonial 
rulers rather than the legitimate security needs of society.  Studies both in 
Malawi and other African countries have pointed to the fact that security 
institutions in Africa have been abused by colonial rulers. For example, 
according to Ngari (1995) and Dafulani (1998) the security agencies were 
mainly conceived for tasks in the wars of pacification against dissenting 
traditional rulers, a function that would today be considered undemocratic, non 
core security business and abuse of office. The Police and the Army then 
helped discipline workers on European-owned estates.  They also enforced 
racial discrimination to perpetuate the inferiority complex of Africans.  During 
this period of colonial governance, there were no legislative and executive 
bodies to pass laws and discharge executive functions in the security sector. 
Due to the absence of the two bodies above, the security institutions in Malawi 
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then undermined the levels of organisational behaviour, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the delivery of services to the society (Mandiza, 2002). 
1.4.2 The Post-Independence Period and One Party Rule 
 
From 1964 to 1994, security institutions in Malawi were influenced by a 
patrimonial political system.  Apart from the Malawi Police Service and the 
Malawi Defence Force, other paramilitary security institutions were conceived, 
such as the Malawi Young Pioneers. During this period, the post independence 
constitution provided for the establishment of parliament and an executive 
authority headed by the Prime Minister.  Thus the creation of security forces at 
the time was to defend and be used in the enforcement of law and order 
respectively.  However, the roles and missions of the security agencies 
continued to serve the interests of those in power.  Security institutions have 
been the most effective tool of the state in carrying out acts of repression.  For 
example, during the one-party rule in Malawi soon after the cabinet crisis in 
1964, Dr. H.K. Banda became a dictator and was made president for life in 
1971.  During this period he summarily detained government officials and 
politicians who were suspected to be aspiring to succeed him.  Accordingly, 
his control mechanism was the creation of other parallel security agencies such 
as the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the Youth League (YL) and the Special 
Branch (SB) of Malawi Police.  These security actors were tools of the state 
that carried out untold atrocities such as acts of brutality, violence and 
detention without trial.  The loyalty of the security actors remained very much 
with the Head of State or the ruling party (Lwanda 1993). 
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1.4.3 The Multiparty Era 
 
Malawi, like many other African countries, has during the last twenty years 
undergone a transition to democracy which has extensively changed the 
political landscape extensively.  This has affected the security sector.  
However, during the past twenty years of Malawi‟s inclusive democratic 
government (1994-2014), not much effort seems to have been made in order to 
reform the security sector. This laxity has not produced a smooth progress.  
The study therefore explores the roles played by various actors in the security 
sector in fields of defence, public safety and security, intelligence, foreign and 
justice fields in a democratic state.  As noted by the OECD (2005:23), “in 
developing a nationally-owned concept of security and  an appropriate 
institutional framework, states require to undergo total transformation so as not 
to handle development and security issues as distinct but  as integrated areas of 
public action”. 
 
This has not been the case since 1994 in Malawi where the state itself became 
a source of threat to the citizenry instead of protecting them.  For instance, in 
1999 some military officers and soldiers from the Malawi Defence Force were 
manipulated by political authorities and attacked and destroyed a media 
printing office belonging to the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) an opposition 
political party.  In the same year the Young Democrats (YD), a political  youth 
wing of the then ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) political party 
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harassed and beat members of Parliament of the opposition on several 
occasions, especially during political rallies of the ruling party. 
 
The advent of multiparty democracy in Malawi in 1994 could have brought the 
need for political authorities to reform the security institutions to conform with 
democratic principles. However this did not occur as suggested by Ball and 
Fayemi (2003). The concept of TSS combines security governance, “elements 
of national security, economic development and basic human rights with the 
objective of protecting Malawians from violence and abuse.  While protecting 
the state and its citizens from external aggression remains a major 
consideration, the most serious threats facing Malawi and many other African 
countries at the beginning of the 21
st
 century tend to be those that either derive 
from internal causes or are transnational and collective in nature” (Ball and 
Fayemi 2003).  The current constitution contains an extensive inclusion of the 
human rights clauses to be enjoyed by the citizens of Malawi, and include 
functions of the different security agencies and departments, yet irregularities 
continue to persist (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1999).  
 
Administratively from 1994 to 2014, the country has experienced the removal 
of civil servants from top positions, particularly from the judiciary and 
executive, especially those who did not get along well with government ideas 
or directives.  The rule of law is once again being challenged by the very 
leadership who took an oath to uphold it.  A recent review of these and other 
issues such as those of an independent judiciary, a free press or free television 
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and radio suffer from absolute control and monopoly by government 
(Kanyongolo 2006).  As long as individual political leaders are key to absolute 
control over the security sector and as long as it is seen as a means of building 
and sustaining power, real protection of the people of Malawi remains elusive.  
The security of the state and the people will remain a closed system and 
compromised in a transitional democracy like Malawi (Ball et al 2003). 
 
In agreement with this observation Bala (2008) asserts that transformation of 
the security sector (TSS) and civil military relations (CMR) both maintain one 
of the important issues facing the security services in countries transitioning to 
democracy. These are legacies from the former culture, and behaviour of the 
security actors who routinely abused human rights, and evoked fear throughout 
a population.  TSS is deeply interested in establishing new institutions, 
structures and legislation that foster democratic values.   
On the other hand CMR would be more concerned with the achievements of 
democratic procedures of oversight and transparency. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
 
Whilst the practices associated with multiparty democracy have grown 
considerably over the past twenty years, total transformation of the security 
sector in Malawi is far from what really constitutes good security governance. 
Security institutions are not governed, funded and made in order to translate 
the new concepts of security into strategies, policies and programmes. The 
indication is that democratic transition (1994-2014) in Malawi did not take into 
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account carrying through a TSS process due to lack of political will and the 
lack of knowledge or expertise of the executive or the legislature.  
 
Following this failure to embrace transformation a number of security 
challenges have emerged during this period; frequent changes of leadership 
and command in the security sector from the time the country became a 
multiparty democracy.  For instance the post of a Chief of the Malawi Defence 
Force has changed nine times while that of the police service has changed 
seven times.  The chiefs of the various security institutions have a tendency of 
presenting security issues to the highest order individually rather than 
collectively. 
 
The general expectation of the public in Malawi at that time was that in view 
of changes in government from one party rule to multiparty democracy in 
1994, there was going to be a corresponding transformation in security 
governance and perhaps by now the country should have achieved good 
progress in transforming.  On the contrary this has not been the case.  There 
has been lack of transparency and abuse of the security services by the 
politicians for example, using intelligence services, Malawi Police Services 
and paramilitary units to intimidate and harass civil society or neutralise 
political opposition parties. 
 
Due to lack of transformation of the security sector, many challenges have 
emerged.  For example, security has been single-handedly controlled by the 
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elite, and have to some extent has been compromised because of lack of policy 
and legal frameworks, lack of political will and/or lack of knowledge by those 
who are in charge. 
 
An investigation is therefore needed to determine the extent to which transition 
to democracy was accompanied by a transformation process of the security 
institutions and management bodies in Malawi.  This should provide 
knowledge and insight to those in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary 
and the society who are the major players and are rightfully placed to initiate 
and encourage government to implement change. There appears to have been 
no such desire by government and the society in Malawi to carry out that kind 
of debate that would help the security sector transform. Arguably, it is 
important that the following security issues should be taken into account by all 
Malawians to improve national security strategy; the political leadership 
should be able to fulfil specific functions such as review of overarching 
national security policy framework; similarly develop institutions and 
procedures to give civil oversight of the Security Sector; in addition improve 
hierarchy structures and processes that promote the efficient and effective 
management of the defence and security issues (Ball et al 2003). 
 
The discourse on security problems may have started as early as the colonial 
era but has become more prominent in the last twenty years due to the advent 
of political pluralism in Malawi.  In this regard, clearly defining roles and 
missions is fundamental to the structuring of Malawi‟s security establishment 
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and to decision-making regarding the governance and management of the 
security sector in a democracy. 
 
The theme to be examined in this research is how Malawi‟s senior security 
officers, senior security management officials, and political leadership in the 
various security institutions understand the importance of transformation of the 
security sector in a democracy. Whether their leadership style, management, 
and administrative ethos of the institutions conform to political determinants 
such as acknowledgements of the principles of civil supremacy, oversight and 
control, and adherence to the principles and practices of accountability, 
transparency and coordinated work activities among security agencies and 
security management bodies in a democracy (Chutter 2000).  
 
All of the above should be qualified by realities of political changes that have 
taken place. From the researcher‟s experience, having served as an army 
officer in the Malawi Defence Force, from 1976 to 2003, most senior 
government officials, members of parliament and even the executive interacted 
with displayed burden of not understanding the potential impact of political 
changes upon which the security sector should undergo transformation process.   
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1.6 Purpose Statement 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the understanding of various 
security actors of their roles in an emerging democracy like Malawi and to 
establish the extent to which security institutions are transforming to the 
demands of multiparty democracy. 
1.6.1 Research Questions 
 
(a) What is the political relationship between the elected authorities, 
security practitioners and the civil society for enabling TSS in Malawi? 
(b) How effective are human practices and cultural norms of the elected 
authorities, security practitioners and the civil society to enable TSS in 
Malawi? 
(c) What are the constraints to transformation of the security sector in 
Malawi? 
(d) What are the strategies for the enabling transformation of the security 
sector in Malawi? 
 
The foregoing background raises a number of national security policy related 
issues regarding protection of the country and its citizenry.  One important 
question is; in the twenty years of a multiparty democracy, has Malawi made 
considerable progress in the reinforcement of TSS, when it is well known that 
before 1994 the authoritarian rule system relied for many years on repressive 
security system.  The starting point in answering the questions raised is to 
understand the characteristics of the security actors, their mission and roles. 
17 
   
1.6.2 Specific Objectives 
 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
(a) To examine political relationships (and organisation character) between 
the security actors and the elected authorities and civil power in Malawi 
for enabling transformation processes between 1994 and 2014. 
(b) To assess human resource practices and cultural norms of security 
actors enabling transformation processes in Malawi between 1994 and 
2014. 
(c) To determine the main constraints to transformation of the security 
sector in Malawi. 
(d) To establish the strategies that have been developed for the 
implementation of transformation of the security sector in Malawi. 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
The study will contribute to a body of knowledge in TSS process that will, if 
adopted improve the understanding and commitment of the elected authorities 
to enable the process take place.  The information generated from the study 
will be used to inform stakeholders on management and governance of security 
organisations and shall assist government, policy makers and civil society to 
dialogue, working out “procedures for greater democratic accountability, 
transparency and control over the security sector and to integrate the security 
system into wider government planning and good practice” (Ball et al 2003). 
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1.8 Arrangement of Chapters 
The study is organised in seven chapters.  Chapter one is an introduction to 
background information, problem statement, the purpose and aim of the study.   
 
In order to explore this phenomenon further chapter one also presents a picture 
of the security institutions during the colonial era, post independence and in a 
democratic transition in particular.  Some highlights of security institutions 
activities focussing on the mission and roles are presented. 
 
Chapter two presents scholarly insights of TSS in general and Malawi in 
particular.  It is argued in this chapter that the dualistic nature of the terms SSR 
and TSS has contributed to misconceptions of security governance that are 
observed today in a democratic transition.  Furthermore, where democratic 
transitions are not consolidated the chances of having TSS conducted is a 
daunting task.  It is this pattern of TSS that motivates the study.   
 
Chapter three analyses some of the key comparative and theoretical issues in 
the literature. The theoretical frameworks, lend considerable empirical 
evidence to explaining transformation of the Security Sector in democratic 
transitions for countries like Malawi (Tompkins 2005). 
 
In chapter four a social constructivism approach is adopted in addressing 
processes of interaction among participants.  The social constructivism 
approach provides an opportunity to “claim knowledge through alternative 
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processes and sets of assumptions formed through interacting with participants 
and through historical and cultural norms that operate in participant‟s lives”. 
(Creswell 2003:8).  In this chapter emphasis on the importance of within-case 
analysis is presented by employing process tracing in social science 
methodology as complementary rather than competitive (George & Bennett 
2005).  Due to limited availability of secondary data, a survey was conducted 
to collect primary data.  The data collected is presented in chapter five. 
 
Chapter five contains results from qualitative analysis as well as statistical 
analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software.  
The statistical analysis was adopted to ascertain numerical values and tables 
which expanded the scope of data interpretation. 
 
Chapter six presents a discussion on theorising how the findings have 
answered the research questions and objectives of the study.  The results 
support the hypothesis that TSS is important in explaining change in security 
organisations and management bodies in a democratic government.  
Nevertheless, the results further reveal that change can only occur when the 
government in power accepts and practices democratic norms and values in the 
transitional phase of democracy. 
 
Chapter seven contains an outline of conclusions on controversies, 
implications and suggestions for further research in the future. 
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1.9. Conclusion 
Chapter one has introduced the evolution of the TSS/SSR phenomenon in the 
21
st
 century.  Insights into the trends and implications of TSS for countries in 
transition from conflict and authoritarian to democracy, particularly in Malawi 
have been highlighted.  Likewise Malawi in a democratic transition is facing 
similar challenges with respect to transformation of the security sector between 
1994 and 2014.  This suggests that there is lack of transformation and yet the 
country claims to be in a transition to democracy.  The study provides an 
opportunity to explore further and to understand the link between TSS and 
transition to democratic in Malawi.  The following chapter places the issue of 
security institutions in a multiparty democracy into context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the literature review is to explore scholarly insight into TSS or 
SSR and governance of security organisations in a democratic state.  The study 
intends to explore TSS in relation to political, cultural, human and 
organisational effectiveness.  Ball and Fayemi (2004:4) assert that “the process 
of changing the security sector can be described as security sector reform 
(SSR). Arguably, reform process tends to be incremental in dealing with 
significant institutional weaknesses.  Reforms may change the appearance of 
the organisation without fundamentally altering its character.” 
 
Ball et al (2004:4) emphasises that the term “reform has many negative 
political connotations in democratically – inclined communities in 
Africa.  Politically, it is often associated with the implementation of 
policy decisions by the executive from above without an attempt to 
secure the broader participation of the masses and consultation with the 
legislation or non state actors.  While the term transformation entails a 
more profound intent on behalf of elected governments to ensure that the 
practices of the security institutions are consistent with democracies they 
serve.” 
 
Likewise Bendix and Stanley (2008) point out that reform projects have been 
carried out in over 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000.   Amongst 
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these the majority were conducted in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone) 
East Africa, (Kenya and Tanzania) and Southern African (Malawi, Zambia, 
Botswana and South Africa).  Ironically this has been a hot subject of debate 
although donor involvement has been of limited scope.  Bendix and Stanley 
(2008) assert that “most programmes seem not to reflect the holistic approach 
and the differences in donor involvement attest to this fact.” Thus the trickling 
donor support has not helped the recipient African nations improve in security 
governance as could be desired.  However, some of the programmes have been 
successful notably Sierra Leone in West Africa, and South Africa in Southern 
Africa as articulated in Appendix 10.  In this respect, transformation of the 
security sector according to Bendix and Stanley (2008) “remains a concept 
with innovative and emancipatory potential. Its emphasis on participation, 
transparency, accountability and the provision of security for all within the rule 
of law is very important for the development of a country.  The transformation 
process should be supportive of the role and tasks that the different security 
institutions are mandated to execute.” 
2.2 Relevance of Transformation of the Security Sector in a Democracy 
 
This section begins with a discussion of the relevance of transformation of the 
security sector in a democracy and some suggestions on how to conceptualise 
it. Transformation runs deeper than reform or change.  A government may 
change security officers or officials in key positions, or change the names of 
security institutions, but that does not achieve meaningful transformation.  
Reform has limits but transformation is limitless since it stems from an 
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evolving discovery and expression of the authentic leadership of the executive.  
It requires that leadership attention should match intentions.  The leadership 
should focus on the protection of the nation and the safety of its citizenry.  
Transformation seeks to liberate the citizenry to aspire to their values and 
worth as nationals of a particular country.  Daszko and Sheinberg (2005:1) 
assert that “transformation has become a popular, overused and misunderstood 
word in [new democracies] in the twenty first century.  Likewise not many 
[leaders] understand transformation or why there is an imperative for 
transformation, not merely incremental or transitional change.  Transformation 
is  change in mindset, and based on learning a system of profound knowledge” 
as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: A System of Profound Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Deming (1986) 
 
 
Daszko et al (2005:4) claim that “transformation begins with the awakening by 
individuals within the organisation and it occurs with intention. This intention 
Systems thinking 
Theory of knowledge 
 
Understanding 
variation 
Theory of Psychology 
24 
   
provides constancy by choosing a course of action.  Without intention, there 
can be no transformation.  Likewise knowledge is obtained through learning 
and learning must be continual”. 
 
In support of this view, Born and Fluri (2010:124) assert that, a security sector 
which is not transformed “coincides with the concept of „poor governance.‟ 
This culminates in arbitrary policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies, 
unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil 
society unengaged in public life and widespread corruption.” 
Table 1. A reformed and not reformed security sector 
 Reformed Security Sector 
(Good Governance) 
Un-Reformed Security Sector 
(Poor Governance) 
Accountability Accountable to 
democratically elected 
leaders 
Un accountable to 
bureaucracies 
Arbitrary policy making 
Work ethos Professionalism, 
predictable execution of 
task  
Amateurism, political leaders 
cannot trust loyal execution of 
orders 
Norms  Transparency and 
dedication 
Nepotism, corruption, risk 
avoiding 
 
Source: Born and Fluri (2010) modified 
 
The researcher, while concurring with Velcu (2007), aims at examining issues 
surrounding transformation, security governance, integration of security work 
into development, professionalism, defence and security review of the security 
sector during political changes that have taken place in Malawi.  Examples will 
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be drawn from other countries and particularly South Africa that have 
attempted to develop effective and efficient governance systems for the 
security sector.  The inability to make this distinction clear, and to define the 
conditions under which the security sector should work together, has led 
governments to political instability.  The researcher argues that Malawi and 
many other African countries seeking to improve management of the security 
sector should adhere to core African principles for SSR and key elements of 
SSR programming (African Union 2010). 
 
According to Mlambo (2010:172)  
“the general objective of the AU SSR policy is to assist national 
governments so they will be best able to fulfil the following 
specific functions: 
“Protect all citizens from all forms of violence and insecurity 
defend the state, borders and national sovereignty and deal with 
criminal elements in society.  Likewise punish and rehabilitate 
offenders within the limits of International Law.  Furthermore, 
promote regional and continental peace and security, including 
peacekeeping. Equally importantly, deal with threats of internal 
and international terrorism and react to natural disasters, serious 
accidents and other national emergencies.” 
 
In support of this view Bryden & Olonisakin (2010:3) assert that “many 
African scholars and practitioners should emphasise the need for 
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transformation rather than reform as a point of departure for positive change in 
relation to the security sector and its governance in Africa”.  In a useful 
contribution to TSS or SSR debates, Van Nieuwkerk (2012) comments that 
there is potential for TSS or SSR in Africa (see Table 2 below). 
Table 2:  TSS in Transitional Democracies in Africa 
Authoritarian states Democratising states 
Conflict-
torn 
societies 
Failed 
states 
Societies undergoing 
conflict mediation 
Societies in 
transition to 
peace 
Post-conflict 
societies 
  conflict cessation: 
negotiations and 
cessation of 
hostilities  
Peacebuilding: 
Transition 
phase 
Peacebuilding: 
Consolidation 
phase 
Unmanageable                   ____________________________                 Major 
potential  
DRC 
Sudan, 
South Sudan, 
Nigeria? 
Chad, 
Somalia Madagascar, Egypt, 
Zimbabwe, Libya, 
Cote d‟ Ivoire, Tunisa 
Lesotho, Swaziland 
Rwanda, 
Burundi, 
Guinea-Bissau 
Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, 
South Africa, 
Mozambique, 
Angola‟ 
Source: Van Nieuwkerk (2010) 
 
Table 2 stipulates that transformation of the security sector would be necessary 
for most African countries in transitional democracy; in particular, those 
coming from authoritarian rule like Zimbabwe, Cote d‟Ivoire and Malawi. 
 
First, there should be progression towards conflict prevention and stability.  A 
security sector which is not transforming, often fails to prevent and more often 
causes violent conflict, for example Zimbabwe, D R Congo and in Malawi 
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recently on 20
th
 July 2011, whereby twenty Malawians were killed by police in 
a nation wide anti-government mass demonstrations, following a deepening 
economic crisis and bad governance. The uprising happened during the second 
term of power of Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika as President of the Republic of 
Malawi and the country was marred by many controversies, amongst them was 
resistance by government to devalue the Malawi Kwacha currency against 
local consumers interests. There was also biased public appointments and 
nepotism where the president handpicked people of his ethnic group to high 
positions in government such as Treasurer General, Reserve Bank Governor, 
Director of Malawi Revenue Authority, Director of National Intelligence and 
Inspector General of Police Service.  Furthermore the President was accused of 
abuse of political and economic governance while the country experienced 
shortage of foreign currency, and fuel for motor vehicles.   
 
The aggrieved citizens of Malawi led by Civil Society Organisations staged a 
peaceful demonstration in the five major cities of the country i.e. Zomba and 
Blantyre in the Southern Region, Lilongwe in the Central Region, Mzuzu and 
Karonga in the Northern Region.  The demonstrations were initially peacefully 
monitored by the police.  However, suddenly, there was tension between the 
demonstrators and the police.  The police fired teargas at first to stop the 
demonstration and the demonstrators started throwing stones. The police failed 
to contain the masses and then fired live bullets, killing 20 people in the 
process.  This has resulted in poor governance by government itself. A 
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transforming security sector has the responsibility to promote stability which is 
a basic condition for democratisation and economic development. 
 
The second reason for the transformation of the security sector is that it will 
contribute to sustainable economic development.  If it is not, International 
foreign and domestic investors will not be able to commit themselves to 
financial investments.   
 
Third reason is that it creates professionalism among different security officers 
thereby becoming a reliable and dedicated corps of service members.  
Furthermore more it becomes a security sector that manages the affairs of 
security on behalf of democratically elected political leaders.   
 
Lastly, the relationship between the political leadership and the security sector 
should be based on accountability and transparency. 
 
Malawi and other African countries are on democratic transitions.   The SSR 
has not necessarily culminated into transforming the security agencies, and 
security management bodies. Transformation or reform of the security sector is 
relevant in a democracy because it supports states and societies to develop 
effective, accountable and efficient security institutions and practices.  
Transformation of the security sector in Africa can arise in different contexts: 
post-conflict societies, fragile states, and transitions to democracy from 
authoritarian rule as was the situation in Malawi. Transformation of the 
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security sector therefore is one of the pillars for  peace and stability, rule of law 
and good governance.  
 
Good security governance requires a country to undertake a fundamental 
transformation of relations between the civil authorities and the security 
organisations. Such transformation should occur within the framework of a 
democratic transition. Much has been said by scholars that in most African 
countries undergoing transitional democracy, executive authority is weak, 
institutions are unstable and leadership lacking probity. 
 
In a useful contribution to debates on democracy, Ulfeder and Lustic (2005:2) 
citing Collier and Adock (1999) argue that “how the [political authority] 
understand and operationalise democracy can and should depend in part on 
what they are going to do with it.  A state will move in the direction or the 
other representing the presence or absence of democracy”.  Likewise, Ulfeder 
and Lustic (2005:8) further assert that “prospects for a transition from 
autocracy to democracy, is contingent upon a country‟s political life course.  
Some democracies are far more likely to break down when participation in 
national politics is not forthcoming”. 
 
Therefore it can hardly be expected that the security sector can understand and 
undertake transformation process.  Much as the concept of transformation of 
the security sector (TSS) or security sector reform (SSR) and other 
terminologies are common in other countries, Malawi is not familiar with 
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them.  There is limited understanding of the concept in developing countries, 
though the principles which underpin it are not alien to many (OECD 2005).   
 
A coordinated, multi-agency reform approach is yet to establish itself in the 
official African security discourse.  At the moment, TSS is seen in specific 
institutional terms, for example Malawi Police Service (MPS) reform in 2002, 
characterised by few linkages across other security institutions, let alone 
linkages to oversight institutions or civilian agencies.  The public perception of 
any improvement in the MPS is a challenge because the programme was 
influenced by donors and did not finish as planned (OECD 2005 and Van de 
Spuy 2009). 
 
What this may suggest is that while various forms of transformation of the 
security sector may have been attempted or are in progress, these may not 
really mean realisation of total transformation of the security sector. The most 
important issue to point out is that transformation of the security sector (TSS) 
calls “for dialogue between political parties, civil society organisations and  
security institutions themselves” as was the case in South Africa and Sierra 
Leone. TSS should be made part of democratic processes and practices and not 
as a separate entity.  Only then, will it become an acceptable practice and a 
legitimate product.   However very little information is available on TSS in 
print, electronic format and other media in Malawi and Africa.  These 
shortcomings spring from the lack of human resource capacity as much as the 
result of inherent limitations of the TSS concept itself (OECD 2005).   
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The security sector exists to serve the public interest and it is essential that it 
performs its duty in an appropriate manner.  For example, it is unprofessional 
and unethical for the police to watch citizens being beaten by ruling political 
party supporters or officials.  Similarly, it is unprofessional for security 
agencies to be serving state functions and interests most of the time. Desirably 
security personnel should be conveniently allocated and assigned roles 
according to their expertise and for the common good.  The interests of all 
citizens are served when the security sector uses resources prudently, operates 
efficiently and addresses society‟s problems effectively (Tompkins, 2005).  
According to Cawthra (2008:3), “traditions of one party governance and 
authoritarianism have run deep in most African countries. This is an old pattern 
of behaviour, where the party is supreme and profoundly entrenched.  In many 
countries there is lack of military and security professionalism, with soldiers 
and other security personnel violating human rights; carrying out abuses in 
support of particular political causes or self-interest.”   
 
In agreement with the above observation Chuter (2006:2) notes that 
“security in a democracy should have two major 
characteristics: It should provide the security that people want 
as effectively and efficiently as possible and be managed with 
the procedures normally used in a parliamentary democracy”.  
Furthermore, Chuter elaborates that transformation requires 
astitute management for it to be successful.  It is essential that 
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three crucial mission success factors are acknowledged during 
the transformation process: Providing decisive and strategic 
leadership over the process itself, ensuring that high level of 
legitimacy accrue to the process and determining the scope of 
the transformation process itself. 
 
For good practice on TSS, in agreement with Chuter, Goodspeed (2007),  notes 
that there are general features that will be associated with TSS/SSR; culture, 
the political environment, external influences and history.  These may in each 
country produce own unique set of circumstances.  Consequently, what follows 
is an identification of TSS/SSR key principles for the process as articulated in 
Appendix 9. 
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2.3 The South African and Malawi experience of TSS in a Democratic       
Transition 
 
This section presents empirical literature for a comparative analysis of regime 
transition in Malawi and South Africa, and identifies factors to explain 
outcomes of TSS that have occurred under different circumstances. 
 
Malawi and South Africa have emanated from authoritarian rule to democratic 
transition in 1994 and seem to have approached TSS processes differently.  
The purpose is to share the experience as it might relate to the challenges that 
face countries in dissolution from authoritarian rule to a universal democratic 
state. 
 
According to Africa (2011) the changed political conditions of South Africa in 
1994 made it possible for government to place the transformation of the 
security sector on the political agenda.  This was due to the formation of the 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in 1993.  The TEC Act of 1993 created 
a multiparty system of collective governance to facilitate the transition.  
Similarly, it was in this act where detailed guidelines were provided for the 
management of the security organs. On the contrary, in Malawi during the 
political change process, the multiparty groups such as United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) never considered a time 
frame and modes of transforming the security sector.  The government which 
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came into power in 1994 did not create a climate for the reconstruction of the 
security forces and services as was the case in South Africa. 
 
Kanyongolo (2012) asserts that in Malawi the government retained many old 
security regulations, for instance the Official Secrets Act (1913), the 
Preservation of Public Security Act (1960) and the Protected Places and Areas 
Act (1960), which are still not amended to suit the multiparty system of 
collective governance for free political participation of the citizenry. 
Furthermore Kanyongolo (2006:27) notes “that after breaking with the one 
party system established in 1966, the 1994 constitution of Malawi included a 
comprehensive bill of rights and created an environment conducive to 
transforming the security sector regulations.” Arguably, statutes and customary 
laws that violate the constitution and international law have been left 
untouched. 
 
The people must be guaranteed their fundamental rights, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of access to courts and the right of access to information.  
While the main and important issue was a political process, however, it was 
not inclusive of security actors.  In South Africa, TEC had specific time frames 
and a number of responsibilities to tackle within the period stipulated for the 
transformation process of the security sector.   
 
Soon after 1994, as Africa (2011:11) asserts, “the post-apartheid 
transformation process of security institutions presented a good practice of 
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participatory and locally owned TSS.  Other actors, such as policy researchers, 
academics, and non-governmental organisations also played an important role 
and had a positive impact.” Furthermore, Africa (2011:11) contends that 
“South Africa went beyond mere reform to transform the security sector by 
taking steps to consult the public about the role of the security sector and 
placing the human security and development at the centre of its national 
security framework.  For instance Participants included security scholars, 
military and civilian defence officials, parliamentarians and civil society 
actors”. 
 
Africa further elaborated that all of the aspects above were challenged during 
the negotiations for a new dispensation and the process leading to the reform of 
the security sector TEC.  
 
Similarly, Africa (2008:186) adds that the “overall picture that emerges in the 
case of South Africa is one of on-going engagement by a number of local 
actors in transitional TSS efforts.  The South African government crafted an 
inclusive and resilient constitutional and legislative framework for its post-
apartheid security dispensation.”   
 
Nevertheless the immediate post – authoritarian/apartheid rule of the security 
sectors in the two countries, still represented the legacy of old oppressive 
security institutions of government.  However, in South Africa security 
services have been influenced to the sphere of security, subject to political 
control.  Furthermore, the government has defined clear and limited   mandates 
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for the different security institutions in order to avoid overlap and duplication. 
In Malawi, the security services have not undergone TSS. The framework for 
the transformation of the security forces is not defined in the constitution.  The 
multiparty working groups mentioned above did not debate and address the 
future of the security sector in a democratic state. Likewise political 
organisations did not make transitional arrangements to lay the basis for 
negotiations to embark on a TSS process for all security organisations and 
management bodies.   
 
Most political organisations never thought that the security actors needed to be 
directed towards a consensual transformation process in order to conform with 
democratic norms of a new multiparty type of government.  As a result there 
was no legal framework or a measure of cooperation between the former ruling 
political party, the new government and the states security institutions.  Instead 
the new government replaced heads of security institutions.  Similarly the new 
government on the other hand never made use of its access to the levels of 
power to initiate an entry point to embark on TSS process in Malawi. Likewise 
there was no healthy space that allowed the Malawian citizenry to voice out the 
demand for their security institutions to reform.  The failure to reform and 
restructure security institutions has served as an indication of regression for the 
transition of the state infrastructure as a whole.  For instance, until now, the 
intelligence services structure is unclear and unconsolidated in terms of its 
missions and duties.  It operates under the decree of the president and it has 
changed names three times and removed the heads of the service five times.  
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Nevertheless the period under review should have been a period of great 
reconciliation in all aspects of life after 30 years of dictatorship. 
 
The first task in South Africa was the transformation of the defence force 
during which eight different armies were integrated into a national defence 
force; the integration of the Police and Intelligence services whereby White 
Papers on Intelligence (1994) and Defence (1995) were adopted by Parliament 
respectively. Defence and security policies have now become processes that 
are managed in open and consultative manner incorporating parliament, the 
civil sector of government, military, police, intelligence services and civil 
society. 
 
In agreement with the views of OECD (2005:77) “the South African approach 
amply demonstrates the power and possibilities of the concept.  It does not 
only redefine the traditional concept of security but also transforms the very 
basis and ethics of public policy”. 
 
Many scholars contend for the importance of institutional development.  The 
focus in South Africa was placed on personnel as well as on formal structures.  
Successful TSS or SSR therefore requires acceptance of change across rank 
and units. Van Nieuwkerk (2009:100) citing Lowndes (1996) adds that 
“institutions display some important key characteristics such as: a set of formal 
rules which structures social action; change and stability which are stages in an 
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institutional life cycle; and a strategic action which plays an important role in 
driving change.” 
 
The challenge in South Africa was the transformation of all defence and 
security institutions and agencies and the formation of various parliamentary 
security committees for oversight.  The 1994 white paper defines the roles of 
the new security sector actors and agencies with the “overall focus being to 
ensure the security and stability of the state and the safety and well-being of its 
citizens”.  An example in the case of South Africa is the intelligence sector. 
According to Africa (2008)  
“the new agencies of the intelligence sector are overseen by two key 
committees:  the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence 
(CCSI), which directs security policy and the National Intelligence 
Committee (NICOC) which oversees the coordination of the services 
and any investigations.   In the case of the South Africa National 
Defence Force (SANDF), intelligence responsibility flows through the 
SANDF Chief of Staff and the defence secretary in consultation with 
the Minister of Defence to the President.  They also have within 
parliament, the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI). 
Despite creating a commendable system in terms of legislation; the 
implementation has not been that perfect. It also became evident that 
transforming the police without addressing the weaknesses of the 
justice system in South Africa was unlikely to be sustainable”.   
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After a few years of TSS implementation, the programme had contributed by 
ensuring that there was an accessible and effective justice system. It is now 
evident that the entire security sector in South Africa is being managed in a 
different manner from those patterns that applied in the apartheid era.  The 
partisan nature of apartheid policy on security required abolition.  For example, 
security strategies were formulated by a select group of cabinet ministers and 
security officials, excluding parliament and the public, from effective 
participation (Chuter 2007 and OECD 2007).  In any democracy, the role of 
the parliament and the public is vital; supporting the views of N‟Diaye 
(2010:211) “a genuine democracy is inconceivable without parliament or its 
functional equivalent playing its legislative and oversight roles. Similarly, it is 
difficult to imagine a security sector functioning according to democratic 
principles and norms without parliamentary involvement and oversight.” 
 
In a democracy, the constitution of the country must stipulate that the 
parliament has the power to determine by law the general organisation of the 
defence and security of the country. N‟Diaye (2010:211) further elaborates 
“conditions for effective parliamentary oversight of the security sector”. There 
must be; Clearly defined constitution and legal powers such as sound 
customary practices, sufficient resources and established expertise, and 
demonstrated political will. During the apartheid era this was not the case as 
articulated above. 
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In this section there is empirical evidence to show that Malawi and South 
Africa took a different stand about transforming the Security Sector from 1994.  
This underscores decisive differences in how much the dissolution of 
authoritarian regimes influence the transition process of the new democratic 
states.  Likewise comparative inferences can be made regarding differences 
across the two cases, of Malawi and South Africa (Ulfeder and Lustik 2005). 
Chuter (2000:7) asserts that “every country‟s experience and every country‟s 
starting point are different.  But in almost all cases, transformation has its 
origins in the decline and fall of the Cold War system and the consequences 
which followed from that.” 
 
2.4 TSS Process Clusters for Good Practice 
 
This part of chapter two presents empirical evidence of transformation of the 
security sector process found in the current body of literature.  According to 
Chuter (2000:1) there are “four major transformation clusters which can be 
determined within the management of any security transformation process: 
Cultural, human, political and organisational”. 
 
2.4.1 Cultural Transformation Perspective 
 
In terms of the cultural transformation process, the study analyses the culture 
of the institution, management, people‟s attitudes and administrative ethos of 
the institution. 
41 
   
 
(a) Culture of the institution 
 
The concept of culture is drawn from the anthropological approach and is used 
to describe a set of norms and values that underlie a social system.  This refers 
to the unique configuration of norms, values, beliefs and ways of behaviour 
that characterise the manner in which security institutions and oversight 
management bodies may  combine to get things done (Hull 1995, Burnes 
2000).  The importance of viewing the security sector from a cultural 
perspective is that it introduces the idea of shared values and beliefs which 
provide the glue that binds the security members together in a common cause 
and determines the levels of commitments and performance.  It must be noted 
that the culture of the security sector is typically based on values such as 
courage, obedience, integrity, stamina and selfless service, as Maslowski 
(1990) describes in his study cited in Malan (1994).   
 
Malan argues that these values hold no intrinsic threat of the survival of a 
democracy.  It is only when these values are promoted through the deliberate 
or implicit denigration of alternative values that the security sector becomes 
intolerant of the political process.  Handy (1999) describes the change in 
culture of security institutions from the culture in Victorian times, where 
subordinates received orders without questioning.  In many African countries, 
top management of the security sector still advocate Victorian leadership.  
Therefore, there is a good reason to advocate transformation of the 
organisational culture in a democracy.  Managers of the security sector should 
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develop consensus among the lower ranks regarding the development of a new 
culture, in recognition of political changes.  However, within the weave of 
culture there are sub-cultures.  The cultures in question are organisational 
culture, social service culture and corporate culture (Matshabaphala 2008). 
 
In this study, cultural transformation refers to something that develops and 
evolves organically over time to an organisation, which provides structural 
stability and integrates values and norms into observable patterns in the social 
and political dimensions of work. As Hull (1995) notes, cultural transformation 
is described in impressionistic and imprecise ways. It is not rigorously defined 
for it is something that is perceived or felt.  Cultural transformation reflects the 
personality and beliefs of the organisations‟ leadership. In the security sector, 
cultural transformation may be widely viewed as conservative, stabilizing 
forces that function to resist rather than facilitate change. Most of the security 
sector elements in African governments may be weak and artificial, suffering a 
hangover from colonial structures. They have the same old regulations, 
obsolete equipment and lack financial resources and internal coherence. They 
are simply the continuation of the colonial legacy, marching to their own 
drums, with expectations that they will continue in much the same way despite 
political transformation taking place. This study will probe the security sector 
and the executive in Malawi about political education, the level of elite 
coherence and adequate quality of individual top leadership (Tompkins 2005 
and Clapham 2001).  
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(i) The Social Service Culture 
 
According to Kotler and Andreasen (1996) cited in Matshabaphala (2008) the 
social service culture is often associated with lack of delivery and maintenance 
and deterioration of services.  In the security organisation‟s life, there is a 
tendency to overlook issues and build a close sense of camaraderie in the 
organisation.  The problem with this type of culture in the security sector 
services is that some soldiers or police officers behave in a manner as if they 
are untouchables.  The top management sometimes just transfers the 
wrongdoers to another station when it comes to taking disciplinary action.  
This type of culture tends to erode the organisation.  The existence of such 
culture obviously cannot be taken for granted when the process of 
democratisation demands a fundamental social service as well as cultural 
transformation within the security sector (Malan, 1994). 
 
(ii) Corporate culture 
 
This sub-culture is developed through leadership and the improvement in the 
delivery of services.  Burnes (2000) describes this type of culture as project 
oriented; the onus is on getting the job in hand done rather than prescribing 
how it should be done.  Such type of culture is appropriate to organically 
structured organisations such as in the security sector, where flexibility and 
team work are encouraged.  Concurring with Matshabaphala (2008), a 
corporate culture can emerge from anybody, any team, or the security sector as 
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a whole and can be a powerful tool for improvement of performance.  Finally, 
in the interest of external integration in agreement with Malan 1994, the 
security sector should understand and accept the values inherent to the 
democratic political culture towards which civil society is striving” (Malan 
1994). 
 
(b)Management and Administrative Ethos 
 
The security transformation issue places the spotlight squarely on those aspects 
of governance and management of security agencies that are unique and those 
features of the organisational context that constrain security managers and the 
political leadership in carrying out their mandated purposes.  Management may 
entail the same basic functions in public or private organisations.  How these 
functions are carried out may vary greatly.  For example, a regular armed force 
and a group of mercenaries may perform the same functions and face similar 
problems, but the regular army exists to execute the law.  By virtue of their 
special trust, the state security managers are responsible for promoting values 
that go beyond efficiency, effectiveness and include responsiveness and public 
service (Tompkins, 2005).  According to Cawthra (2005) it is the primary role 
of senior security officials to initiate and establish a policy framework for an 
overarching transformation process for the security institutions which will seek 
to place the national security and defence firmly under constitutional and 
democratic control.   
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Williams (2001) defines top managers as responsible for creating change, 
developing attitudes of commitment and ownership.  However Clarke (1994) 
argues that to be effective in this role, top “managers will require knowledge 
and expertise in strategy formulation and human resource management.  If top 
managers are to gain the commitment of the security sector to transform, they 
must be prepared to challenge their own assumptions, attitudes and mindsets”. 
Shemella (2006) commends that only wisdom of a democratic government and 
the society can ensure that the leadership of the security sector remains focused 
and properly developed in line with good governance principles.  
 
Hence the challenges for consolidating transformation for the good of 
improving security governance, and organisational effectiveness by the 
executive and legislature may have remained weak in practice in most 
developing countries.   The researcher‟s view concurring with Fits-Gerald and 
Tracy (2008:3) that most of the “security practitioners are well-educated and 
experienced but not necessarily and specifically trained in transformation 
management.  A good security practitioner is the one that increases the chances 
of good outcome when faced with such challenges as; risk calculation, 
resource allocation, strategy formulation, change and programme planning.  
Arguably, the recognition of effective decision making in uncertain 
environments must be supported by strong political leadership which is 
knowledgeable in security sector transformation management.   To some 
political leaders in Malawi the security sector may be seen as a threat that must 
be removed gradually by making it smaller with poorer structures. 
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(c) Attitudes of the security personnel 
Attitude of the security personnel may not necessarily be the same as that of 
the citizenry in any country.  This is due to the vigorous training security 
personnel go through and hence as such they are more socially conservative 
than the society as a whole.  Nevertheless, this should not be the licence for 
them to behave abnormally and run into conflict with the norms and values of 
society in general.  Likewise, complaints of atrocities committed by the police, 
intelligence services and the military, in most African countries and world over 
cannot be tolerated in any democracy.  The security personnel must act within 
the law and not like independent judges.  However, it must be noted also that 
when the security personnel have acted in unacceptable fashion, this may 
reflect that there is either something wrong with the state or the security 
management itself.  This will arise because the political system may be 
unhealthy or civil security relations are not good (Chuter 2000). 
 
2.4.2 Organisational Transformation Perspective 
 
This section highlights organisational effectiveness of an institution in the 
process of transformation.  According to de Vries (2006:4), “organisational 
transformation constitutes a more mechanical process within which the 
organisation being transformed is designed, structured and right-sized.  It 
includes the improvement of its internal management and leadership practices 
and of the organisational processes to achieve greater levels of efficiency and 
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effectiveness”. Inappropriate security structures and mechanisms can 
contribute to weak governance and to instability and violent conflict (OECD 
2005).  Nevertheless, defining organisational transformation, this means a 
change in the way the security practitioners, political leadership and the civil 
society within a democratic state behave, - the way they interact with each 
other and the outside world on security related issues and their country.  The 
key is to transform the security actor‟s attitudes and behaviour so that they 
articulate clearly changes underway underlining the reasons why they are 
necessary, and the designed outcomes that will make the democratic state fit 
for purpose.  Effective transformation will only be possible if all security 
actors understand that their state is no longer fit for the purpose of  
authoritarian rule and must buy in to the need for change to democratic norms 
so that they are fully committed to it (Tompkins 2005). 
 
Burnes (2000:463) asserts that “a number of models have been used to provide 
an explanation why institutions such as the security sector change or resist 
change, organisational changes.”  Tompkins (2005) argues that models are 
used because they have been found to be useful in predicting a continuous 
process of structural change in institutions only they may be interrupted briefly 
by periods of relative stability (Tompkins 2005).  Likewise, organisations 
should know their own strength and weaknesses by establishing benchmarks 
and performance against a range of internal and external factors.  In agreement 
with the views of Burnes (2000) the security institutions and security 
management bodies in Malawi may lack organisational characteristics such as 
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appropriate structure, transformational leadership style, policies, system 
procedures, teamwork, cooperation and openness among the actors.  Burnes 
(2000) citing Akao (1991) further notes that successful organisations will focus 
their attentions on identifying key aspects of the organisations strategy. 
 
(a) Institutional Structures 
 
The process of structural change and institutional transformation should begin 
when leadership perceives an internal or external threat to the functioning of 
the organisation.  Any kind of government, whether autocratic or democratic 
generally  has structures to ensure that the security sector plays the roles 
assigned to it and does so in a way that is compatible with the ethical norms of 
the state and society.  
 
Supporting the views of Cawthra (1997:1) conflicts in Malawi and any other 
African country may “arise from intra-state rather than inter-state causes and 
will usually be manifested in civil wars, military coups and other internal 
conflicts”.  Arguably, the structural designs of the security apparatus need to 
be tailored according to the norms and principles of a democratic state rather 
than whereby the entire security machinery is involved in one function, the 
protection of a few elites. Cawthra notes that “transformation of the security 
institutions should rest on concepts of good governance, sound security 
relations and commitments to democracy.  There should be a holistic approach 
to security structural design which must entail a re-examination of the role and 
functions of the security institutions in Malawi”.   The challenge confronting 
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African leaders is that they often try to combine the components into 
institutional structures that implement government agenda and personal 
benefit. This is done to make sure that the security sector is responsive to the 
leadership of that time.  As an organisational context, much depends on 
leadership, character, and quality of officials in the security sector. 
 
(b) Leadership Style Practices 
 
According to Matshabaphala (2008) citing in Bell (2006) and Annunzio 
(2001), leaders are said to be the greatest influence in the way the organisation 
is shaped, transformed and renewed.  It must be leadership that facilitates the 
internal transformation and sensitivity to an environment that is rapidly 
changing. Supported by Tompkins (2005: 379), “it is only visionary leadership 
theory which holds that those in positions of responsibility must develop a 
clear vision of organisational success, articulate the values by which success 
will be achieved.” 
 
Pretorius (1995) suggests that leaders must be sincere and provide meaningful 
collective leadership.  He points out that it must boil down to real 
democratisation of the work place, with “flattening of the hierarchy, the 
devolution of power and authority, the opening up of existing communication 
channels and the creation of new ones.  He emphasizes that leadership aimed at 
the future must be synonymous with a strong value system containing elements 
such as integrity and fairness”. According to Kaplan and Norton (2001) cited 
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in Matshabaphala (2008), leadership is considered from three different 
perspectives, that is personal, organisational and public. Since leadership has to 
do with the behaviour that others notice, the challenge is to work on this 
behaviour.  Much as this is an ingredient, the executive, legislature and the 
chiefs of security organisations in Malawi and in Africa may miss on strategic 
leadership.   
 
Matshabaphala (2008) points out that governments are faced with the strategic 
leadership challenge of providing leadership predicated on strategic thinking 
impulses.  In his opinion, it is every official‟s and politician‟s responsibility to 
provide leadership at every level of organisation, instead of always expecting 
to be led by someone.  In many African countries, security decision making is 
centralised in the office of the President, which can be detrimental on issues of 
security which require collective decision-making (Cawthra 2008).  This 
mainly has to do with policies put in place.  There is no appropriate 
prioritisation and integration of policy initiatives taking place because of lack 
of systems and procedures at political level in some African governments. 
 
(c)  Policies and System Procedures 
(i)   Policy 
 
Ball et al (2003:55) define policy “as a statement of purpose or broad 
guidelines as to how the purpose is to be achieved within which strategies can 
be framed and activities can take place.”  A key task for a country involved in 
transformation of the security sector would be the construction of various 
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policies for a vibrant security sector.  A policy in any sector is important for 
the following reasons:  According to Ball et al (2003:55): 
 
“It provides a clear series of guidelines within which strategies can be 
framed and activities take place.  It also helps discipline government 
behaviour my minimizing ad hoc and costly decision-making processes 
and by promoting the optimal use of resources in pursuit of specific 
objectives”. 
 
As contended by many scholars, for instance Cleary and Mclonville (2008) the 
key purpose of any policy is to give guidance.  For example, for multiple 
actors in the security sector to behave in a coherent way a good policy should 
be put in place. Likewise, domestic and international community are informed 
about government‟s intentions and plans if a clear policy is in place.  Internally 
a government may wish to support the defence and security policies through 
serving personnel, taxpayers and the widest public. On the other side, 
externally, a government may wish to transmit reassurance and determination.  
Similarly, policies are an attempt to form political party promises into reality.  
They provide the strategic vision for states and their governing institutions.  
Nevertheless, a country that has no policies for its security institutions, may 
reflect: „Symptoms of a system that is weak on accountability and lacks 
transparency. Although direction may be given, it is likely to be the vision of 
an individual rather than a group.  There is also no power of enforcement and 
limited means to measure progress. Thus makes it more difficult to determine 
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the resources required Cleary & McConville 2008). A policy should therefore 
indicate the strategic context, national interests and the plan of action. 
 
(ii)  Systems Procedures 
 
Pendlebury (1999) describes systems as the flow of everything within the 
structure; information, materials, finances and human resources.  An 
organisation will spend a great deal of energy on making systems work as it is 
mostly concerned with the circulation of information and decision-making 
which are particularly influential.  The ability of security agencies to seize 
opportunities and react to aggression of any sort depends largely on these 
systems.  It is obviously not only the formal and explicit aspects of systems 
that matter but also the informal and implicit aspects.  The security agencies 
may undoubtedly play an important and influential role in task alignment if 
they are well coordinated.  In tandem with this assertion Cawthra (2007:7) says 
“while transformation of national security management systems may be in 
place in most African countries, it is doubtful whether coherent and integrated 
guidelines to the transformation process on security policies exist.” 
 
Similarly, there is no reason for government to fail to put in place such a 
security framework that improves national security in a democratic state.  
Security agencies are departments within the executive branch which are, in 
turn, just one part of the larger system of government. In the case of Malawi, 
they are under the control of the Secretary to the President and Cabinet (SPC). 
The checks that the legislative and judicial branches of government can 
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lawfully impose cannot be achieved. Supporting the views of Cawthra (2005:1) 
this is because “security decision making has been increasingly centralised in 
the Office of the President and Cabinet in most African countries.  This 
arrangement has not called for a much more coordinated system for security 
transformation management in a democracy; as openness, accessibility and 
responsiveness in a democracy are integral parts of what makes a country‟s 
system really democratic.”  However, much depends on collective decision 
making rather than on centralised decision in the Office of the President and 
Cabinet.  This boils down to the old cultures adopted from the colonial 
governments.  
 
(d)The Technical Perspective 
 
This section examines the use of technology to create a framework that makes 
it easier for the reader to ameliorate the principal issues in the process of TSS. 
Tompkins (2005: 20) notes that “the way security agencies are organised and 
managed, and whether they perform in regular and predictable ways will 
depend on part of their technical means of production.  Technology, in this 
instance, refers broadly to the system of tools and techniques used by an 
organisation to carry out its tasks.” For instance, to balance today‟s needs 
against future demands, the security institutions should recognise the 
challenges posed by the rate of accelerating technological change (Geis, Hailes 
and Hammond 2011). 
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In order to develop a comprehensive cross-government strategy on TSS most 
African countries will require a high-level of thematic and cross-cutting 
expertise.  According to OECD (2005), „there is a need to ensure that this is 
backed up by sufficient training and all of government mechanisms to enable a 
coherent approach to, governance and oversight, threat assessments, national 
security strategies, human rights, integrated border management organised 
crime etc‟. Besides the issues described above, there is also need for the 
technical side to acquire knowledge of institutional security systems on 
transformation management (OECD 2005). In addition, based on new the 
concept of democratising the security organisations and indeed for the purpose 
of understanding transformation in a democracy it is prudent to provide some 
technical definitions of key concepts used in this study beginning with 
democracy. 
 
(i) Democracy 
According to Bratton and Van de Walle, democracy refers “to a distinct set of 
political institutions and practices, a particular body of rights, a social and 
economic order, a system that ensures desirable results or a unique process of 
making collective and binding decisions.   The emphasis is placed on the rule 
by the people.  Nevertheless democracy is a form of regime whose legitimacy 
derives from the principle of popular sovereignty”.(Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997:10) 
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In agreement with this view Ulfelder (2005:2) emphasizes “the procedure by 
which a government is chosen and requires the regime to obtain some minimal 
degree of contestation and inclusiveness in order to be considered democratic”. 
 
In this study empirical literature shows evidence that Malawi and South Africa 
are democratic regimes that are in a transition toward a consolidated 
democracy (Espstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O‟Halloran 2004), 
Further,  Espstein and others  describe Malawi as one of the 15 countries which 
are „up to partial democracies‟ in the world.  Partial democracies are less stable 
and can easily change into an autocracy.   South Africa is one of the three 
countries who are “Up to democracy” among 56 countries in the world shifting 
between autocracy and democracy.  Maclaren (2009) asserts that 
understanding the transition to democracy is imperative not only due to the 
prevalence of promotion effects but also due to the high stakes involved such 
as transforming the security institutions. 
 
(ii)        Governance 
 
Governance refers “to the process of governmental decision-making and the 
manner in which decisions are put into practice.  It consists of the traditions 
and institutions by which activity is exercised.  This would include the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of 
governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the 
respect for citizenry and the state of the institutions that manage the security 
sector for the prevalence of peace and stability among the citizenry”(Cleary 
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2010:7).  In addition democratic government is a prerequisite for transforming 
the security sector efforts.  For transformation of the security sector to succeed 
in Malawi the political leadership should create necessary conditions for the 
security institutions of the past authoritarian rules to change. 
 
(iii)        Security Governance  
 
A focus on security governance as a means of conceptualising and linking 
management, political leadership style, and oversight and accountability 
practices in the transformation of the security sector may be a more coherent 
approach for policymakers to address the broad security challenges posed by 
the current democratic transition in Malawi.  According to Ball et al (2001) 
security governance “refers to the organisation and management of the security 
sector”, whose main responsibilities are the protection of the state and its 
people.   Arguably, Cawthra (2008) notes that security governance may remain 
opaque, personalised and will lack professionalism if not put in practice in the 
transitional phase of democracy.‟ 
 
The concept of security governance recognises both the multidimensional 
nature of the security system and the reality in a democratic transition situation 
moving from authoritarian rule (insecurity) to a democratic system which 
requires a transformation process of reconfiguring the security roles and 
responsibilities.  Setting up sound security governance therefore requires a 
process of transformation that engages key principles to guide the management 
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of the security organisations.  The guiding principles should outline the 
following as noted by Ball et al (2001): 
“The role and responsibilities of the political actors, including the role 
of parliament and the oversight responsibilities of the government; 
Likewise the chain of command with the different security 
organisations; the roles and tasks envisaged for each security 
organisation.  There must be broad democratic principles to which the 
security organisations should adhere in their conduct as professionals. 
 
It is also necessary to set out the government‟s responsibilities toward 
the security organisations.  In particular, the government should: 
Provide clear political leadership to the security organisations and 
prevent political interference in the chain of command by the political 
leadership of the country concerned.  Furthermore seek to provide the 
security organisations with adequate resources to accomplish their 
constitutionally designated missions” (Ball et al 2001). 
(iv) Security 
 
„Security‟ should be understood by many policymakers and the civil society in 
Malawi and elsewhere as described by the DAC guidelines:“An all 
encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; 
participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of 
fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; 
and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health”.  The 
security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforced.  A wide 
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range of state institutions and other entities must be responsible for ensuring 
the aspects of security, DAC Guidelines (2001:20)  
Similarly, as noted by Wolfers (1962:20) “security in objective sense, 
measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in subjective sense, it is 
the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. 
 
Arguably such a definition leaves out questions such as whose and which 
values might be threatened by whom or what and by which means according to 
Moller (2009)  the meaning of security must be subdivided into different forms 
of security as illustrated in table 4 below: 
 
Table 3:  Concepts of Security 
Label  Referent 
object 
Value at risk Sources of 
threat 
Form of Threat 
National 
security 
The state 
(regime) 
Sovereignty, 
territorial integrity 
Other states 
(sub-state 
actors) 
Military attack 
Societal 
security 
Nations 
societal groups 
National unity, 
identity 
States 
migrants 
cultures 
Genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, 
discrimination 
Human 
security 
Individuals, 
humankind 
Survival, quality 
of life 
The state 
globalisation 
Crime, under-
development, terrorism 
Environmental 
security 
Ecosystem, 
species, planet 
Sustainability  Humankind Pollution, warming, 
destruction of habitants 
 
Source Moller,  (2009). 
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However, security in Malawi and elsewhere in the world today should 
undeniably centre on people by finding non-violent solutions to disputes at the 
national, regional and international levels.  Concurring with this assumption 
Ball et al (2001) adds that, “the inability of many African security 
organisations, to provide a safe and secure environment for economic and 
political development arises to a large degree out of poor governance both of 
the state and the security sector”. 
 
(v)     National Security and Strategy Assessment 
 
According to Sarkesian et al (2002:13) citing Smoke (1987) national security 
can be defined as: “the study of security problems faced by nations, of the 
strategies, policies and programmes by which these problems are addressed, 
and also of the governmental processes through which the strategies, policies 
and programmes are decided upon and carried out.” No formal definition of 
national security as a field has been generally accepted. There are two 
dimensions to that definition; physical and psychological. The physical is an 
objective measure based on the strength of the security forces as a capacity for 
the nation to challenge adversaries. The psychological is subjective, reflecting 
the opinion and attitudes of the civil society, willingness to support 
government efforts to achieve a clear understanding of national security. The 
meaning can be misleading in some African countries, for example, 
Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Ivory Coast.  It is often not the protection of the 
nation, referring to community or society, but rather that of the incumbent 
regimes (Moller 2009).   
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National security is crucial for any in a democracy for it provides some 
guidelines that relate to human rights, political conduct, preservation and 
protection of the community and the country.  It is the national security 
strategy that Malawi must assess and address threats either by military or non-
military tools.  The threats to Malawi like to any other country within the 
southern African Development Community have become complex and 
interrelated whilst the number of the vulnerable is growing fast.   
 
Recent trends in Malawi, particularly since 1994 when the country attained 
multiparty democracy, have unveiled increased insecurity to the state and the 
citizenry ranging from political instability, border disputes, economic decline 
and environmental security to organized crime, and health among others.  For 
instance, according to Northern Life Magazine (2012) the partition of the lakes 
surface area between Malawi and Tanzania that is under dispute is one of these 
social-political threats.  Mijoni (2009:2) citing CIA (2006) asserts that 
“Malawi is considered one of the least developed countries of the world.  
Overpopulation in Malawi is putting pressures on public services like health 
services and the stress on natural resources”. 
 
According to Mijoni (2009:2) citing Phiri (2005) “about 6.3 million Malawians 
live below the poverty line”.  The consideration for situation analysis of 
national security strategy should therefore address various security issues and 
necessitate coordination and cooperation among security actors and security 
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management bodies. Ball et al (2003) contends that “While protecting the state 
and its citizens from external aggression remains a major consideration, the 
most serious threats facing [Malawi] tend to be those that either derive from 
internal causes or are transnational and collective in nature”. 
 
According to Fitzgerald (2007:3) national security/strategy “making a way 
through challenges of issues, events and trends identifying constraints using 
means both necessary and available and taking carefully calculated risks in 
making choices to ends of minimising their effects on, and maximising the 
benefits for national interests”   In this context, in agreement with Sarkesian et 
al (2003) there are two dimensions to the definition of national security, 
physical and psychological. 
 
The physical definition of national security is an objective measure based on 
the strength and capacity of nation‟s security forces to challenge adversaries.  
While the psychological or social definition of national security is subjective, 
reflecting the opinions and attitudes of the civil society willingness to support 
government‟s efforts to achieve human security.  However, the contextual 
nature of national security introduces more complications in an increasingly 
multi-centric world of nation- states.  For instance the overview of United 
States of America‟s national security strategy in 2006 by former president 
George Bush reads: 
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“To seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every 
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world.  In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes 
matters as much as the distribution of power among them.  The goal of 
our statecraft is to help a world of democratic, well governed states that 
can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly 
in the international system.  This is the best way to provide enduring 
security for America.” 
 
From this standpoint the USA can use various techniques of influencing 
national security, ranging from persuasion or offering of rewards to threats or 
the actual use of force in its strategy.  Buzan (1991) argues national security 
under conditions of ideology rivalry requires economic and political security as 
well as military in that sense the concept links military and foreign policy into 
a combined response to a set of threats across a broad spectrum of political, 
economic and military contingencies. 
 
Cawthra (2013:3) citing International Workshop Group on national security 
(IWGN), asserts that “national security must reflect what a country wants to be 
as individuals and as a nation to live as equals, live in peace and harmony.  
National security must guard values and interests against both internal and 
external threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state 
and citizens” 
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Likewise a broad framework for improving national security is crucial for any 
country in a democracy.  It is this broad framework in which principles relating 
to human rights, political conduct and for security governance in a democracy 
are agreed upon.  For example, any country should be able to assess and 
address threats of a nation either by military or non-military tools. Determining 
the balance between the use of military and non-military tools must ultimately 
be a political judgement and not that of security experts.  
 
According to Pantev (2005:17) contends that “a clear definition of what 
security is according to the government, must be provided in the strategic 
security document. The NSP must reflect the conceptual approach to dealing 
with the threats and risks as well as the legal and institutional instruments, 
national, foreign and international that should be applied to cope with the task 
of neutralising the threats.”  Supporting this view Sarkesian et al (2002) notes 
that “success of national security policy depends on the president‟s leadership 
and his relationship with legislature”.  The president has the constitutional 
authority.  Furthermore, Sarkesian et al (2002) citing Hargraves and Hoopes 
(1975), point out that “in assessing the presidential power and the ability of a 
given president to wield effectively or perhaps even abuse it is that the style 
and character of the president himself is in every bit as important as the 
inherent power of the institution.  And when one talks about power of 
presidency, must consider three factors:  Presidents sense of purpose, political 
skills and character.” 
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Ironically, since multiparty democracy cameto Malawi, the government has 
never come up with national security assessment or a consensus national 
security strategy.   Nevertheless on several occasions attempts have been made 
to actually develop a coherent national security policy set out in a single 
document.  For instance in 2010 the then National Security Advisor (NSA) 
proposed and developed a draft NSP which was put on shelf.  Until at the time 
of this research it was not accepted. From February, 2013 another team is 
working to produce another draft to be presented to the government.  Perhaps 
the problem is that the task of drafting the strategy has been delegated to the 
members of the security sector without a coordinated effort with academics 
and the civil society.   
 
Political leadership should have a clear picture of the nations interests, and also 
understand the purpose and function of the security agencies in achieving those 
interests, and hence the need for transformation of the security sector in a 
democracy (Cleary et al 2008, Cawthra 2005). The framework in figure 2 
below aims at describing how a country can provide security for the state and 
its citizens.  It is presented as guideline on how to start formulating security 
policy in a coordinated effort. 
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Figure 2. Security Policy Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  = critical decision point 
Source: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Clingendael 
Institute (2003). 
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governance of the security and promote dialogue.”   Likewise in determining to 
enhance democratic governance of the security institutions the assessment 
process consists of three main parts: Developing the terms of reference to 
guide the overall process, mapping and analysing the status of security system 
governance and assessing options and developing strategy.” 
 
According to Albrecht and Barnes (2008:1) A security policy framework (SPF) 
“is a tool designed to be a resource for staff responsible for initiating security 
policy making processes within the executive branch of governance, including 
those responsible for drafting, implementing and evaluating security policies”. 
 
Paradoxically, Van Eekelen criticises that “the challenge is to devise a method 
by which the constitutional role for the executive and the legislature can be 
exercised in a purposeful and professional manner.  If a rigorous method is not 
formalised, control is in danger of becoming political rhetoric, leaving many 
opportunities for the bureaucracy and the security agencies to go their own 
way.”(Van Eekelen 2010:51). 
 
(vi) Security Sector 
 
According to Ball et al (2003) security sector can be defined as: “Institutions 
that are responsible for securing the state and population from fear of 
violence”. the security sector may consist of military, police and intelligence 
services, the related ministries, department and government oversight bodies 
67 
   
etc as noted by Moller (2009) on concepts of security and security providers in 
table 5 below. 
Table 4:  Concepts of Security and Security Providers(examples) 
Form of Security Threats Providers of security 
National  International  
National 
Security 
Narrow  Military attack Armed forces 
Intelligence  
Agencies 
UN 
Alliances  
Expanded  Economic threats State Treasury 
Customs services 
WB, IMF, 
WTO 
Development 
agencies 
Terrorism Police 
Judiciary 
Interpol 
UN 
 
 
Societal security 
Genocide Ethnic 
cleansing 
Armed forces 
Self-defence 
groups 
Intervention 
forces 
Peacekeepers  
Discrimination Lawyers 
Human rights 
NGOs 
UN, NGOs 
 
 
Human security  
Crime  Police 
Militias  
Courts  
ICC 
Disease  Doctors 
Hospitals   
WHO 
UNAIDS 
Poverty Private companies 
Charities 
Donors  
Diasporas  
Environmental 
security 
S. from the 
environment 
Natural disasters, 
Global warming 
Rescue agencies  
Planning agencies 
Relief agencies 
UN 
State  
NGOs 
 S. of the 
environment 
Global warming 
Poaching 
Planning agencies  
Game wardens 
UN 
NGOs 
Legend:  UN – United Nations; WB – World Bank, IMF – International Monetary Fund; 
WTO – World Trade Organisation; NGO – Non-Governmental Organisations; ICC – 
International Criminal Court; WHO – World Health Organisation. 
Source:  Moller, B. (2009) 
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Table 4 above illustrates the security sector as comprising all actors and 
agencies that provide some form of security to either the state, human 
collectives or individuals or the environment.   
 
In summary security should be evaluated in terms of all threats a country, 
region or the world face and the situation in which measures are exercised to 
counter such threats.  Gausi (2012) citing Garnett (1996) contends that the 
definition of security is being overemphasized.  Similarly concepts of national 
security are hard to define.  In this context national security deals with wide 
variety of risks about whose probabilities nations have less knowledge and 
contingencies whose nature can only be perceived.  It is important that national 
security must not only emphasize in military prism through armaments but also 
through human development, territorial, food and environment security (Buzan 
1998). 
 
2.4.3   Political Transformation Perspective 
 
This section highlights the political transformation process which can influence 
transformation of the security sector. There are a number of categories of 
external factors which may affect the security sector.  TSS can influence the 
balance of power and has the potential to challenge and be challenged by 
established principles, norms, systems and relationships.  
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(a) Civil Supremacy and Control of Security Institutions 
 
The political dimension of the transformation process refers to “attempts to 
ensure that the conduct and character of the security sector in question 
conforms to the principles of democracy. In a useful contribution Burnes 
(1997) draws an important distinction between „politics‟ and „power.‟  He 
defines politics as “the deployment of influence or leverage, while „power‟ is 
the possession of position or resources”. In this scenario he defines 
transformational politics as „efforts‟ of some security members to mobilize 
support for or against policies, rules, goals or other decisions in which the 
outcome will have some effect on them.  Politics therefore, is essentially the 
experience of power. Politics, therefore, involves disagreements and the 
resolutions to those disagreements.  The security sector in Malawi is not 
immune to conflict and the need to resolve such conflicts, for this is the 
essence of politics.  Malan (1994) asserts that because of an inadequate 
understanding of the fundamental nature of transformational politics in a 
democracy, senior members of the security sector have persisted in 
perpetuating the myth of an “apolitical” security sector.  This implies that 
members of the security sector have neither an understanding of nor interest in 
differentiating the four types of political power. According to Birch (2005) the 
four types of policy power are political coercion, authority, influence and 
manipulation.  
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(b) Political Power 
 
It is crucial to know how the political leadership in any country especially in 
Africa, uses power and organisational politics.  Political parties today use 
power and politics in order to win the hearts and minds of the electorate to vote 
for them during elections.   Power is the ability of one person or a group of 
persons to influence others.  Furthermore it is important to recognise the four 
types of political power as logically distinct from each other just as it is 
important to recognise that there are four different types of representation.  
Birch (2005) defines political coercion “as the control of citizens by agents of 
governments using force for instance the police carrying out arrests without 
warrants of arrest or an army enforcing a curfew at will.  This is what goes on 
in some African countries that are transitional democracies.  Birch further 
elaborates the second type of power which is political authority.  Political 
authority is defined as “making and implementing decisions that are binding 
within a prescribed area of jurisdiction, for example the power of parliament to 
pass laws.  The third type is political influence whereby the emphasis is on the 
nature of influence of public opinion, through elections, political parties etc for 
various good causes.  The fourth type of political power is political 
manipulation. Political manipulation is defined as the activity of shaping the 
political transformation opinions, values and behaviour of others without the 
latter realising that this is happening for instance the media presenting  and 
exaggerating a particular political situation of the party as very likely going to 
happen when it is actually open to change. 
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Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:62) citing Claphan (1968) observe that 
„neopatrimonialism is the most salient type of [political] authority in the Third 
World because it corresponds to the normal forms of social organisations in 
pre-colonial societies‟.  Similarly the core feature of politics in most African 
countries is a patrimonial political system.  This is whereby the ruler ensures 
personal political survival and of the regime by providing security in an 
uncertain environment.  For instance, the concentration of political power is 
vested in the hands of one individual who resists delegating decision-making 
tasks.  The individual ruler asserts total personal control over already frail 
structures within the security sector. 
 
The majority of security officials in African countries harbour very distinctive 
preferences in terms of political parties and types of regime. Malan 
(1994),“notes that the loyalty of the security sector establishment under a 
democratic political system depends fundamentally upon their acceptance of 
the political system”.  Supporting this view, Sarkesian et al (2002) assert that 
“In the United States, for example, the security sector accepts its role as a non-
partisan instrument of government of the day because of the shared belief in 
the fairness and virtues of the democratic political system.” 
 
Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the security sector in most African 
democracies can quickly turn and do the same as can the security sector in the 
United States of America due to extreme poverty in Africa. Likewise Cawthra 
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(2003), and MacGinty (2010) note that “African democratic institutions of the 
past decade have come to be regarded as the only legitimate forms of 
governance.  However, elections have seemingly and relatively replaced coups 
and dictatorships.  The long standing legacies of authoritarian rule continue to 
cast a shadow over most of these newly institutional African democracies.”  
They are hybrid regimes governing security. As long as factions exist within 
the security sector, the transformation process of the security sector in a 
democratic transition will be threatened.  This study probed proper roles of 
security sector members in a democratic Malawi and how they now understand 
the values and operations of the democratic political system.  At the same time 
the researcher looked at the role of civilian authorities, how they exercise and 
safeguard the power of control over the security sector. 
 
(c) Oversight, Transparency and Accountability 
 
The security system should be managed according to the same principles of 
accountability and transparency as the one that apply across the public sector, 
in particular through greater civil oversight of security processes. Supporting 
this view Scheye (2006:4) states that “transformation of the security sector 
goes well beyond its original concentration on military spending to encompass 
a diverse array of security institutions, their character, management and 
control.  The issue of civilian control reveals an endeavour, namely democratic 
governance.  The underlying argument is for the optimal performance of the 
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security sector”, it needs to adhere to democratic oversight, transparency and 
accountability: 
 
(i) Oversight 
 
Bruneau and Tollefson (2006:37) define oversight as “the legislature‟s ability 
to monitor the implementation of budgets, laws and policy decisions passed 
during the formulation stage.  Oversight has two functions; First to hold the 
government and the security forces accountable for their actions and second, to 
see if laws are working the way they were intended”. Similarly in agreement 
with Born, Fluri and Lunn (2010) state that “oversight of the security sector is 
an essential element of power-sharing at state level and if effective, sets limits 
of the power of the executive or president.  A state without parliamentary 
control of its security sector, should, at best be deemed an unfinished 
democracy or democracy in the making.  The crucial issue is the degree to 
which oversight translates into real influence over the decisions of the 
Executive”. 
 
Born (2002:5-6) asserts that assuming “parliaments are willing to hold the 
government to account, four types of parliament classification can be 
distinguished on their powers and resources, rubber stamp where parliament 
only applauds the policies of government, emerging parliaments mostly found 
in transitional states, arena parliaments those that are capable of organising 
debates and raising questions and thus influencing the legitimacy of 
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government‟s decision to act  and transformative parliaments that are capable 
of scrutinising and altering governments proposals and laws”. 
 
(ii) Transparency 
 
Transparency is defined as ”the ease or difficulty with which a country‟s own 
legislature, the media, interest groups, civil society, and the public at large can 
see what is going on.  Ideally the aim is to achieve transparency in decision 
making, allocation of budgetary resources and the administration of the rule of 
law” (Cleary 2010).Similarly Born et al (2010) assert that “parliamentary 
debates and reports help make the security sector especially defence more 
transparent and increase public awareness of defence and security matters in a 
country”. 
 
(iii) Accountability 
 
Accountability advances the concept of responsibility and infers that an 
individual should be able to explain and answer for his or her actions and may 
be legally obliged to do so. According to Ball (2003:31) 
 
“Should be accountable to elected authorities and civil society and operate 
in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.  Likewise 
budgeting and planning should be transparent and openly available, 
organizations of the state involved with the security sector should be 
capable of functioning effectively to oversee the security sector and civic 
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society capacities should be strengthened to monitor and participate in the 
activities and policy information.” 
 
In agreement with this observation Born (2002:3) notes that “democratic 
accountability has to be distinguished from other forms of accountability, such 
as public accountability (e.g. via the media), administrative accountability (via 
government institutions such as audit offices) and judicial accountability.  
Democratic accountability is deeply rooted in democracy.  It deals with the 
issue of how people can be involved in government”. 
 
Haynes (2006:29) contends that “accountability can be both an end in itself-
representing democratic values and a means towards the development of more 
efficient and effective security institutions in the context of the development of 
good security governance” Similarly, it is a key to ensure that politicians, 
public servants and security practitioners in authority use their power 
appropriately and in accordance with the public interests.  In many African 
countries, defence and security issues are shrouded in secrecy and there is 
usually a residual suspicion about exposing such deliberations, by those in 
power (Cleary 2006). 
 
In support of the aforementioned assertion, OECD (2005:32) observe that 
democratic accountability of the security sector should be “based on the 
principles of transparency, responsibility, participation and responsiveness to 
citizens.  Representatives of security institutions must be liable for their actions 
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and should be called to account for malpractice”. This is currently difficult for 
civilian authorities in Malawi, because they are unfamiliar with what goes on 
in security institutions.  Thus the sector‟s, lack of expertise is often visible to 
parliamentarians, the media and civil society at large. 
 
(iv)  Control 
 
In a useful contribution to the expression „democratic control of the security 
sector‟ Lunn (2010) contends that it “is generally understood as the 
subordination of the armed forces to those democratically elected to take 
charge of a country‟s affairs. This means that all decisions regarding defence 
and security of the country, the security institutions, deployment and use of 
armed forces, the setting of military priorities and requirements and the 
allocation of resources are taken by democratic leadership and scrutinised by 
the legislature in order to ensure popular support and legitimacy” 
 
Control of the security sector can turn into a threat to the democratic process if 
not properly managed.  This might be the case, for example, if the power of 
control is concentrated in an individual political leadership or a single 
institution of government.  Security and justice actors could conceivably be 
manipulated by this institution or an individual to the detriment of society 
(Kohn, 1997).  Some of the Western established models for effective 
democratic civil control of the security sector may not apply in Africa.  
The history of civil control of the security agencies in Africa has been spotty.  
For example, in Zimbabwe, control of the military and police is in the hands of 
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the President. “Control” is not an understood concept if interpreted in the 
narrow fashion of direction and authority.  This has more to do with the wider 
concept of control; that of inspection and oversight.  
 
Civil control is often confused with civilian control. According to Chuter 
(2000), “Civil” in this context refers to the state of which the security sector is 
a part of government, provided it acts in a legal and constitutional fashion.  
Civil control exists when government controls budgets, administration of the 
agencies of the security sector and the use of the security apparatus collective 
the decisions of executive officials”. While „civilian‟ control is achieved 
through the appointment of civilian politicians to positions of responsibility 
over the armed forces granting; tenets for civil control, overarching strategic 
framework guiding national security policy making, and resource allocations 
for security organisations that need to be examined.  All this must be qualified 
by the realities of political changes that take place (Sarkesian, Williams and 
Cimbala, 2002).  Security sector agencies exist to serve the public interests.  
Arguably, many factors constrain their performance. Among them, are ill-
conceived policies, inadequate resources, and other social and economic 
conditions over which many African governments have little control 
(Sarkesian et al 2002). 
 
In some African countries, there are no institutional arrangements for 
optimising regulation and control of the security agencies. In countries that are 
civilian ruled usually the executive exercises control, holding a tight rein over 
78 
   
the security agencies who also make all decisions involving recruitment, 
promotion, deployment, policy and budgets.  Other organs of government are 
not involved in these matters.  Especially the military and intelligence service 
matters are often shrouded in secrecy, and the executive sometimes abuses its 
monopoly on information to manipulate the security forces to ensure loyalty.   
 
It is therefore important to look carefully at the issue of control; what is it for, 
who should have it and how much control there should be. In democratic 
settings the legitimate government requires control of the organs of the state in 
order to do its job.  The state can not allow have the police, the military and 
other security agencies to decide for themselves what their priorities should be 
(Chuter 2000, Kohn 1997).   
 
Sandler et al. (1995) further note that security expenditure has generated a 
great deal of debate as international donors and domestic stakeholders increase 
pressure on governments to scale down and rationalise security costs in Africa 
so that they concentrate on development through the TSS agenda.  Likewise 
economic issues feature significantly in security institutions and security 
management bodies in Africa. Shemella (2006) notes that security 
establishments are of necessity and dynamic, and for them to remain relevant, 
they must continuously transform in response to domestic and international 
stimuli.  TSS in Malawi can be a resource hungry enterprise.  This is because 
of dependency on the West for funding the TSS efforts which creates its own 
problems.  For example, depending on external resources does not sit 
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comfortably with notions of ownership of the transformation agenda.  
Secondly it is bound to compete with other equally pressing domestic 
priorities. 
 
In Malawi, the most pressing crisis issues are emergencies on relief and 
rehabilitation programmes aimed at stabilising situations of hunger, drought 
and other disasters.  Similarly, experience has shown that transformation of the 
security sector programmes by donors often tends to exclude certain 
institutions such as those dealing with justice, security management bodies of 
oversight and accountability, and even the political leadership itself. This 
undermines the adoption of a comprehensive approach of TSS itself.  In this 
case, security roles are changed through deliberate political decisions by those 
who do not understand TSS.  Sandler et al (1995) note that without a detailed 
analysis it is difficult to make the argument that security sector spending has 
either a positive or negative impact on economic growth in a country.  In 
Europe, moreover the Legislative can decide to allocate funds to security.  For 
example, Targarev (2004) asserts that, the National Assembly of the Republic 
of Bulgaria as a representative of the interests of a country‟s allocates a 
considerable portion of the national budget for the security sector in that 
country. 
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(d) Civil Society and the Media 
 
Haynes (2006:21-22) defines Civil Society as “the political space between the 
individual and the government expressed by membership of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), social groups, associations and other organisations and 
networks.” Civil Society organisations may include professional and interest 
groups such as trade unions, the media, human rights groups, universities, faith 
groups and independent policy think tanks”. According to Agokla, Mussa and 
Odewale (2010:313) „„the term civil society refers to autonomous 
organisations that are between the state institutions on the one hand and the 
private life of individuals and communities on the other”.  The role of civil 
society organisations in the transitional democracies would be; advocacy 
through dialogue and campaigning, networking and joint activities:  
collaborating with security agents by providing critical information useful for 
effective law enforcement; and as whistle-blowers and gatekeepers, ensuring, 
accountability and transparency in the management of resources of the security 
sector. 
 
Notably, during the transition and in the immediate post-election period 
between 1994 and 2000 in Malawi, civil society organisations emerged; a few 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media have grown 
substantially in terms of specialising and reporting security issues. Such 
organisations could be useful tools in the transformation of the security sector. 
However, it is unclear to what extent they have really influenced government‟s 
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policies.  It is also notable, however that, the level of consultation between 
government and civil society is minimal if at all it is there in many countries in 
Africa.  
 
Ironically in some countries in Africa, civil society and non government 
organisations have been viewed by government as proponents of trouble and 
allies of the opposition political parties aimed at frustrating the ruling 
governments‟ agenda. Nevertheless, civil society organisations, the media and 
academics can play an important role in the transformation of the security 
sector if they are consulted and work together with government (Cawthra 2005 
and Cleary 2006). 
2.4.4 Human Transformation Perspective 
 
The human transformation process strives to ensure that there is an orderly 
composition of the security institutions with regard to race, ethnicity, region 
and gender.  According to Hendrix and Hutton (2008:5) Country‟s security 
institutions “should reflect the constituent identities within that society.  This 
fosters representativeness and national ownership which in turn increases the 
legitimacy of the security institutions”.  Likewise OECD (2007:65) observes 
that, “it is equally important that the design of TSS programmes must take into 
account basic issues such as the number of qualified government officials and 
security personnel and their skills.”Surprisingly, political leaders in many 
African countries try to oversee the security institutions by appointing high 
ranking security officers either by those who are political friends to the ruling 
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elite or indeed select them from their tribal or ethnic grouping.  Such, this 
selection is not based so much on professionalism but political loyalty.  
According to Chuter (2006) the other challenge faced by many African 
countries is the failure to create Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, and 
Intelligence and integrate workers consisting of both civilians and security 
personal who can effectively manage the different security departments. 
 
Similarly the historical composition of the security sector management bodies 
and institutions in Malawi has not been restructured to conform to democratic 
principles.  For instance the intelligence services operate under the decree of 
the President because they do not have an Intelligence Act.  Nathan (1994), 
citing Bayham (1990), observes that „in societies deeply divided by race, 
ethnicity, gender or other primordial affiliations, the composition is of vital 
importance to the state and its inhabitants.  Nathan (1994) adds that the 
establishment of a democracy requires the re-orientation of all state security 
needs and equally respect of the rights of the people. 
 
In the past security institutions existed to fight and spy for the king.  The 
security agencies might have consisted of slaves, criminals or foreign 
mercenaries. In a democracy and in any society which is based on the principle 
of popular sovereignty this is not acceptable (Chuter 2006).  Security agencies 
have to be representative of the society which pays and deploys them.  In many 
African governments, for unknown reasons, the security personnel are not the 
reflection of the society from which they come but are from a particular ethnic 
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or elite group.  There are security traditions, security families and regions 
which have historically produced soldiers, policemen or sailors (Chuter 2006). 
 
In a useful contribution, to section 2.4, on the issue of the four major 
transformation clusters; human, political, organisational, and cultural 
perspective. Daszko et al (2005:1) argue that “challenging assumptions, 
beliefs, patterns, habits and paradigms it is at the heart of transformation; it is 
critical because assumptions and paradigms drive policies, procedures, and 
most importantly systems and structures” as figure 3 illustrates. 
 
Figure 3: Assumptions drive policies that drive behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Daszko (2005) 
 
 
Daszko elaborates further that this does not “lead to transformation or more 
permanent change unless there is continual challenge.  It takes new knowledge 
and a system of challenging assumptions and thinking differently”. 
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Structures 
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2.5 Constraints to Transformation of the Security Sector 
 
The reform process in Malawi appears to have not been considered by all 
actors concerned.  The main reason (author‟s view) could be the resistance by 
security practitioners themselves.  The need to overcome the traditional notion 
of security presents a real challenge.  Nevertheless this is not limited to 
overcoming traditional notions of security, but there is also opposition to a 
consultation process, (see appendix 13), lack of funding, expertise gaps and 
others (Jaye 2010:43). 
 
Constraints to TSS can be any internal or external environmental factors that 
interfere with satisfaction of security organisation‟s needs. Some transitional 
democracies in Africa are experiencing some strained relations between the 
security sector and civil authorities.  The question which needs to be asked is, 
why should the security sector organisations feel that they need to review and 
transform in a transitional democracy?  The most common reason is that there 
has been political change that calls for new ways of doing business.  Failure to 
acknowledge this will lead to underperformance.  Security sector organisations 
may result in being restructured or would probably see the removal of a 
number of old senior officers who are resistant to such changes or by even 
unforeseen factors. Arguably, in most African countries, the security 
institutions are not the only ones that may be deficient in democratic norms 
and values.  Lack of human and institutional capacity in the civil sector can 
also be a major setback.  This means that the capacity of the civil authorities to 
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manage and oversee the security institutions is limited.  Parliamentarians and 
the civil society sector do not contribute much to issues of transparency and 
accountability.  This could be due to inherent limitations of the multiparty 
system.  It is either that the parliamentarians misunderstand the nature of their 
functions or are too weak to carry out these functions.  It may also be due to 
the fact that the ruling party-leaders control parliament.  This effect it also 
reduces the capacity of the legislature for effective oversight.  Consequently 
the transformation of the security sector may not take place effectively.  For 
this to be realised it “will require the collaboration of democratically-minded 
politicians, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, members of the security institutions 
and the civil society (Ball et al 2003). In spite of external differences and some 
significant exceptions, transformation programmes in Africa where they do 
exist, tend to be characterised by short comings as articulated below: 
 
2.5.1 Internal Constraints to Transformation 
 
Although the benefits of transformation appear to be indisputable, in line with 
democratic principles and good governance, some members within the security 
institutions, for example the military, police, and intelligence regard change as 
a direct challenge to their power, livelihoods and practices.  This is clear even 
when their political leadership and senior civilian members within the 
ministries of defence and internal security are in favour of TSS.  Security 
institutions throughout the world tend to be conservative.  They are tradition-
bound organisations who may be distrustful of transformation initiatives 
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(Scheye and Peak 2005).  Other shortcomings arise from under-funding, ill-
adjustment to domestic institutional and resource capabilities, and lack of 
coordination among the security institution themselves (Hutchful and Fayemi 
2005).  Major problems within the security institutions in Africa have centred 
on issues such as overspending on major operational pieces of equipment 
(Cleary, and MacConville 2006). 
 
2.5.2 External Constraints to Transformation 
 
External environmental constraints include political sensitivities at local, 
national and international levels, economic considerations, impact of 
technology on modes of operation etc. It must be noted that within the security 
sector organisations, the breadth of stakeholders is significant and their 
particular interests can be highly varied. For example, negative public attitudes 
are reinforced when the security sector consistently fails to provide security to 
the society and state because of inadequate funds.  According to Sandler and 
Keith (1995), in developing nations, security matters such as expenditure, size 
and structure of the security personnel are not debated in parliament or else the 
parliament just rubber-stamps, and this can be a concern for the society.  Other 
constraints as noted by Fitz-Gerald & Tracy (2008:6) include: “spoilers can 
range from senior members of a current or former security regime, 
parliamentary or opposition leaders, and within groups of non-state actors 
(rebel groups) which normally operate outside the bounds of the legitimate 
political process.” 
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Figure4: Constraints to Transformation or Reform  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Cleary L. (2010), modified  
 
Figure 4 indicates likely security constraints of reform: suspicion and mistrust, 
lack of trust between administration and politicisation of defence and security 
institutions. 
 
In other studies, Frazer (1995) and Biddle (1990) observe that the security 
sector is isolated to do its own things and the rift between the security sector 
and the society is especially wide in Africa.    
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According to OECD (2005:80) the constraints to organisational transformation 
in the external environment could be “characterised by lack of political will, 
weak government leadership and inadequate linkage with the regional context 
and emerging collective security mechanisms.  It could be the fact that very 
little has been put in place to enhance the capacity of civilians to make an 
impact on transformation management mechanisms”.   
 
In certain circumstances, it may have been the executive, legislative and 
judicial officials resisting transformation pursuing their own political agendas 
and protecting their own institutional prerogatives.  They could be resisting 
transformation and try to present any possible change for them to remain in 
power.  This has been a common practice in Africa.  For example Uganda, 
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, leaders of these countries and others have remained 
in power for as long as 20-40 years.  They are hybrid regimes in the disguise of 
democracy just to make sure that sure that they remained in authority ( Chuter 
2008 & McGinty 2010).  
 
Turning to Malawi, the researcher examined whether and to what extent issues 
of TSS and security governance were debated in the national assembly and ifat 
all there was open, public dialogue in Malawi. In addition the researcher tried 
to establish whether there were stable lines of formal and informal relations 
between the security sector and civil authority. 
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2.6 Strategies for Implementing Effective Transformation 
 
According to de Vries (2006:3) “transformation involves radical change such 
as the change of organisational culture, policy, structures, and how the 
organisation does its work, leads, commands and manages its resources and 
people”.  In order for the security institutions to play a positive role in the 
transformation processes, they have to be supportive of democratic processes 
and accountable to the civilian political authorities. As de Vries (2006:3) notes, 
“in transforming the security sector one requires to strike a balance between 
the conflicting pressures of stability and change and the need to manage the 
transformation process sensitively”.  Wide consultation on transformation of 
the security sector should take place with the public civil authorities and non 
governmental organisations.  However, the transformation process should 
ultimately be decided by the political decision makers.  The advantage of this 
is that the transformation can be launched and conducted in a legitimate and 
transparent manner and that the process will proactively be linked to wider 
public service renewal initiatives.   
 
Transformation processes however are immensely difficult to accomplish in 
their entirety, they require the hearts and minds of all Malawians.  First and 
foremost there is need for a powerful and imperative national unity.    The 
restructuring of the security sector in Malawi and other countries particularly 
those that have emerged from an authoritarian rule demand visionary and 
integrated transformational strategy as described by de Vries (2006:3), namely 
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“to develop a clear case for change, make a firm decision to transform, and 
develop an integrated master plan and a team to do so”. When conducting the 
transformation process, strategies must be put in place and to achieve this, a 
number of perspectives need to be included:  The nature of the macro 
environment, the internal strengths and weaknesses of the organisations and an 
understanding of the impact of the organisational culture (Cleary et al 
2006:133). 
 
2.7 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
 
The previous sections presented empirical evidence that has emerged on TSS 
and a number of differences of opinion on TSS and SSR have risen.  In 
response, chapter three analyses some of the key theoretical issues that have 
emerged linking the study of the transformation of the security sector. 
 
Transformation as a theory holds several important implications that encourage 
the researcher to think about the world in more dynamic holistic and intuitive 
ways and to view the security sector as a living organism (Tompkins 2005).  In 
a useful contribution to this view, Daszko and Sheinberg (2005:4) assert that “a 
theory of [transformation] means there should be a profound change in 
structure that creates something new.  Transformation should occur through a 
system of continual questioning, challenging, exploration and evaluation.  It 
should begin with the realisation that the organisation‟s thinking (the security 
sector) was limited and flawed from the past (authoritarian rule)”.  The security 
sector as a system is a network of interdependent components that work 
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together to try to accomplish the purpose of the system which is the defence 
and protection of the state and its people.   
 
The security sector should begin with an awakening (dissolution of 
authoritarian rule).  The idea is to impress the importance of the need to 
change.  The awakening should create a new mindset to see the security sector 
anew in a democratic state.  Likewise from awakening the organisation should 
have the intention which is the conscious choosing of a course of action.  This 
should happen to an organisation‟s leaders with knowledge and consent.  
Action is the application of new learning, and new learning occurs when the 
leader plans, study and act repeatedly bringing new learning.  Good leaders are 
those who ask for help or coaching and go through a rigorous process to find 
coaches with profound knowledge.  The stakeholders of this process, for 
instance in the case of the security sector are the executive, legislature and 
security practitioners, then the civil society with whom the security sector does  
business with. This illustrates that transformation is never ending process of 
continually choosing and learning and tacking action.  Arguably some leaders 
seek to lead organisations by tradition handed down from another leader with 
unguided efforts.  Daszko and Sheinberg (2005:4) point out that, “knowledge 
through learning must come from education and coaching and accompanied by 
action.  Not everyone will accept transformation which means the leaders need 
to prepare and at the same time acknowledge that the fears that transforming 
[the security sector] will create for instance losing jobs, making mistakes and 
resisting to change.” 
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Another view is that the basic concept examined in this study is that 
transformation in the security sector should be seen through four distinct 
clusters: political, human, cultural and organisational effectiveness   (Chuter 
2000).  The key aim of this chapter is to provide generic knowledge that could 
tell about transformation process and the management of public organisations 
such as the security institutions. As noted by Tompkins (2005:27), defining 
“transformation process for an effective security sector and what values and 
methods that would bring into being for the betterment of the state and society 
in a democracy is one of the many challenges facing security managers and 
political leaders in Africa.”Similarly how the security agencies and the state‟s 
many security activities can be coordinated and controlled so that 
organisational objectives are accomplished is another issue. 
 
In addition such challenges question as to what the political leadership and the 
managers of the security sector agencies can do if anything, to encourage high 
level of motivation and performance on the part of employees still remain an 
answered. 
 
Like Chuter observes (2000:1), an effective security sector in a transformation 
process is the one that satisfies functional imperatives in a balanced fashion: 
“Cultural transformation, this entails the transformation of the culture 
of the security institutions in question: the leadership management and 
administrative ethos of the institutions and the traditions upon which 
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the institutions are predicated.  Furthermore should look at the 
transformation of the composition of the institution with regard to 
human resource practices.  As for political transformation, should 
ensure that the conduct and character of the institution in question 
conform to the political features of democracy. An acknowledgement 
of the principle of civil supremacy, the institutions of appropriate 
mechanism of oversight and control, adherence to principles and 
practices of accountability and transparency are very crucial.  Last 
organisational transformation is the process within which the security 
institutions are right-sized, their management practices are made more 
cost-effective, and their ability to provide services rendered more 
efficient ‟‟ 
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Figure 5 below illustrates the conceptual framework for an effective TSS. 
Figure 5:   Transformation of Security Sector Conceptual Framework 
       Flexibility 
Human Transformation:    Adaptive function: the need to 
The need to maintain    acquire resources and adapt to 
a competent, integrated,    an uncertain environment 
and dedicated security sector 
Means-oriented values: cohesion, morale  Means-oriented values: 
Human      flexibility,           Organisational 
transformation     readiness             transformation 
Process        process  
  
 Ends-oriented values: human resources Ends-oriented values: 
 development in racial, ethnic, regional growth and 
 and gender    resource acquisition 
 
Internal         External 
Focus          Focus 
           
Means-oriented values: Info. Management Means-oriented values: planning  and  
Cultural  communication,  goal setting    Political  
transformation  leadership and    transformation 
process   administrative ethos   process  
  
 
  Ends-oriented values:  Ends-oriented values 
  stability and   productivity 
  control    efficiency  
 
Integrative function:  the need to   Goal attainment function: the need 
Coordinate and control work   to focus efforts on goal attainment 
activities 
 
             Control     
 
Source:Tompkins (2005,) Modified 
Output Quality 
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The researcher has paid attention to the method of process-tracing which 
attempted to trace the links between possible causes and outcomes of 
transformation process of the security sector in Malawi (George and Bennet 
2005). 
 
2.8 The Application of Theory to the Study 
 
Figure 5 above represents the conceptual framework guiding the research. It 
emphasizes the relationship between the security organisations, their human 
resources development, stability and control, political cultural practices and 
finally the need to focus on efforts for planning and  goal attainment.  These 
roles are accomplished by planning strategically to ensure continued support.  
Such security strategies and plans can be developed by policy and decision 
makers within transformation process, Tompkins (2005). 
2.8.1 Human Culture and Transformation 
 
(a) Human transformation  
Human transformation process assumes that the organisation‟s problems may 
be caused by mistrust and hostility among different bodies of the security 
sector as regards human relations.  
(b) Cultural Transformation 
On the other hand, the cultural transformation process assumes that the 
problem may be caused by incompatibilities between structures, system 
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procedures, different cultural communications styles, and hostility between 
employee needs and abilities within and among the security agencies.   
 
The goals of work a base for human and cultural transformation would be; 
facilitations of  workshops for different bodies of security institutions in order 
to identify threats, and fears each body feels and build empathy between them; 
Jointly make these security bodies reach agreements that recognise the core 
needs of all agencies of the security sector.   
2.8.2. Political and Organisation Transformation Process 
 
(a) Political Transformation 
The political transformation process in an organisation assumes that the 
problems of the security sector may be caused by inequality and injustice 
expressed by competing environment on civil supremacy, and the institution of 
appropriate mechanisms of oversight and control accountability, and 
transparency, legal and ethical frameworks.  
 
(b)  Organisational Transformation 
On the other hand the organisational transformation process assumes that the 
problem may be caused by inadequate planning and goal setting into the future 
by the senior managers and the political executives. 
 
The goals of a work base for transformation should be as follows:  
Organisational transformation – the need to acquire adequate resources, change 
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structures  that cause inequality, including budget funding while the political 
transformation process needs to improve and sustain longer term relationships 
and attitudes among the executive and security agencies in order to promote 
flexibility and readiness at all times. 
Human and cultural effectiveness of security institutions plus the 
organisational and political system of governance need work activities of all 
groups to become an open transparent system as a new analysis framework for 
the security sector, the state and society emerges in a democracy.  The lesson 
must be learnt that policy makers must have good knowledge of security 
system governance and communication style (Tompkins 2005). 
 
 Arguably, the most unique problematic issue identified in the analysis by the 
researcher was the question of the ability and leadership factors.  The ability 
factor included lack of knowledge and skills, control and attitudes by 
policymakers.  Without the requisite knowledge and skills to perform a 
particular activity, an individual may not create or provide a good service.  On 
the leadership factor, attitudes are also an important aspect of capacity or 
competence because an individual as a leader may not perform effectively as a 
manager without proper attitudes (Dzimbiri 2009).  At the level of the state, the 
researcher looked at the ability of an individual who is vested with absolute 
powers of state affairs and in some instances acts alone without consultation on 
an issue of national security of the entire country.  This is due to flawed laws 
of the colonial regimes which gave absolute power to single persons.  It is 
important to pay attention to transformation process on issues regarding the 
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security sector and regulatory mechanisms of the justice sector in a democratic 
state because laws and regulations change with time.   
2.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed TSS and the emphasis was to determine the 
establishment of effective security governance, oversight, transparency, 
accountability and the improvement in the delivery of security and justice 
services in a democracy.  The literature review has dealt with the importance 
of transformation of the security sector in a democratic transitional process, 
and how the agencies, policy makers and society can tackle the process.   It has 
also explained the core issue at the end of transforming the security sector from 
disorder, crime, violence and more broadly achieving sustainable economic, 
social and political development of a country.  Nevertheless African countries, 
if they are to create the conditions in which they have to escape from 
insecurity, it is important to undergo the transformation process. TSS provides 
guidance for policy makers, security practitioners and the civil society, 
identifying, designing and managing good governance in a democratic state (de 
Vries 2006). 
 
In this chapter, it has also discussed about transformation concept which is 
both a theoretical commitment and a political (transition to democracy) 
orientation concerned with the construction of TSS.  As a theoretical 
commitment it is a framework of ideas deriving from the dissolution of 
authoritarian rule to a democratic state in Malawi. As a political orientation it 
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is informed by the aim of enhancing transformation through emancipatory 
politics. There are two general claims about the approach: 
 
First, theoretical commitment and political orientation of TSS concept offers a 
much richer understanding of change than provided by SSR.  In particular 
(TSS), it looks towards an ontology embracing a more extensive set of 
referents for transformation: Human resource practices, organisational 
character, political and cultural make-up; and an epistemology which is „post 
naturalist‟ that is always being willing to engage with the real world in politics 
and in this case democratic transition. 
 
Second, the approach broadens the TSS agenda in order to develop a 
theoretical commitment and political orientation towards a conception of good 
security governance in the collective interest of local ownership by the people 
away from a past that was imperfect (authoritarian rule) and a future that is 
free and fair on security issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. 0 Methodology 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
 
In this chapter qualitative method of analysis of the phenomenon of TSS in 
Malawi is undertaken. A social constructivism approach is adopted in 
addressing process of interaction among participants.  Social constructivism 
“provides an opportunity to claim knowledge through alternative process and 
set of assumptions formed through interactions with participants and through 
historical and cultural norms that operate in participants‟ lives.  The goal of 
research is to rely as much as possible on the participant‟s views of the 
situation being studied” (Creswell 2003:8). 
 
The goal of science is to develop an understanding of social life so as to 
discover how people construct meaning in natural settings. Qualitative research 
has a long history in anthropology and sociology although it is no longer 
limited to these disciplines.  It is an accepted methodology in the social 
sciences (Merriam, 2002 and Creswell 2003).   
 
This approach was chosen since its conceptual assumptions did not only 
provide the ideal framework for the researcher to understand the reluctance in 
the transformation of the security institutions in Malawi, but also sought an 
explanation within the realm of the individual consciousness, and subjectivity, 
as opposed to those of the researcher‟s action.  The interest was to know what 
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was meaningful and relevant to what was being studied, and how participants 
interpret their experiences.  Qualitative research is an effort to understand 
situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions 
there. (Merriam, 2002:5)  
3.2 Research design 
 
This study employed interpretive qualitative research method. As interpretive 
it is assumed that knowledge of reality is gained through social construction, 
such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools and other 
artifacts.  It attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that 
people assign to them.  Focussing on the complexity of human sense making 
and aimed at producing an understanding of the context of transformation 
process.  Content analysis is a technique for systematically describing written 
communication and open ended answers to interviews from respondents who 
said what, why, to what extent and with what effect (Krippendorff 1989).   The 
researcher also used process tracing to investigate the social phenomena, in a 
case study between the South African experience and that of Malawi to 
complement the mainstay research method (George and Bennett 2005).The 
qualitative methodology attempted to understand participants‟ perceptions and 
views, while statistical interpretation was for data visualization, using a 
statistical package for social sciences.  The goal of statistical analysis was to 
identify trends, find patterns in unstructured and semi-structured respondents‟ 
information in a graphical presentation.  The study design chosen was suitable 
for learning more about poorly understood situations of the transformation 
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process, and governance of the security sector in Malawi.  The research 
process was bound by the time frame, and collection of information using a 
variety of collection procedures over six months.   
 
3.3 Research participants 
 
The study involved forty participants mostly from Military, Police, Intelligence 
Services, government officials and management bodies of the security sector in 
Malawi who were specialised elite-individual interviewees.  The participants 
were chosen on the basis of their uniqueness, because of particular 
experiences, and the positions that they occupied during the period of study.  
These individual participants (see appendix 2) had appropriate qualifications 
for this investigation because qualitative studies are intended to study some 
phenomena intensively, hence the forty were enough to get a full range of 
information in relation to the phenomena. 
3.4 Sampling Method 
 
The study also involved purposive sampling to obtain data and this entailed 
that individual participants were picked from different security actors as 
illustrated in appendix 3 attached. This yielded information about the topic 
(Leedy et al 2005). 
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3.5 Pilot Testing 
 
A pre-test was conducted at Mzuzu University using students and staff to 
ensure that the questions to be provided to the interviewees during the actual 
interviews were meaningful.  A total of ten respondents were interviewed.  The 
pilot study targeted six students from different security institutions for one to 
one interviews and four staff members of Mzuzu University as key informants. 
The purpose of the pre-test was to assess the format comprehensively and 
cultural appropriateness of the survey instruments to be used for the study. 
Following the pilot survey further improvements were made to the 
questionnaires. 
3.6 Data Collection 
 
The research administered in-depth interviews through questionnaires that 
were given to participants as the main method of data collection supplemented 
by documents as additional methods for primary data triangulation.  Secondary 
data included materials from books, journals, articles and magazines, on 
organisational effectiveness, transformation management and security 
governance (Leedy, et al., 2005:145). 
 
3.6.1 Primary data 
 
The mainstay of qualitative research was the written accounts of what the 
researcher (fieldworker) heard, saw, experienced and thought in the course of 
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collecting and reflecting the data during interviews.  The researcher looked out 
for the following; First, what activities occurred?  Second, where did the 
activities occur?  Third, what were the views and theories of the research 
participants? During the interview process it was essential that data collection 
methods were consistent with ethical principles.  The researcher made sure that 
the participants were willing to be interviewed and knowledgeable of the 
intentions of the research and that any data collected thereof should not be 
traceable back to individuals thereby maintaining the participants‟ privacy. 
 
(a) Individual in-depth interviews 
 
Open-ended semi-structured questions were given to twenty interviewees for 
them to answer on a one on one basis (see Appendix 1). The individual 
interview method was chosen considering the high profile of the participants, 
and in addition the method assisted the researcher to obtain supplementary 
information by asking questions and observing the participants as they 
answered some extra questions.  The participants were allowed to comment on 
transformation and security governance issues that affect security organisations 
in Malawi.  The interviews illuminated the individual participant‟s knowledge, 
opinions, attitudes, but most importantly, their understanding about 
experiences and the outcome of those decisions by government which might 
have affected the security sector.  In line with the requirements of the method, 
the researcher made it certain that the participants were  representative of the 
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group and those chosen were whom the researcher expected to give the typical 
perceptions and perspective (Leedy et al 2005:147).   
 
The individual in depth interview method was chosen so as to provide an 
opportunity for the researcher to understand the participants‟ feelings and their 
experiences better, on how governments‟ policies and decisions affected 
transformation and the organisational performance of the security sector 
elements in Malawi.  The success of the interviews, however, depended on the 
cooperation of the participants themselves. Sometimes they were not willing to 
say anything that one wanted to know.  It was important therefore for the 
researcher to seek informed consent for the participants and protect the privacy 
at all cost (Leedy, et al., 2005:150-154) (See appendix 3).   
 
The other method for primary data collection included appropriate completion 
of individual questionnaire and written documents as indicated below: 
 
(b) Completion of individual questionnaire 
 
Twenty high profile participants were given questionnaires by the researcher at 
specific venues at least one from each site where participants completed the 
questionnaire in the presence of the researcher, who had to explain certain 
questions and concepts of the participants whenever they did not understand 
the concept (see appendix 1).  In this category of data collection the researcher 
106 
   
used a statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) to analyse data and 
produce frequencies, charts, tables and figures. 
 
(c) Documents  
 
Written documents such as memoranda, minutes, agendas from Ministries of 
Defence, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs, headquarters of Army, Police and 
the Office of President and Cabinet were used (Merriam 2005: 13).  The 
documents were carefully reviewed and filtered to avoid incorrect data being 
included.  The researcher had to judge whether a document was authentic by 
reviewing the data to determine its external and internal evidence.  He was 
more concerned with the process through which a text or a document depict 
„reality‟ rather than whether a such text contained true or false statements.  
Other documents included archival sources such as records of parliamentary 
debates on motions of defence and security during the period under review. 
Materials to be studied were the following; cabinet memos, minutes of  
defence council meetings and police reports etc.   Some of this data, in 
particular documents such as defence minutes and police minutes were only 
available in those organisations (army, police and office of the president and 
cabinet) that produce them (Leedy et al 2005 and Silverman 2006). 
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3.6.2 Secondary data 
 
Secondary data sources included all the text books cited in the introduction, 
and the literature review chapter.  Such data provides a useful source for 
answering research questions.  Most research questions were answered using a 
combination of secondary and primary data.  To this end the availability of 
both primary and secondary data enabled the researcher to capture most of the 
responses (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2000 and Churchill 1999). 
 
3.6.3 Data storage 
 
The first concern in terms of the data being collected was the form in which it 
was to be kept.  It was important for the researcher to keep the research setting; 
field notes, and reports, so that information gathered would not be lost or 
forgotten.  This granted a sure and safe way of data storage system. 
 
When conducting the interviews a form was used.  The form included the 
following components: “(a) heading (b) Instruction (c) the key research 
questions to be asked (d) probes to follow key questions (e) transition 
messages for the interview (f) space for recording the interview‟s comments 
and (g) space in which the researcher recorded reflective notes.”  However, a 
protocol for recording information was established that identified (a) 
Information about the document (b) key categories that the researcher looked 
for and established (Creswell 1994). 
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3.7 Data analysis 
 
Analysis involved working with the data, organizing them, breaking them into 
manageable units, synthesizing them, and searching for patterns, discovering 
what was important and what was to be learned.  In this study therefore, I 
manually sorted out and analysed the data as described by Creswell (2003: 
191-195): 
 
Step 1 “Organising and preparing data for analysing and this 
involves transcribing interviews by optically scanning 
material and typing up field notes 
 
Step 2 Reading through all the data in order to obtain a general 
sense of information and reflecting its overall meaning 
 
Step 3  Detailing analyses with a coding process 
 
Step 4 Using the coding process to generate a description of the 
setting or people as well as categories or themes for 
analysis 
 
Step 5 Advancing how the description and themes will be 
represented in the qualitative narrative.  The most 
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popular approach is to use a narrative passage to convey 
the findings of analysis 
 
Step 6 Making an interpretation or meaning of the data about 
the lessons learned.  These lessons could be the 
researcher‟s personal interpretation, crunched in the 
individual understanding that the inquirer brings to the 
study from his own culture, history and experiences.” 
 
In addition, apart from analysing data manually, the researchers made use of 
Microsoft excel and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to 
produce charts, tables and figures.  The employment of an array of methods in 
the study enabled triangulation to take place so as to have confidence in the 
data interpretation.  Furthermore, the interpretation of the data involved 
exploring the main purpose and secondary objectives of the study while linking 
it to the literature review chapter throughout the investigation of the research. 
3.8 Verification 
 
This study achieved its trustworthiness in the following ways:  by making use 
of multiple methods of data production and analysis.  Additionally, this study 
made use of a thick description of not only data but also of the study setting 
with consequent detailed and precise report which built strong justification for 
its results.  The researcher took six months for adequate data generation and 
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this was a long period for regular and repeated observations of similar 
phenomena (Leedy et al 2005).   
 
Furthermore, the researcher kept an up to date and detailed diary of field 
events during data collection process.  These notes were fed into the main 
descriptive document and added to the credibility of the results obtained. The 
researcher took transcripts of interviews back to the participants to check with 
them whether what was summarised from the data was what they actually said, 
a process known as „respondent validation‟ (Leedy et al.,  2005:155).  This 
input of „check list‟ added to the credibility of results.  Validity was achieved 
through use of multiple sources of evidence reflected by the data collection 
tools employed. The researcher also went to verify data by ascertaining the 
question of using the guidelines known as “assessing the quality of qualitative 
research and strategies for promoting validity and reliability” (Leedy et al 2005 
and Merriam 2002:23). 
3.9 Ethical Considerations 
 
The greatest ethical issue in research of this nature was the relations between 
the participants and researcher. The participants in this study were beings who 
have the right to privacy and protection.  In order to ensure protection of the 
forty participants, clearance was sought from Mzuzu University director of 
research.  To accomplish this, the researcher explained to the participants the 
purpose, benefits and the time to be spent, privacy and anonymity that were to 
be safeguarded.  The participants were assured of the confidentiality of the 
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information that they were going to divulge.  Anonymity was to be ensured by 
way of using participant‟s interview numbers and codes instead of names.  In 
any research, confidentiality is an obligation but also reflect on high integrity 
of the researcher.  Likewise participants were explained in detail on the 
purpose of the study and they were given freedom to opt out at any point 
during the interviews (Merriam 2002 and Leedy et al 2005). 
 
3.10 Research Strategy 
 
For the greater part, this qualitative research took place in Mzuzu City in the 
Northern Region of Malawi where the researcher resides.  Most of the research 
plan and the writing of the proposal was done in Mzuzu.  However, the other 
greater part of the research was conducted in Lilongwe, the Capital City of 
Malawi in the Central Region where most participants reside.  See appendix 5 
for the work plan, showing the viability of my research proposal, indicating 
target dates necessary to meet the study programme. 
3.11 Reporting the Findings 
 
Copies of this study will be made available to all security organisations in 
Malawi, the Office of the President and Cabinet and other security 
management bodies, with a view of helping them develop appropriate security 
strategies and policies to address security governance and transformation 
problems for the entire security sector in Malawi. 
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3.12 Limitation of the Research 
 
The study involved senior security officers, senior officials in security 
management bodies and senior officials in civil society organisations.  There 
was need for informed written consent from all security institutions.  The forty 
small study samples might have limited generalisability of findings but 
transferability was possible.  Participants may not have felt free to disclose 
their security experiences for reasons of confidentiality.  I treaded carefully 
and tried to build a rapport with the participants and convinced them that the 
information will be treated in a way that will not indicate or expose any 
authorship for privacy and personnel security reasons (Creswell 2003). Since 
the study was confined to security officers, security management bodies, senior 
officials and a few participants from the civil society, most of the views from 
the citizenry, were missing out and indeed that is one of the major limitations. 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodology that guided the investigation of the 
study‟s specific four objectives. The output was presented through graphs, pie 
charts and labels for statistical data interpretation, while qualitative data was 
analysed through content analysis whereby data went through coding and 
interpretations.  In the following chapter, key findings from the study are 
presented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 Presentation of Findings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of the study whose purpose was to undertake an 
audit of the transformation process of the security sector and its security 
management bodies in Malawi from 1994 to 2014 in the context of transition 
to multiparty democracy.  The findings focused on qualitative method of 
interpreting data.  In order to expand the scope of data collection, some 
statistical data interpretation was also employed to ascertain numerical values 
to validate the finding of the study.  Charts graphs and tables were produced by 
a technique called statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). 
 
The researcher has also paid attention to the method of process tracing on a 
case study which has attempted to trace links between possible causes and 
outcomes of TSS in Malawi and the Republic of South Africa from 1994.  The 
process tracing method was used to test whether the residual differences 
between the two countries would have any different effects on TSS since both 
have come from authoritarian rule type of government.  This was based on the 
sequence of events in the transformation process observed inductively (George 
and Bennett 2005). 
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This was an exploratory study design which followed a logical framework of 
qualitative data gathering approaches.  Qualitative methodology produces the 
most needed data in accordance to the objectives of the study.  Results  came 
by choosing ideas, drawn together from themes in literature review, 
documents, and interview transcripts given to forty participants in dispersed 
geographical locations throughout the main towns of Malawi (see appendix 2). 
4.1.1The Dynamics of Political Space towards the Advancement of TSS in 
Malawi 
 
The findings used literature review data contained in chapter one to identify 
gaps on how the past governments looked at security issues. For example, 
during the colonial era there were no legislative and executive bodies to pass 
laws and discharge functions in the security sector.  The security sector, were 
mainly conceived for tasks against dissenting citizenry views and opposition 
parties.  Since then the loyalty of the security actors remained very much with 
the Head of State or the ruling party.   Likewise, from the historical 
perspective, the term colonialism refers to a long tradition of military conquest 
and the scramble for Africa.  Indeed during the colonial period, states made use 
of the armed forces, intelligence services and the police to fight wars, suppress 
insurgences and silence those who had opposing views.  As a consequence, 
citizens in post colonial states have remained accustomed to their governments 
deciding on security matters of a country.  Moreover, this is truce, as the period 
of post-colonial dictatorship is frequently associated with a country‟s “belle 
époque” the period of comfortable and peaceful life before multiparty 
democracy.  This is due to the fact that the military and other security agencies 
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in former colonial and dictatorial era often enjoyed high prestige which has 
hampered oversight.  For the purpose of this study, the mere existence of 
African democracies seems less important, however, than the use of the 
security agencies in protecting the regime and suppressing the citizenry. 
(Wagner 2006:16). During the multiparty era, whilst practices associated with 
democracy have grown considerably, management and functions of the 
security sector are still colonial in nature.  It is like having the same script 
played by different actors (Mandiza 2002, Lwanda 1993 and Kanyongolo 
2006). 
 
The historical context of security in Malawi is that of an authoritarian type of 
political system which dominated the country for over thirty years until 1994 
when the country became a multiparty system for the second time.  The most 
challenging area during Malawi‟s transition has been the transformation of the 
security sector.  The new 1994 constitution of the Republic of Malawi is silent 
in many areas.   Some acts and regulations for instance, the Official Secrets 
Act (1960) and the Protected Places and Areas Act (1960) have not been 
amended or repealed.   The system still relies on repressive laws and practices 
(Kanyongolo 2012). 
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4.1.2 Basic Conceptual Approaches and Links of TSS/SSR 
 
As a framework for interpreting data, the researcher found it necessary to 
distinguish between the concept of Transformation of the Security Sector 
(TSS) and that of Security Sector Reform (SSR) as a link to good Security 
Sector Governance.  The concept of SSR may mean to change the old habits 
while TSS seeks to free and liberate the mindset of the security actors to aspire 
to the values and worthiness of a nation in a democratic transition.  SSR in 
almost all literature reviewed is increasingly recognised as a key contribution 
to promoting peace and development.  Explanations from literature review 
indicate that the terms Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Transformation of 
the Security Sector (TSS) are interchangeable.  However, SSR has some 
elements of post-conflict peace building efforts.  As a framework for 
organising and interpreting data, the researcher sought to distinguish between 
TSS and SSR.  The former describes situations in the four transformation 
clusters of political, cultural, human and organisational process. whilst the 
latter highlights inherent tensions between intervention and ownership.  SSR 
encompasses a narrow range of goals to address deep rooted cleavages 
amongst politicians, government officials, security actors and civil society 
from past authoritarian rule. 
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4.1.3 Comparability of TSS in South Africa and Malawi 
 
The findings revealed that South African‟s change of government from 
apartheid to multiparty democracy in 1994 was a major turning point towards 
advancement of transformation of the security sector.  The transformation 
process was inclusive of political actors, security actors and civil society, who 
also had an opportunity to engage in the debate about the role of the security 
sector.  In Malawi the participants said one could argue that there has not been 
an attempt to transform the security sector.  The Malawi government never 
called for such a programme as indicated in table 18 on who should initiate a 
joint assistance programme for TSS.  Consequently, the case for TSS in 
Malawi has not been understood by the political actors. 
 
4.1.4 Relevance of Transformation of the Security Sector 
 
The research data confirms the relevance of transforming the security sector 
for various reasons:  The need for progress towards conflict prevention, and 
stability in order to contribute to sustainable economic development.  The idea 
is the absolute necessity to address the security situation of the country that 
passed through regime change.  Transformation springs from desire for 
survival and the need to respond to challenges is therefore a need that the 
security sector responds to the demands of a democratic country, and that this 
is a continuous, endless process.  For transformation to occur it requires that 
the executive, security practitioners and civil society be committed to new 
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thinking condition learning and action.  Findings furthermore revealed that 
transformation of the security sector in Malawi was seen in specific 
institutional terms, not necessarily in all institutions and that it was driven by 
external actors such as foreign donor agencies as was the case with Malawi 
Police Service in 2002 (OECD 2005). 
 
4.2 Demographic Data 
 
The following tables and figures provide the general profile of participants 
indicating area of residence, official status, age, formal education and gender.  
The tables and figures show the percentages for the proportion of the sample of 
the 20 participants who completed the questionnaire. 
 
4.2.1 Age Group of Participants 
Figure 6:  Respondent Age 
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The age group sample distribution contained in figure 6 above shows the age 
of 26 to 30 years, and 31 to 40 years.  This was the bracket that most 
participants belonged to and they were the majority who have witnessed of 
what has been happening.  (See figure 6 above) 
 
4.2.2 Gender of Participants 
Figure 7:  Sex of participants 
 
In figure 7above 98 percent were male participants and 2 percent were female 
participants.  It can be observed that there are more male participants than 
females due to the fact that security institutions and management bodies in 
Malawi and across Africa are male dominated. 
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4.2.3 Official status 
Figure 8:  Official Status 
 
Figure 8 above indicates that data was collected from several sources and areas 
within the security sector institutions and security management bodies and 
civil society. The majority were civil servants and security officials, more than 
those from academia and civil society. 
 
4.2.4 Level of Education 
Table 5.  Level of Education 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Malawi School Certificate 6 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Diploma 5 25.0 25.0 55.0 
University Degree 7 35.0 35.0 90.0 
Other 2 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
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The majority of participants as indicated in table 5 above were university 
graduates, 35 percent of them belonged to this group, 30 percent were holders 
of the Malawi School Certificate of Education, 25 percent were diploma 
holders, and 10 percentages were other. 
4.3 Political and Organisational Transformation 
 
The following tables and figures were used to determine political relationships 
and the organisational character of the security sector with elected authorities 
and the civil power for enabling the transformation process on objective one of 
the study. 
4.3.1 Political System 
Table 6.  Political System 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 5 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Agree 3 15.0 15.0 40.0 
Agree slightly 7 35.0 35.0 75.0 
Disagree slightly 2 10.0 10.0 85.0 
Disagree 3 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The participants when asked whether the country‟s political system was 
multiparty or dictatorship type of government.  Majority of participants said it 
was more or less dictatorship as indicated in the table 6 that 35 percent agree 
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slightly, 25 percent agree strongly 15 percent agree which makes a total of 75 
percent majority saying there was domination of dictatorship system in the past 
and only 25 percent disagreed.   When this question was further interrogated in 
qualitative interviews, it emerged that indeed dictatorship dominated the 
country for over thirty years until 1994.  A Senior MDF Officer said that 
“Kamuzu was like a God and there is no difference to what the presidents in 
the multiparty do: Women dance for them, they have absolute power”.   
Expressing a similar view a former member of Parliament summarised that 
“the Cash Gate scandal has indeed plundered the economy”. Discussions from 
the interviews confirm that it has been difficult for some political leaders to 
change their mindset to align themselves with multiparty democracy and its 
requirements. 
4.3.2 The State of the Economy in Malawi 
 
Table 7:  State of Economy  
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 6 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Agree 10 50.0 50.0 80.0 
Agree slightly 3 15.0 15.0 95.0 
Disagree 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The participants were asked the state of the economy in Malawi. 
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As table 7 above shows, 95 percent of the interviewees observed that the 
economy has sharp changes in the macroeconomic climate which has led to the 
growth of hidden corruption and illicit transactions while only 5 percent of the 
respondents disagreed. During the in-depth interviews, respondents said that 
there was rampant corruption and illicit transactions by the leadership.  
Furthermore, the participants said that the 17 years of multiparty democracy 
have seen Malawi‟s economy plundered by civil authorities.  Those in the 
cabinet or particular Member of Parliament found themselves rich within a 
short period of time as corruption has become rampant.  The participants 
revealed that in 1994, the economy of the country started to grow due to donor 
support, but started falling in 2001 after most of the donors pulled out their 
support from the country because of high profile corruption cases. 
4.3.3 Power Structures and Relations on Security Policy 
Table 8: Power Structure and Security Policy 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 3 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Agree 4 20.0 20.0 35.0 
Agree slightly 5 25.0 25.0 60.0 
Disagree slightly 1 5.0 5.0 65.0 
Disagree 4 20.0 20.0 85.0 
Disagree 
strongly 
3 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
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As regards the role of power structures and security policy in table 8 above 
shows that 60 percent of the interviewees said there were no power structures 
and 40 percent of the interviewees agree that there were some power 
structures.  When this question was put across to participants in qualitative 
interviews, it emerged that there was arbitrary policy making due to lack of 
transparency among the political leadership.   
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4.3.4 Key Security Policies and Objectives 
Table 9:  Key Security Policies and Objectives 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 7 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Agree 9 45.0 45.0 80.0 
Agree slightly 2 10.0 10.0 90.0 
Disagree slightly 1 5.0 5.0 95.0 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The participants were asked whether there were security policies for the 
security institutions. Table 9 above shows that the majority of participants 
which is35 percent of them agree strongly, 45 percent agreed and 10 percent 
agree slightly that there are different values and perception across players 
regarding key security policies and objectives for the country and only 5 
percent of them disagreed strongly and 5 percent disagreed slightly.  
Furthermore, from the interviews the participants said that there were 
significant differences among security actors.  Each set of actors were mostly 
concerned with the protection of the presidency.  Expressing a similar view, a 
junior officer of the MDF said, “security to the average Malawian is about 
feeling sage when you are at home.  Otherwise, it is all about the protection fo 
the President wherever he is or is going”  The different security actors operate 
in isolation due to the lack of an overarching security policy. 
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4.3.5 Political Rights on Security 
Table 10: Civil Society Political Rights 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 3 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Agree 4 20.0 20.0 35.0 
Agree slightly 2 10.0 10.0 45.0 
Disagree slightly 4 20.0 20.0 65.0 
Disagree 5 25.0 25.0 90.0 
Disagree 
strongly 
2 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
 
The participants were asked how free the civil society was to exercise political 
rights on matters of security. From table 10 above, it can be seen that 45 
percent of the respondents said that there was influential space for civil society 
to freely exercise political rights on issues of security and that 55 percent of the 
interviewees disagreed.  Participants on qualitative interviews revealed that 
whenever the civil society voiced out their concerns the government did not 
take up their opinions or criticism.  For instance when Civil Society members 
of the Livingstonia Church of Central African Presbyterian organised a 
peaceful demonstration, they were stopped and blocked by the Malawi Police 
Service on instructions by government as indicated below in the picture. 
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Figure 9: Police Block Synod of Livingstonia Demonstration 
 
Source: the Nation Jan 2010 
 
4.3.6 Media Operates Freely 
Table 11: Media operates freely 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 3 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Agree 2 10.0 10.0 25.0 
Agree slightly 1 5.0 5.0 30.0 
Disagree slightly 4 20.0 20.0 50.0 
Disagree 3 15.0 15.0 65.0 
Disagree 
strongly 
7 35.0 35.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The question was meant to investigate whether the media in Malawi operates 
freely or not.  Table 11 above indicates that, the media in Malawi does not 
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operate freely without interference from the state. Seventy percent of the 
participants disagree and 30percent of them agree.  During in depth interviews 
some of the participants said that whenever the civil society voiced their 
concerns on a particular issue the government did not condone any dissenting 
views or criticism and sometimes it used threats to shutdown the media house 
or simply punish it by ordering government departments to stop advertising 
through such particular media.  Most of the participants interviewed gave the 
example of the peaceful conference organised by Public Affairs Committee 
(PAC) which was held in Blantyre and was declared illegal by government as 
shown in the picture below.  However, responding to the same question, a civil 
society activist cautioned that despite confrontations with the Malawi Police 
Service, the country has enjoyed freedom of expression since the advent of 
multiparty democracy. 
 
Figure 10  Alleged Illegal Conference by Public Affairs Committee (PAC) 
 
 
Source: Nation March 2012-09-11 
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4.3.7 Civil Society Structures Supporting the State 
Table 12: Civil Society Structures Support 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  Agree strongly 7 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Agree 8 40.0 40.0 75.0 
Agree slightly 3 15.0 15.0 90.0 
Disagree 1 5.0 5.0 95.0 
Disagree strongly 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The participants were asked whether the civil society structures do support the 
state in a democracy.  Table 12 above shows that 90 percent of the participants 
agreed that Civil Society structures support the state for democratisation in 
Malawi.  However, during further interrogations participants said that while 
the civil society structures support the state, most of them have no monitoring 
and oversight groups at national as well as local level. 
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4.3.8  Influences over the Ruling Elite by the Opposition Political Parties 
Table 13: Influences over Ruling Elite 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 10 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Agree 6 30.0 30.0 80.0 
Disagree slightly 2 10.0 10.0 90.0 
Disagree 1 5.0 5.0 95.0 
Disagree strongly 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
As regarding opposition political parties influence over the ruling elite, table 
13 above indicates that 80 percent of the interviewees agree that there is no 
influence by the opposition political parties on matters of the state.  On further 
interrogation the interviews revealed that the opposition political parties are 
very weak due to their small numbers in parliament. Furthermore, the findings 
revealed that given the variations of perceptions within each group of the 
opposition parties generalisations are difficult to make.  However some 
participants said that the opposition parties have no direct influence in security 
matters of the nation.  This was due to the fact that it is difficult for the 
political parties to obtain information on security issues.  Political opposition 
parties are mostly concerned with wining the next election.  However, due to 
being in the minority in parliament, their views on security matters are not 
always taken on board. 
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4.4 Human Practice and Cultural Norms Perspective 
 
These finding are based on the study‟s objective number 2 which was to assess 
human practice and cultural norms of the security actors for enabling the 
transformation process in Malawi. 
 
4.4.1 A Body on National Security Policy Process 
Figure 11:  Policy Making process 
 
The participants were asked whether there was a body working on national 
security policy for the state.  Figure 11 above reveals that 80 percent of the 
participants disagreed to whether there was a national security policy making 
body in Malawi.  Some participants said that there have been no primary roles 
of policymakers on national security policy from time immemorial.  
Participants such as academics and the majority of the private sector said that 
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the issue of national policy has never been discussed.  This could be due to the 
fact that those in power did not understand the importance of such documents 
for the country‟s security.  Most of them had never come across or heard of the 
think tank on national security policy.  A Senior Army Officer of the Malawi 
Defence Force dismissed any thinking that there is a body or a think tank that 
looks at national security issues and come up with a national security strategy. 
 
4.4.2 Adequate Oversight Mechanisms 
 
Figure12. Internal and external oversight mechanisms 
 
In figure 12 above the majority of the participants disagreed that there were 
adequate internal and external oversight mechanism in the security sector.  
However, some said the Defence and Security Parliamentary Committee was 
the only oversight body for the security institutions in Malawi.  A veteran 
security officer argued that the parliamentary committee on Defence and 
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Security is overstretched by the nature of its composition looking into the 
affairs of all the security institutions.  In his view, there should be 
subcommittees for each security institution. 
 
4.4.3 Executive and Parliamentarians adequately equipped and trained 
on TSS 
Figure13. Members trained on the roles assigned on security 
 
The respondents were asked whether the Executive and Members of 
Parliament are thoroughly equipped and adequately trained on TSS. Figure 13 
above indicates that 75 percent of participants disagreed that the Executive and 
Parliamentarians are adequately equipped and trained on transformation 
process. Of the participants, particularly Security Officials, the Executive and 
Members of Parliament were asked how much training they received on TSS 
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during their tour of duty.  They revealed that the only important training 
programmes on TSS were organised by Mzuzu University at the Centre for 
Security Studies.  Some said they attended such training at Malawi Armed 
Forces College organised by British team on Managing Defence and Security 
in a democracy. 
 
4.4.4 Frameworks on TSS Process 
Figure 14 Existing development to embark on TSS process 
 
 
The findings in figure 14 above indicate that the majority of the participants 
did not agree that there was an existing development framework in Malawi to 
embark on the TSS process.  However, some held a different view of this issue 
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significantly.  They indicated that the development framework depended on 
particular security actors, and hence cannot be over-generalised. 
4.4.5 Government to Support Security Institutions to Reform 
 
It was revealed that the Malawi Police Service and the Malawi Defence Force 
have attempted to reform but have not proceeded because of lack of support 
from government. Other security institutions for instance, Intelligence, 
Immigration and Prison Services have not even attempted to do so. 
 
Figure 15. Political programmes do not  provide entry point to TSS 
 
From the findings in figure 15 above the majority of the participants 65 percent 
of them indicated that the government has no desire to support the security 
institutions to transform.  Likewise 35 percent of the interviewees said that the 
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government was in support at same time it had no knowledge of the need for 
the security sector to transform. 
 
4.4.6 The Role of the State in the Regional Peace and Security 
Table 14: Role of the State in Region 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Agree 6 30.0 30.0 40.0 
Agree slightly 5 25.0 25.0 65.0 
Disagree slightly 1 5.0 5.0 70.0 
Disagree 4 20.0 20.0 90.0 
Disagree strongly 2 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The findings in table 14 above show that the majority of the participants 65 
percent confirmed that Malawi does play a significant role in the region by 
offering its security men and women to assist in peace missions in the region 
and beyond. 
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4.4.7 Security Threat to Malawi – Internally and Externally 
Table 15: Security Threats to Malawi 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 6 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Agree 6 30.0 30.0 60.0 
Agree slightly 1 5.0 5.0 65.0 
Disagree slightly 2 10.0 10.0 75.0 
Disagree 2 10.0 10.0 85.0 
Disagree strongly 3 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
In the findings table 15 above,65 percent of the participants agree that the 
evolving situation on the ground is that of internal instability.  Partially, but not 
very grave, is the instability between the people who are fighting for human 
rights and the government.  These have taken forms of strikes, demonstrations 
looting and violence.  The findings indicated that the major threats are the way 
the police handle the unarmed civilians during such demonstrations.  For 
example the July 20, 2011 killings by the police in the five main cities of 
Karonga, Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Blantyre and Zomba during the peaceful 
demonstrations is clear testimony to the fact that police erred in the way to 
handle the innocent civilians .  However, in the view of a senior army officer 
of the Malawi Defence Force that the country has in the past two years 
witnessed border dispute with Tanzania over the boundary of the lake between 
two countries.  In his view, this may end up escalating into significant conflict 
leading to war.  He further pointed out that Malawian‟s security vulnerabilities 
stem from the fact that the country has a small army which is not well 
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equipped compared to most of the armies in SADC region.  Further, another 
senior immigrant officer cited illegal immigrants who are involved in 
establishing small business without permits to stay and do business in the 
country.  The officer attributes this to Malawi‟s open stance of accepting 
refugees. 
 
4.4.8 The Culture within Security Institutions 
 
The findings sought the views of the private security sector and national 
government security management officials to find out about the culture that 
existed in these institutions.  The interviewees revealed that the police and the 
intelligence service left a lot to be desired.  These are widely viewed as 
conservative and unprofessional organs that function for the state and not for 
the people.  They have old regulations, lack financial resources and internal 
coherence.  There is lack of information sharing and coordination, pay is poor 
and there is a lack of professional ethos and work ethics. 
 
4.5 Challenges to Transformation of the Security Sector in Malawi 
 
This tool was used to respond to objective 3 to determine constraints that my 
impede transformation process in the security institutions and management 
bodies in a transitional democracy in Malawi. 
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4.5.1 Framework to Embark on TSS process 
 
From table 16 above, it can be seen that 65 percent of the participants indicated 
that there are development frameworks currently available in Malawi to 
embark on a transformation process for the security sector and management 
bodies. On the other hand, 35 percent of the interviewees disagree.  During the 
interviews the minority of the participants said that they did not know if there 
were such initiatives relating to transformation for the security institutions and 
security management bodies. 
 
 
Table 16: Current Development Framework for TSS Process 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Agree 2 10.0 10.0 20.0 
Agree slightly 9 45.0 45.0 65.0 
Disagree slightly 3 15.0 15.0 80.0 
Disagree 3 15.0 15.0 95.0 
Disagree 
strongly 
1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
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4.5.2 Civil Service Reform Programme 
 Table 17: Civil Service Reform Programme 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid      Agree  strongly    1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
              Agree 5 25.0 25.0 30.0 
              Agree slightly 5 25.0 25.0 55.0 
              Disagree slightly 3 15.0 15.0 70.0 
              Disagree  2 10.0 10.0 80.0 
              Disagree strongly 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
              Total  20 100.0 100.0  
 
During interviews, participants were asked whether there was a programme on 
civil service reform. 
 
Table 17 above reveals that 60 percent of the participants agreed that there was 
some resistance to transform the security sector. Likewise 40 percent of the 
participants interviewed did not agree. The participants revealed that there was 
no government effort to create civil service reform so as to secure the support  
of the civil society organisations and the community.   On a closer examination 
during the interviews some participants said that there was lack of planning to 
be conceived by the government. 
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4.5.3 Joint Assistance Programme for TSS 
Table 18: Security Sector, Civil Society, Executive Joint Assistance 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Agree slightly 4 20.0 20.0 25.0 
Disagree slightly 5 25.0 25.0 50.0 
Disagree 7 35.0 35.0 85.0 
Disagree strongly 3 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
The findings indicated that 75 percent disagree that there was any joint 
assistance programme at all on TSS at any time in Malawi as indicated in table 
18 above. 
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4.5.4 Financial Support by Government on TSS 
Table 19: Financial Support to Security Institutions Reform 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree strongly 1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Agree 1 5.0 5.0 10.0 
Agree slightly 4 20.0 20.0 30.0 
Disagree slightly 4 20.0 20.0 50.0 
Disagree 6 30.0 30.0 80.0 
Disagree strongly 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
A question was put across to establish if the Malawi government made any 
efforts to support the TSS financially.  Table 19 above summarises the 
findings.  As seen from the table above, 70 percent of the participants did not 
agree that the government has made any efforts to provide financial support to 
security institutions to reform. On the other hand 30 percent of the 
interviewees agree that government had made some strides to support the TSS 
programme. 
 
4.6 Strategies for Effective Transformation 
 
In this section, the discussion was based on the study‟s objective 4.  To 
identify strategies that can be developed for the implementation of effective 
transformation process of the security institutions and security management 
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bodies in Malawi.  The question meant to solicit the public‟s views on the 
matter of effective transformation.    
 
4.6.1 A Requirement of a clear case for TSS 
Figure16  TSS needed 
 
In figure 16 above 80 percent of the participants were of the opinion that there 
was no will on the part of the executive to support and advocate TSS.  This 
was due to lack of capacity.   Likewise, lack of strength of the state designing a 
TSS programme for Malawi is the major problem. 
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4.6.2 Who should initiate the Programme of TSS? 
Figure17 Executive to Initiate TSS programme 
 
The findings revealed that the majority of the participants strongly agree that 
the executive of the government should initiate the programme as indicated in 
figure 17 above.  In-depth interviews pointed out that TSS initiation required 
the support of other institutions such as vibrant civil societies, government 
ministries particularly the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs.  In many cases the requisite infrastructure was extremely weak.  The 
security institutions themselves were under-funded and therefore there were no 
strategies made for TSS from 1994 to the present time. 
4.6.3 Requirements for training to understand TSS 
Figure 18 Requirement of MPs and senior security officials TSS training 
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As regarding training to understand the transformation process 80 percent of 
the participants were of the view that training for the Executive, Members of 
Parliament and Senior Security officials was paramount as indicated in figure 
18 above. 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented findings of the study by examining the 
transformation process allowing participants to give their views on the four 
specific questions represented to them.  The research also applied the process 
tracing method which has attempted to give the true picture of TSS between 
the countries of Malawi and the republic of South Africa on possible causes 
and outcomes of TSS as revealed in the literature review.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 Discussion of the Results 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses and analyses findings from chapter four to allow the 
researcher to interpret the participants‟ views from both qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives on the transformation of the security sector and 
security management bodies in Malawi. 
5.2 Demographic Data 
 
The sample of 40 participants included participants in the security sector and 
security management bodies, civilian senior officials in government, members 
of parliament, civil society and academics.  The sample was reasonably fair 
and the majority of participants were security officers and senior security 
officials.  The results obtained from the sample provide strong evidence to 
sustain the conclusion that forty (40) participants interviewed were from the 
target population required.  The sample was therefore sufficient to explore and 
construct a profile of security institutions and security management bodies‟ 
personnel.  As regards geographical location, the study covered all security 
institutions in major cities of Malawi, namely Mzuzu in the Northern part of 
Malawi, Lilongwe and Salima in the Central and Zomba and Blantyre in the 
Southern Region. This represented all participants living and staying within 
security institutions localities as indicated in appendix 6.  Most of the 
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participants had basic education at the level of Malawi School Certificate of 
Education (MSCE) up to a university degree level.  Sixty percent of those 
given the questionnaire were high profile participants who had at least a 
diploma, and were employed or have worked in the security institutions. 
5.2.1. Age Group of Participants 
 
The sample distribution as revealed in the findings (figure 6) indicates that the 
majority of the participants were of the age bracket between 26 to 30 years and 
31 to 40 years.  There is evidence to suggest that the age group between 26 to 
40 years would understand the need for transformation of the security sector 
more likely.  However, this age group is in the middle class management and 
therefore cannot influence change in the institutions. 
5.2.2   Gender 
 
In figure 7 results indicate that only 2 percent were female participants.  Most 
empirical studies have found that security institutions in Africa predominantly 
employ men.  In agreement with this view, Hendrick & Valasek (2010:74) note 
that “African armed forces and police services are often suffused with 
discriminatory policies and practices.”  This probably explains why the number 
of females in most of the security institutions in Malawi.  Nevertheless in 
terms of culture and tradition it has been observed that in Africa females 
exhibit less security tendencies than men.   
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Decisions concerning security or protection of the household are made by men 
and females are often not allowed to participate let alone to make a choice to 
join the security services.  In agreement with this view, Hendricks et al 
(2010:73) “assert that security institutions are themselves steeped in a sexist 
institutional culture. They deeply influence the institutions‟ doctrine and 
procedures, structures as well as operations”.  Under these circumstances 
culture and tradition dictate that female security officers stay into the offices 
and administrate while male security officers go in the field for combat 
training and fighting the enemy. 
 
In most cultures, including Malawi, females are expected to take care of the 
elderly and the children, a factor which limits their ability to join the security 
institutions.  Nevertheless gender issues can be an objective, an entry point and 
an indicator of security transformation.  A transformed security sector needs to 
be able to meet the different security needs of man, women, boys and girls as 
well as being an equitable employer to male and female staff (Hendricks & 
Valasek 2010). 
 
According to Mlambo (2010:177) citing Solemn Declaration on Gender 
Equality in Africa (2004), notes that “in the area of peace and security, the 
Solemn Declaration on Common African Defence and Security Policy calls on 
member states to provide a framework for the effective participation of women 
in conflict prevention, management and resolution activities. Specifically the 
national governments SSR process should aim at achieving the following: 
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Improving the mechanism for the prevention of gender-based violence with the 
aim of ending all violence against women.  Likewise involve women at all 
levels of SSR, with the aim of creating more representative Security Sector 
Institutions.  Also address specific needs of female ex-combatants as well as 
wives and widows of former combatants”. 
5.2.3 Education 
 
Findings show that education is inversely related to social class.  In many cases 
it appears as a deterrent to security reform.  The author attributes this to the 
huge number of the lower ranks in the security institutions, most of whom 
compose the institutions and less educated. These findings seem to suggest that 
those interviewed were the leadership group who may understand 
transformation processes of the security sector in a democratic transition.  
Along with educated security officers, there are some who are unschooled and 
have risen to high ranks in the security sector.  Some of these may have 
attained such ranks on the basis of belonging to the ethnic group of the 
political leadership of the time. 
 
5.3 Political Space towards the Advancement of Transformation of       the 
Security Sector 
 
Reasonable basic education aside as indicated in the demographic data, the 
importance of the nation‟s security and the protection of its citizenry cannot be 
overemphasized.  The general picture in the literature review and from the 
interview findings reveals that the security sector institutions in Malawi from 
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the colonial era to the present time have hitherto been guided by broad 
mandates stipulated in the old Constitution and much more by directives 
provided by political leaders from time to time. 
 
For instance during the Banda era (1963 to 1993), the people of Malawi had to 
abide by the “Four Corner Stones” of the Malawi Congress Party manifesto:  
Loyalty, Obedience, Unity and Discipline.  Security forces and services were 
used coercively to serve the interests of the few in power rather than the 
legitimate security needs of the citizenry.  The citizenry in Malawi suffered 
from the dominance of their leaders who strove for absolute power.  Similarly 
the citizenry lacked democratic decision making mechanisms characterised by 
a concentrated power structure that depended on dictatorship.  
 
The multiparty democracy in 1994 was expected to be different. On the 
contrary, multiparty Presidents:  Dr.  Bakili Muluzi and Dr. Bingu wa 
Mutharika from1994 to 2004 and 2004 to 2012 respectively in their own ways 
ruled with an iron hand in different forms.  To contain such behaviour there 
was need for the civil society to reasonably undertake dialogue and have 
mutual accommodation of each other.  However, Police and Intelligence 
Services pursued and arrested innocent Malawians and others went into exile.  
Clearly the security institutions did not take into account the needs of civilians.  
 
The findings confirmed that although the country has been in a democratic 
transition from 1994 to 2012, the security institutions have not satisfactory 
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changed.  During the period under review the country has continued to witness 
problems of insecurity perpetrated by the political leadership and security 
institutions themselves.  For instance, on 20
th
 July 2011 twenty people died 
during peaceful demonstrations organised by the civil society and other untold 
atrocities have been the order of the day.(Commission of Inquiry Report 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, what has been clear is that actual forms of government in the 
past and the period under review, each with its own strengths and weaknesses 
in playing a role in the application of security for the citizenry and state.  For 
example the authoritarian system under Dr. H.K. Banda restricted the citizenry 
from enjoying their freedom and rights.  The regime also permitted 
formulation of highly organised state security strategies that were not only 
barbaric but also brutal.  On the other hand the current democratic system of 
governance by comparison, requires security strategies that call for both 
consensus-building and persuasion in an open pluralistic society.   
 
In order to be effective, the political leadership and policy makers must 
understand the different sources of security for the nation and its citizenry, as 
well as the respective strengths and limitations.  A government may  take the 
shape and operate the way it does on security issues for complex reasons and 
many of which reflect on the experiences of the citizenry and their attitudes 
towards, and expectations of, what the government is supposed to do and how 
it should be.  For instance, a fear of too much state power caused the people of 
Malawi to call for multiparty democracy in 1994. A country may have a 
152 
   
democratic-sounding system that has little in common with the actual 
operations of the security institutions and security management bodies.  The 
opening of political space in 1994 was an opportunity for a major strategic 
moment in the advancement towards the transformation of the security sector 
and management bodies in Malawi.  Political conditions created a window of 
opportunity for a transformation process as an entry point for citizens to take 
part in issues of national security.  Despite the reservations expressed by some 
participants in the findings, majority of the participants said Malawi was able 
to assert democratic governance of security and can build on the latter to 
engage on a more transformative process.   
 
Paradoxically, the country has undergone transition to democracy without yet 
implementing effective reforms in the Military, Security and Justice 
Institutions.  This is due to the fact that democracy has not been consolidated 
and the failure that this was not considered at the beginning of multiparty 
politics in 1994.  Likewise, in agreement with the views of Ball et al (2007), 
“the lack of high-level political acceptance of the need for and shape of reform 
often creates blockages to programme implementation that can be difficult to 
address.   It is essential to give adequate attention from the outset to developing 
a strategy to overcome political resistance to TSS and prioritise activities.  A 
strategic approach should be a rigorous political analysis” (see also figure 19 
page 181 and recommendations pages 186-205).Similarly supporting Lukham 
and Hutchful‟s views (2010:38), in the final analysis, government, legislature 
and “civil societies need their own democratic strategies to transform security. 
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The country has to identify the historical paradigm of security governance and 
open a political space for transformation.  Malawi has made transition to 
democracy without yet implementing effective reforms in the military, police, 
intelligence and other security institutions.  Significantly empirical results 
reveal that a number of African states are willing and able both to ensure 
democratic governance of security and to build on the latter to engage on a 
more transformative agenda (Luckham et al 2010). 
 
The history of the security institutions in Malawi from the colonial, 
independence and multiparty era draws out principles that can be learnt to 
whether there were earlier efforts at transforming the security sector,  the 
researcher‟s view is that the security institutions are inherently conservative.  
They are organised hierarchically and are shaped by those whose promotion 
has come through supporting the system.  For instance, Dr. H. K.  Banda‟s era 
as the first president, Malawi on attaining independence inherited the colonial 
system of security.  Likewise the incoming governments have never thought of 
radical reform of the security institutions. 
 
The challenge that has faced the security sector in Malawi has been that it 
cannot change without a strong and knowledgeable political leadership.  There 
should be a way of finding a balance.  Arguably, the security sector cannot 
transform “out of contact” with the civilian authority relations. The debate for 
change has never been tabled.  The result has been lack of security and defence 
reviews. For this reason, a vacuum was created and has proved overwhelming.  
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Without a strategic context, the security sector struggles to reform itself.  In 
summary, until now the main challenge is the result of lack of civil military 
relations between the political leadership and the security sector.  In such 
circumstances without objective drivers, the citizenry cannot be certain that 
when the unexpected occurs the security institutions will be able to adapt 
accordingly. 
 
In agreement with the views of Luckham et al (2010:38) another crucial point 
is that the long history of authoritarian rule, tended to “focus on the abuse 
meted to citizens by the security agencies.  The African states, Malawi 
inclusive, that emerged from colonial rule are shaped by the same ideas and 
assumptions that were left behind by the colonial masters.  The new African 
states are no more than a caricature of the classical state and mirror the 
colonial system from which they were born.  The security establishment is not 
created for the protection of the people, but rather for the protection of the 
elite, and their interests and it is intended to control the population”. 
 
5.4 Basic Concept of TSS and SSR in Malawi 
 
Drawing from chapter 1 and 2 and interviews, the researcher found it helpful to 
distinguish between Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Transformation of 
Security Sector Transformation (TSS).  Security Sector Reform may serve as a 
shorthand to describe nations that have had wars and conflicts and poor 
governance and therefore must reform under the influence of external actors.  
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It is not about objective reform vigorously measured, but rather about 
subjective reform as perceived by those involved. In a useful contribution 
Bryden et al (2010:6) asserts that transformation of the security sector is used 
in a sense to describe situations of a nation, in which organisational character, 
cultural make up, human resource practices and political relationships with 
elected authorities and the civil power processes have to be measured and 
move in the right direction”.  In so doing, provision of an enabling 
environment for development, good governance, the rule of law and a vibrant 
civil society is called for.   Furthermore, in tandem with this, Bryden and 
Olonisakin (2010:6) say that “a central plank of the transformation discourse is 
the need to alter the culture and character of security actors”.  
 
Transformation should encompass a much wider range of rights and 
aspirations.  Bryden et al (2010) further elaborate on political will as a key 
requirement so that elected authorities show more profound intent to bring 
security sector practices in line with democratic principles.  Conceptualising 
SSR or TSS is not to change aspects of the functioning of the security actors, 
such as moving commanders of the military, or of units from one place to 
another or acquiring armaments by the government.  Such measures are neither 
transformation nor reform of the security sector as they entail mere 
restructuring of an organisation.  The findings reveal that SSR and TSS are 
related and have in common the recognition of the need for change.   
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N‟Diaye (2010:58) proposes that “the transformation of the security sector 
entails a clear consciousness of the absolute necessity, even the urgency of 
carrying out a systematic overhaul of the orientation, values, principles and 
practices of the security sector to conform to a democratising political system.  
Transformation must undergo sustained revolutions, approaches, relationships 
and attributes on the part of all the components of the security sector”.  It is a 
sense of revolutions to be carried out in the entire security system.  This should 
be a concern for the executive, legislature and the security bodies themselves.  
While SSR also entails similar attitudes and a will to reform the security sector 
radically, however, it requires an aggressive stance by the legislature willing to 
confront resistance and use all the constitutional and legal avenues open.  The 
legislature, ordinarily the opposition political parties are very weak to 
influence such stance in Malawi.   
 
In tandem with this view Bryden and Olomsakin (2010:7) note that “SSR is 
conceptually flawed and thus of limited relevance to Africa.  SSR is portrayed 
as a piecemeal and a narrow approach to changing the security establishment, 
thus making a wholesale and incomplete transformation of the security sector.”  
In the case of Malawi, government officials, the legislature and civil society 
need to own democratic strategies to transform security. Supporting the views 
of Bryden and Olomisakin (2010:7), Malawi amongst several countries in 
Africa is one of “a weak or contested democracy with little real capacity to 
ensure democratic governance of security institutions.”  The findings reveal 
that the country has made transition to democracy without yet implementing 
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effective reform in the military, intelligence service, justice sector and the 
police service.  The study further reveals (figure 15) that the government has 
no desire to support reform of the security sector and that it has not done so 
because of gaps in reform policy and due to the reality of unequal security, 
violence and injustice experienced during the transition. 
 
Clearly, the finding reveal that civil authorities have not taken into account the 
need for transformation of the security sector in Malawi.  From 1994, many 
political statements have been made at campaign podiums about security of the 
country and its citizenry by political leadership.  There has been a great deal of 
lip service paid to the society to make them “think outside the box.”  The 
“box” in this case remains to contain traditional approaches to security that 
affects the country‟s national security. 
 
The concept of transformation of the security sector should therefore help 
provide the alteration of culture and organisational character, human resource 
practices and political relationships of security actors and civilian authorities to 
work out an efficient and effective security governance system.   This is a key 
step in transformation process that will play an increasingly larger role in the 
future for the security actors and civilian professionals concerned with good 
governance in Malawi. 
 
Furthermore in agreement with the views of Bryden et al (2010:7), assert that 
“conceptual clarity is essential in order to make the case for and identify 
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concrete opportunities to a support transformative approach to SSR” in 
Malawi.  This Section builds on responses to the experiences of TSS between 
South Africa and Malawi from 1994 when the two countries attained 
multiparty democracy from post authoritarian rule, drawing from their 
experiences to learn on the significance, dynamics and challenges of 
transformation during the period under review. 
 
5.5 Experiences of TSS between South Africa and Malawi 
 
The experiences between South Africa and Malawi on approaches to TSS as 
from 1994 when the two countries attained multiparty democracy shows 
clearly the differences. It is apparent that in South Africa there has been an 
attempted comprehensive reform encompassing not only the military and 
police institutions but also intelligence agencies and other security actors.  In 
contrast, Malawi TSS was only attempted to Malawi Police Service in 2002 
and was thereafter abandoned because of non availability of donor funding 
(OECD 2007 and Bendix and Stanely 2008). 
 
With regard to ownership and democratic participation in the TSS process, 
there has been very little support on understanding the meaning and scope of 
the concept.  In agreement with this Ebo (2007) asserts that security actors do 
not constitute a homogeneous group of actors.  The legislature, the academia 
and the Civil Society are among the groups excluded in the TSS, in the case of 
Malawi.  According to Chuter (2004) for TSS to take place in South Africa it 
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was initiated by a small group of individuals located mainly in African 
National Congress (ANC), think tanks such as the Military Research Group 
(MRG) and academia at the University of the Witwatersrand and the Institute 
for Security Studies in Pretoria.  It seems TSS in Malawi has not realised its 
potential and very few among the actors, for example the executive hierarchy, 
may understand the concept.  Holding a similar view, Bendix et al (2008) 
observe that there must be dissemination of information, dialogue and training 
of the policymakers and individuals affected by the security arrangements.  It 
is important in order to discern their perceptions of own security needs and 
give them a genuine input into control over the TSS process.  TSS therefore 
remains a challenging concept for Malawi. 
 
According to Africa (2011:8) “the multiparty working groups in South Africa 
met over several months and they were responsible for the recommendations 
on laws to create a climate for free political activity also thereby indirectly 
addressed the future of the security forces”. 
 
The process in South Africa revealed some positive as well as negative effects 
that transformation elements can have on the security sector.  Problems of 
coordination among actors still remains in one way or the other.  However, 
South Africa‟s democratic transition has provided for the transformation of the 
security sector.  This did not happen in a vacuum but it was part of a complex 
web of political, economic, and social measures that had an impact on security 
institutions and security management bodies.  There was the need to alter the 
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culture and organisational character, human resources practices and political 
relationships with elected authorities and the civil power (Bryden et al 2010).  
Nevertheless the main issue was that the political leadership in Malawi was not 
inclusive of the security sector to change in its relationship with the elected 
authorities and the civil society. 
 
The multiparty groups in Malawi never considered a timeframe and models of   
transforming the security sector in accordance with the required norms of a 
democratic state.  The new government, which came into power in 1994, did 
not create a conducive climate for the reconstruction of the security forces and 
services.  The new regime retained many old security regulations of the 
colonial era.  For instance, statutes such as the Official Secret Act (1960), and 
Protected Places and Areas Act (1960) are in use up to date without any 
amendments.  Such statutes are volatile to democracy whereby there is no 
collective governance and free political participation of the citizenry.  The 
people must be guaranteed of their fundamental rights, on the other hand in 
Malawi, the revelation is that the political actors did not take into account and 
attempt to endorse an agenda for the transformation of the security institutions 
as was the case with South Africa. ( Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 
2004). 
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5.6 The Relevance of Transformation Process 
 
The research data confirms the relevance of transforming the security sector. 
There is need for progress towards conflict prevention, and the stability of a 
country in order to contribute to sustainable economic development.  
Transformation of the security sector is necessary to address dismal security 
situations after the change of the regime from authoritarian rule to multiparty 
democracy. However, Ball et al(2004) elaborates on this need for overhaul of 
the security sectors so as: 
“To ensure that the practices of the security organisations, are 
consistent with the democracies that they serve.  Countries with serious 
governance deficits may require a fundamental transformation of 
relations between the civil authorities and civil society on one hand and 
the security organisations on the other hand.” 
 
The researcher citing Africa (2011:14) also identified certain legacies of the 
past regime from 1994 that need to be addressed in the post-transitional 
democracy transformation process, such as: “A low capacity on human 
resource as regards knowledge on national security strategy by the elected civil 
authorities.  Likewise initiatives among security actors tend to happen in a 
piecemeal and uncoordinated manner.  Policy makers‟ researchers, academics 
and non-governmental organisations should be engaged to influence the 
proceedings.” 
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In agreement with this view Ball et al (2004) assert that for these reasons, the 
very prospect of a thorough on going transformation may prove daunting to a 
country‟s political leadership in Malawi.   The researcher, on analysing the 
different types of transformation/reform, observes that although there has been 
a growing body of literature on TSS, little attention has been paid to the 
question of why reforms differ so vastly by donors supporting the process in 
Africa (Bendix and Stanley 2008). 
 
5.7 Political Relationships and Organisational Character of the Security 
Sector with the Elected Authorities and Civil Power 
 
5.7.1 Political Relationships 
 
The analysis of the findings reveals that political relationships between the 
elected authorities and civil power have improved tremendously since 
multiparty democracy.  However, the eighteen years since the establishment of 
first the inclusive democratic government in 1994, a systematic process of TSS 
has not been introduced by the political actors.  Participants revealed that there 
was no political will, so that the elected authorities should have had a more 
profound intent to bring security practices in line with democratic principles in 
the period under review. 
 
It is apparent that there has been absence of qualities of decisive leadership and 
clearly determined scope of action as necessary to enable transformation 
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emanating from the executive authorities.  For instance, the attempted TSS of 
the Malawi Police Service in 2002 failed because it was largely externally 
supported.   The concept of TSS in Malawi is not shaped and driven by local 
actors; as such it cannot be fully implemented and sustained.  Transformation 
process must be driven by close attention to both the national and regional 
context and history (Bryden et al 2010 and Nathan 2008).  
 
There are several visible indicators of security transformation in Malawi as 
revealed by interviewees.  Security institutions such as the Police and the 
Special Branch, previously were serving as agents of repression of opposition 
political parties and the population.  They are currently called Malawi Police 
Service and National Intelligence Bureau, and this is due to an opening up of 
political spaces whereby new voices and actors such as civil society 
organisations (CSOs) have raised concern on human rights.   
 
There is also recognition of civil bodies such as parliament in the oversight of 
security institutions.   However, the oversight management bodies are weak 
and lack human capacity in terms of expertise to perform their duties.  For 
instance, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security is willing to 
do its work, but is unable to oversee the executive and security institutions due 
to lack of human and budgetary resources.  Resources such as parliamentary 
staff and fairly learned members of parliament in the committee would provide 
essential capability to perform oversight.   
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The findings further reveal that security management bodies are not 
specialised, for instance in military/security doctrines and strategies and have 
no long term planning of the security sector, such as high level planning 
documents of regional and national security or defence planning.  Both the 
executive and the elected security committees do not sufficiently understand 
security rationales.  The security sector is a highly complex field, in which the 
executive and the security standing committees have to oversee issues such as 
weapons procurement, arms control etc.  They do not have sufficient 
knowledge and expertise to deal with such issues in an effective manner.  In 
the case of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security  it does not 
have the time and opportunity since its term is only one year in accordance 
with the regulatory rules (Malawi Constitution 2004) 
 
On the part of the security practitioners‟ relationship with the elected 
authorities and civil power, the mindset still continues to uphold the notion of 
the population rather than its protection (See figure 9).  The powerful 
executives would want to manipulate the security system for regime protection.  
For instance, the president in Malawi is heavily guarded by the police and 
military in combat camouflage with automatic weapons.  Every minister or 
executive member has a camouflaged uniformed police officer as a body 
guard.  The question which comes to the mind of the citizen is who is the 
enemy of these elites? The core traditional security actors are embedded in the 
protection of the elite at the expense of the citizenry for their normal daily life 
of freedom from fear, participation and want.  It would be worthwhile for the 
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security sector to coordinate and perform its duties according to what is 
stipulated in their various Acts.  There is no coordinated system for national 
security management and the executive itself has not been effective in the role 
of relating to crafting an overarching national security policy and other security 
policies for various security institutions.  
 
The powerful executives would want to manipulate the security system for 
regime protection. Similarly the security system has been intended for the 
control of the population and resource extraction by the elite as was in the past 
by the colonial security structures which have not changed.  In agreement with 
this observation Bryden et al (2010:12) the three governments from 1994 to 
“have missed the opportunity to seize the transitional moment to transform the 
basis for security delivery and governance through a participatory conversation 
about a national vision of security, including citizen‟s security needs and 
protection.  The practice of the security actors encourages civilian authoritarian 
rule.  Formal state security systems in Malawi have remained largely state and 
not people focused”.  
 
However by and large, the research findings have shown that Malawians, as 
shown in figure 14, expect state actors to play a leading role in security 
provision of TSS despite the visible evidence of shortcomings with regard to 
capacity, skills and resources. 
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In agreement with this view,  Luckham and Hutchful (2010:35) elaborate that 
the “politics of force have continued in [Malawi] in various different guises.”  
The experiences under the government of Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika are the 
same security which still depended heavily upon state coercion, surveillance 
and suppressed dissent. For instance, the arrest of three opposition political 
members, Kamlepo Kalua, Humphrey Mvula and Makande in 2008.The arrest 
of Harry Mkandawire in 2009 was clear testimonies of how the security actors 
were used to service the interests of political authorities.  Electoral 
manipulation, violations of human rights and patronage politics etc remained 
widespread, hence undermining security governance.  Nevertheless, the 
findings reveal that there is still political space open to transform of the 
security sector in Malawi, notably under the current ruling political authorities.   
 
Bryden et al (2010:16) assert that 
“there are several visible indicators of radical change in a state 
transitioning from dictatorship a regime where power was previously 
concentrated in one branch of government  and resided in the hands of 
a few individuals: There must be a change in the roles of security 
institutions previously serving as agents of repression of legitimate 
opposition and the population, an opening up of political spaces to 
include new voices and actors, such as those with civil society 
particularly women and youth, recognition and pre-eminence of civil 
institutions such as parliament in the oversight of security institutions, 
reform in the laws that govern the creation of security institutions, 
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innovative policies that define a new role for the security establishment 
and a visible expansion in the pool of security decision-makers at 
various levels.”  
 
5.7.2 Organisational Character of the Security Sector and Civil Power 
 
What also came out clear from the findings is that in Malawi there is no 
coordinated security system.  The security establishment has long-standing 
relationships of dependence between itself and the executive. Security has been 
used for the protection of the elite but not for the protection of the people.  Day 
to day management of security issues is centralised in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet (OPC).  All the security functions such as Intelligence, 
Peace Missions, International Relations and threat analysis are subject to 
scrutiny from OPC which is headed by the chief secretary, the highest level 
senior government official.  Executive control of the security sector depends 
much on the character and leadership style of the president in power at that 
particular period of time. 
 
As regards to structures and political relations as indicated in table 8 there is no 
coordinated power structure.  The design of security to focus on the 
organisational structures and management processes within the security system 
is not clear.  Transformation of the security sector will be ineffective and 
unsustainable if the government merely trains only the security practitioners 
without properly managed security administration bodies, for instance like was 
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in Republic of South Africa Cabinet Committees on International Relations, 
Peace and Security (IRPS) or an Inter-Ministerial Security Committee (IMSC) 
involving relevant ministries in the security sector as key clusters of security 
governance for the country.  In addition, there has been no effective National 
Security Council (NSC) consisting of senior ministers and government senior 
officials that has been put in place to make key decisions on high-impact 
security issues, be they internal or external.   
 
Managerial systems and planning capacities by the elected authorities need to 
be developed and supported at the various levels of the security sector.  
Likewise, capacity to develop, in this case refers to the ability of the political 
leadership to define security strategies, set security priorities, solve security 
problems and achieve results.  This requires an approach that does not only 
address obvious security capacity gaps, but also pays attention to the enabling 
security environment.  There should be efforts to improve security institutions, 
laws, accountability and transparency.  It is therefore important for the political 
leadership to define the parameters within which each security institution 
operates and do the checks and balances within the system and the relationship 
between and among the various security actors.  Nevertheless at times it may 
be necessary to change key parts of the constitution before substantial TSS can 
occur. 
 
The OECD (2010) citing Motes and Vial (2006) affirm that was a research was 
conducted in Chile on defence reform and this depended on revisions of the 
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constitution in 1989 and 2005 respectively.  In the case of Malawi the legal 
framework for the security system does not allow the security sectors to adapt 
to changing contexts.  The constitution of the Republic of Malawi was revised 
in 1994 following the transition from a single party system of government to a 
multi-party system but made no amendments to revise defence and security 
reforms.  Regulations tell the political leadership, the security actors and the 
civil society how to comply with the laws and define how state security 
institution will be implemented.  From the findings the results reveal that there 
are insufficient policy guidelines for the security sector.  
5.8 Human Practices and Cultural Make Up 
 
It is apparent in this study as indicated in figure 15 that there is little capacity 
to ensure democratic governance of the security institutions, due to lack of 
reform.  Malawi well migrated to democracy, however, it did not yet 
implement effective reforms in the Intelligence, Military, Police and Justice 
Institutions.  The reforms are not entirely ruled out, but they are less likely to 
be initiated.  If at all they will be implemented, they are more likely to be 
donor-driven and less likely to make any real impact on the security sector and 
the citizenry. (Hutchful 2010).  Despite the reasonable basic understanding of 
the transformation process, the general perception from participants is that of 
lack of partnership among the executive, the security forces and the citizenry 
for locally owned transformation process entry points.  Capacity on human 
resource as regards to knowledge of TSS is limited among various security 
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actors.  The requirement of a constituted homogeneous group of security actors 
is crucial to an effective TSS process (Hutchful 2010). 
 
5.8.1 A Body of National Security Policy Making. 
 
 For TSS to be sustainable, security institutions and their management bodies 
must be culturally appropriate.  In response to objective 2 on human and 
cultural practices of the security sector, participants came up with various 
practices.  One question was whether a body of national security policy making 
was in place.   Eighty percent (80%) of the participants said there was no such 
body. This is an evidence that many capacity building approaches are lacking,  
hence the inability of the executive, security actors and civil society to manage 
their security issues successfully. 
 
The study as indicated in figure 11, reveals that there is little capacity to ensure 
democratic governance of the security institutions, due to lack of TSS training.  
The operation of security institutions and their management bodies should be 
influenced by an enabling environment.  In addition this must include the 
institutional frameworks and the structures of power, in which the 
organisations should be embedded.  The general picture reveals that there is no 
civilian office and capacity to lead national strategic policy making.  As a 
result, policy making on security issues has led to one or two core security 
institutions whose capacity are also limited to make discussions on critical 
security issues.  The researcher‟s view is that government requires a central-
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coordinating body and it is important to have policy and planning units in each 
of the security institutions where TSS has to be implemented. This is 
evidenced by participants who said until now there was no security institution 
which has a policy for security issues.  For instance, there is no defence policy 
for the Malawi Defence Force, neither is there a safety and security policy for 
the police and the justice sector on law enforcement, social crime prevention, 
institutional reform and the enhancement of policing.  Likewise all what is 
currently in place is hard-line driven response regulations aimed at combating 
rather than preventing crime and oppressing the people. 
 
5.8.2 Adequate Oversight Mechanism for TSS 
 
The majority of the participants in figure 10,said there was no adequate 
oversight mechanism for the security sector in Malawi.  The inadequacy of the 
executive, judiciary and particularly parliamentary oversight is mainly caused 
by lack of expertise and confidence within the National Assembly.  In part it is 
because of the historical legacy of some of the security actors as stipulated in 
chapter one.  Another reason revealed by the participants for the inability to 
oversight, is because of the weakness of the civil society organisations.  On 
many occasions in the period under review the civil society organisations have 
been accused by the ruling party as collaborators for foreign actors.  This has 
resulted in a situation where violations of human rights and failures of 
governance have exacerbated.  Certainly TSS has been limited despite 
commitments to good governance and shared democratic values by the 
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political leadership.  In agreement with this view N‟Diaye (2010) asserts that 
parliament, the executive, the judiciary and also non-constitutional institutions 
such as civil society organisations and the media share all in the responsibility 
for maintaining a well-functioning security sector. 
5.8.3 The State of the Economy – Supporting the Security Sector 
 
Malawi is a landlocked country and small in size comparing with the 
neighbouring states.  It is the most densely populated country in the SADC 
region. The country has long been dependent on agriculture since it got 
independence in 1964 from colonial rule.  It has no natural resources compared 
to other SADC countries.  Malawi‟s economic performance has been less 
impressive; rising unemployment, and successive currency devaluation has led 
to unsustainable exports in commodity industries such as tobacco, cotton and 
tea. 
 
Supporting the views of Van Eekelen (2010:540), the main aim of Malawi 
should be the creation of a climate of stability in which economic development 
and cooperation can prosper.  Nevertheless stability is not a state quality but 
rather an ongoing process a country like Malawi should adhere to. 
 
The rule of law and its application; a functioning pluralistic democracy at all 
levels of government, state province and competition, good neighbourly 
relations, including a constructive effort to resolve minority issues, democratic 
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control of the security forces and transparency of the budget and accountability 
for its implementation.” 
 
The security sector in Malawi is not there to make profit but as a service 
provider.  Therefore the primary focus is service delivery.  The entire security 
sector, in particular the Malawi Defence Force, Malawi Police Service and 
National Intelligence Bureau depend on inputs of their armaments, small arms, 
service equipment, uniform, button sticks from other countries and this is 
costly to the government. According to Schiller (1997) the consequence of 
importing is the exhaustion of scarce foreign currency.  A country cannot 
always depend on foreign supplies to provide essential defence and security 
related goods.  The researcher‟s interviews of the participants indicated that 
decisions of funding priorities tend to be made by a small elite group of 
government officials.  Likewise the security sector establishments are austerely 
funded.  The country operates on a „cash budget‟  in which the Ministries of 
Defence and Internal Affairs are allocated funding on a month by month basis, 
but  the use of cash budgeting funding to the security sector makes it very 
difficult to plan strategically.  However, most of the budget goes to salaries and 
very little is allocated to operations, maintenance and training for the entire 
security sector. 
 
The citizens of the Republic of Malawi as clients expect the security sector to 
perform and assist on such activities as flood relief and disaster missions and 
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the security sector has not been able to do so or accomplish such missions due 
to shortage of equipment and financial resources. 
 
During the in depth interviews some of the participants revealed that many of 
the security sector‟s equipment systems, be it the military, police and the 
intelligence service are of far below acceptable standards and scales due to 
obsolete inventory, unavailability of equipment and lack of adequate 
maintenance.  The current reduced level of preparedness has been due to 
budget cuts by the treasury.  The obsolescence of some equipment, make the 
security institutions ineffective for any operations which they may be called 
upon. 
 
The other major obstacle for the security institutions include weak 
infrastructure, particularly the inadequacy of transport systems in roads, and 
waterways and limited air transport services.  On several occasions some of the 
security institutions have not been able to render services in support of the 
rural people and other state functions for various reasons. 
 
The factors which have emerged indicate that the security institutions in 
Malawi operate in very difficult circumstances.  The dwindling of the Malawi 
economy has come up due to misappropriation of government funds by some 
civil servants and politicians and has compelled donor countries to withhold 
monies allocated to Malawi.  There is an underdeveloped political culture and 
some political authorities have little knowledge about security issues of a 
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country. There is also lack of higher education which must be devoted to 
helping security officials and security practitioners learn how to think 
critically.  This should establish security practitioners minds standard of 
aesthetic and intellectual excellence against which they will implicitly weigh 
the value of what type of decisions are taken on issues of that nature.  What 
may be lacking for the executive, legislature and security practitioners is a 
transparent process based upon a broad National Security Policy Framework 
and National Security Strategy in defining security for Malawi and its citizens. 
 
5.8.4 Civil Society and the Media 
 
The study reveals that the security sector particularly the Malawi Police 
Service has not been sufficiently transparent and accountable to the public in 
Malawi as indicated in table 10 in the findings.  Likewise this has negatively 
contributed to the image of the security service by making them target of 
criticism by the civil society.  In support of this view Ratchev (2005:21) 
contends that there is “need to increase democratization of both the civil 
society and security practitioners to deal with the rising complexity of security 
issues such as the TSS process”.  The civil society seems to lack sufficient 
expertise to deal with security issues.  In agreement with Agokla et al 
(2010:313) “society is both important to, and an expression of the process of 
democratisation”  
 
In Malawi the media have assisted government to explain its decisions and 
actions to the citizens in relation to the security sector, the media has 
performed these roles under constraints caused by the need to protect 
information and inform the people of the truth of the matter not knowing that 
they endanger national security. 
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5.8.5 Adequately Equipped and Trained on TSS 
 
In the study findings in figure 16, eighty percent of the participants revealed 
that the executive, parliament and its support staff are not adequately trained 
on TSS programmes.  The main challenge facing the government is indeed the 
lack of capacity available to support TSS.  The serving security officers and 
government civilian staff do have technical expertise in their sectors, however, 
more guidance is needed to enable these officers to achieve a better 
understanding of the political and contextual nature of TSS and the need to 
ensure TSS linkage across the system.  For instance, in the Malawi Police 
Service TSS programme was funded by donor in 2002 without looking at how 
that training fitted into the justice sector and other security sectors.   
 
Many security practitioners and civilian officials have never been involved in 
TSS process and therefore require specific guidance on entry point, programme 
design and TSS programme management.  The researcher‟s interpretation is 
that training the security sector and management bodies should focus on skills 
such as an understanding of institutional reform, change management, financial 
management, strategic planning and human resource.   The Centre for Security 
Studies (CSS) at Mzuzu University has developed training modules which 
would support the dissemination of TSS programmes and has always 
encouraged the security institutions and parliament to review their capacity.  
For instance the CSS recently conducted two executive courses in 2012 
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(Parliamentary Oversight and Security Sector Governance) whereby the 
majority of the participants valued the importance of such programmes.  The 
Centre for Security Studies would be keen to continue providing such support 
to TSS implementation in Malawi.  (Security Sector Governance Report 
Proceedings 2012). 
 
5.9 Constraints to Transformation of the Security Sector in Malawi 
 
There are a number of cross-cutting challenges identified by the participants 
that have made it impossible for the TSS process to take place during the 
period under review.  First, the political leadership did not initiate a TSS 
programme and never tried to put in place a framework to embark on a TSS 
process.  From the early stage of democratic transition in 1994, it has been 
difficult for the political leadership to recognise and set up a comprehensive 
TSS process due to factors such as capacity weaknesses.  So the focus has been 
on small, short term reforms.  An example is the police reform project of 2002 
for the Malawi Police Service, which got under way and did not finish due to 
lack of financial resources.  
 
The second other main challenge, supporting the views of Ball et al (2007)  
due to lack of high level political acceptance of the need for TSS, most often 
this has created blockages to programme initiation.  It is important therefore 
that the political leadership should have adequate knowledge and 
understanding from the outset about national security matters of a country, in 
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order to overcome political resistance to reform the security institutions.  The 
third challenge is that TSS in most African countries has been considerably aid 
dependent from external actors.  Without the assistance of external actors 
funding the projects, very little effort comes from government.  Likewise if the 
project (TSS) is funded, becomes more susceptible to external pressure from 
the donors.  In general, it appears that the government does not invest adequate 
financial and human resources on national security strategy and this is 
particularly true of major security programmes such as the defence and 
security review programmes.  From year to year the military and other security 
services in Malawi bid for financial resources which are never enough to 
conduct such programmes. 
 
The challenges identified underscore some crucial gaps in the transitional 
democratic period in the attempt to produce full, prompt and effective TSS to 
take place.  The experience of TSS presented by South Africa shows that in 
Malawi there are major main gaps in a number of areas among others TSS 
initiation.  The political leadership, members of security organisations as well 
as civil society had no idea of a TSS initiative and did not plan for this kind of 
process.   
 
Second security institutional issues; the security organisations have not yet 
proven able to manage TSS process on a large scale that would have been 
necessary to provide adequate reform for the entire institutions and 
management bodies.   
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Third, generally there has been no inclusive transformation process.  The major 
political actors, security actors and citizens had no opportunity to engage in the 
debate about the role of the security sector (Africa, 2011).  To avoid such 
critical situations in the future requires a change of attitude. 
5.10 Strategies for Effective TSS 
 
In identifying strategies that could be developed for the implementation of 
effective transformation of the security institutions and security management 
bodies, the statement on page 229 (2.1 and 2.2) meant to solicit public views as 
revealed in figures 14 and  15 in the previous chapter.  However, it indicates 
that there was no strategic planning the time the country adopted multiparty 
democracy to take care of the security institutions.  An important component of 
a strategic approach for an effective TSS process should have been a political 
analysis, so as to inform of the feasibility and challenges of implementing TSS 
(Africa 2010).  It is clear, however, from interviews conducted during the 
study that the political authorities, did not consider that the entire security 
sector required to reform except the MPS and MYP.  During the authoritarian 
rule the Special Branch of the Malawi Police Service, and the National 
Intelligence Services were tools of the state which carried out repressions and 
indeed such institutions required immediate reform. 
 
This suggests that due to variations in the political environment, for instance, 
new government by that president, ministries and new heads of security after 
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every 4 year term of office.  This perhaps could have convinced political 
authorities that all was well as regarding the security of the country and the 
people.  The difficulty of identifying TSS interventions by the political 
authority and getting the support from civil society has been the major 
stumbling block. The underlying motivation of the new governments work on 
TSS should have been guided by political agreements that would redefine the 
role of the security sector during political negotiations in 1994.  This did not 
happen and challenges remain in the country‟s TSS (Africa 2010). 
 
In order for TSS to work, in agreement with  the view of Ball et al (2007) there 
should have been an agenda for TSS, an example illustrated in figure 19 below. 
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Institutional Framework 
 
. Constitutional provisions 
. Security/justice legislation 
. White papers 
. Strategic reviews 
 
Figure 19:   Security and Justice Sector Reform Components 
 
Core elements of a security and justice sector reform agenda 
 Institutional framework for providing security and justice that is implemented 
 Democratic governance and oversight of security and justice institutions that function equitably and 
accountably 
 Capable professional security forces, accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society 
 Culture, especially among political, security and justice leadership, supportive of legal framework, 
international law, good democratic practice and the functions and supremacy of civil management and 
oversight bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil society:  1) help to develop norms of democratic behaviour. 2) provide technical input to policy making and 
policy implementation. 3) foster change and 4) act as watchdog  
 
Source:  Derived from Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development, Security 
SystemReform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Paris, 2004, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf, and Nicole ball, Peter Bartu and Adriaan Verheul, 
Squaring the Circle: Security-Sector Reform and transformation and Fiscal Stabilisation in Palestine, 
Report prepared for the UK Department for International development, 16 January 2006 
 
To reinforce TSS policy process in Malawi, some factors stand out as 
particularly important in maximising effectiveness through programme design. 
On designing of a TSS programme, it is required to accurately assess the 
commitment to reform on the part of the political leadership.  Likewise this is 
very crucial for any TSS programme to start without the trust and commitment 
Post –Authoritarian Legacy 
Conflict Legacy 
. Integration of MYP 
. Weapons management 
 Rule of law 
 Accountability 
 Transparency 
 Accessibility 
 Affordability 
Professionalism and Capacity 
. Police Service 
.Armed forces 
. Intelligence services 
. Judicially 
. Correctional facilities 
.Internal/traditional security/justice 
providers 
 
Democratic Governance 
Line ministries (defence, internal, 
justice) 
. Economic manager (finance, 
planning) 
. Legislature and relevant 
committees 
. External audit 
. Informal/traditional 
security/justice providers 
. Capable responsible civil society 
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of those in political authority.  Obtaining the political commitment of the 
executive branch of government would require consistent high level 
coordinated effort of the academics, security practitioners, and the civil 
society.  For instance, as it happened in South Africa and Uganda.  It was 
possible to put in place an inclusive process involving wide representation of 
stakeholders in government, civil society, and academia in which there was 
reasonable openness at every stage.  Paradoxically, security issues have been 
undeniably underplayed during the political transition in Malawi.  This 
situation is likely to continue into foreseable future in Malawi.  In contrast, 
according to (Ball et al 2007) citing Cawthra (2013) assert that the experience 
of South Africa during its  transition indicates that the TSS interventions have 
been more effective to the extent that they have involved civil society. “South 
African experience has demonstrated that the success of TSS programmes and 
sustainability outcomes have depended very much on the capacity within the 
civil society who have supported the process and provided much needed 
expertise”. 
 
The researcher‟s view is that there should be an approach that brings together 
all elements on security planning and capabilities, along with other concerned 
government departments to enable an effective TSS process to be undertaken. 
This could be seen as logical and common sense.  The transformation of the 
security sector requires the collaboration of the democratically minded 
politicians, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, members of the security 
organisations and civil society.  Likewise as a matter of priority, the actors 
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need to embark on a TSS framework and then base their strategy for the TSS 
process on a realistic appraisal of institutional capabilities.   
 
Figure 19 above identifies components, and particularly the core elements of 
the TSS agenda.  The components of the TSS are rule of law, accountability, 
transparency, accessibility and affordability.  Ball et al (2007) add that they are 
central to TSS.  Likewise there are four key elements of TSS agenda namely;  
“development and implementation of  an institutional framework, 
establishment and implementation of the principle of democratic 
control of the security sector through practice of good governance, 
especially oversight, accountability and transparency, development of 
capable, professional and accountable security services and justice 
systems and fostering a culture that is supportive of the above among 
the political actors, security practitioners and civil society.” 
 
The results of the study on strategies for effective TSS suggest a considerable 
measure of weakness among the executive, legislature and security 
practitioners themselves.  Effectiveness lies on the top management as 
articulated above: the lack of control or understanding on issues of TSS poses a 
great challenge to the entire country.  The availability of appropriate 
knowledge, skills and intellectual capacity to ensure timely decisions is of 
paramount importance. 
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5.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that TSS is still a contested concept in Malawi and in 
most African countries.  The process of changing the security sector cannot be 
described as SSR only.  SSR to a large extent is a  very basic and simple 
method for the security sector to become better.  This entails that the type of 
change is incremental so that the system improves to manage and control 
existing processes.  The limitation here is that this tends to focus on 
performance of the security personnel and not the whole system to make a 
significance difference.  Indeed in SSR there is a realisation of fixing a 
problem, however, the degree of change is that the system moves from old 
(authoritarian rule) to new (democratic transition).  The destination of SSR is 
merely completion of projects in the strategy plans as maybe influenced by 
some Western Donors. 
 
The study showed that this does not however absolve the country from TSS.  
Transformation springs from the desire for survival and the need to respond to 
challenges being posed by security governance in a democracy.  The action 
required to successfully achieve transformation is the need for a complete 
change of mindset, strategy, systems and communication since the country 
attained multiparty democracy. 
 
At the core of the instruments that should be at disposal of the government to 
meet the security challenges are not only the security institutions but also the 
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whole government system; the executive and legislature and the civil service 
machinery requires a complete change of mindset and strategy to make 
transformation of the security sector happen. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to explore in detail the issue of transformation of the 
security sector in a democratic Malawi.   In chapter one, the purpose of this 
study was outlined to establish the extent to which security institutions and 
security management bodies have been transformed in line with the demands 
of multiparty democracy from 1994 to 2014.  The conclusion drawn from the 
findings is that the security sector failed to transform sufficiently. The 
opportunity for change was significant, however, it has been limited due to the 
fact that transition to democracy stalled and remained captured by narrow 
group of elites since the country attained multiparty democracy in 1994.  This 
has made TSS fail altogether, leading to its continued abuse by those in power.  
Furthermore, this might be a deliberate attempt by ruling politicians to 
maintain a weak security sector in their own interests. 
 
The merits of TSS require inclusive political and society ownership.  In a 
useful contribution by Nathan (2010:6) asserts that “the principle of local 
ownership of TSS/SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions 
and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented 
by domestic actors.  Donais (2010:6) Supporting Nathan, contends that “The 
South African experience where SSR was both primary a domestic affair and a 
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significant success story continues to serve as the example of how TSS/SSR 
processes should unfold.” 
 
TSS is undoubtedly a very important process and Malawi has to choose the 
most suitable and practical way to carry it out.  However there are some 
common values that need to be shared and subscribed to.  Supporting Bryden 
et al (2010) the comprehensive approach should focus on four areas of 
transformation of the security sector which this research has done as articulated 
in chapter two of this study. 
 
Therefore it requires a fundamental transformation process, but this must be a 
continuous process driven by the evolving interests of the country.  Historical 
precedents about the security sector are immensely valuable.  The author‟s 
view is that one needs to supplement past experience with a considerable 
amount of other research, technical and non-technical.  Without research one 
cannot be able to distinguish between proposals or reforms based on opinion.  
All aspects of the old system of the security sector should be challenged for a 
new political dispensation and the process leading to the reform of the security 
sector in Malawi. 
 
Transformation as a process strategy is a new way to develop thinking about 
how to manage and lead an organisation such as the security sector.  The case 
for Malawi is that it should clearly be understood that TSS cannot be isolated 
from the process of democratic transition.  If the democratic transition moves 
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forward, it is possible to advance TSS, but if the democratic transition slows 
down, it is impossible for TSS to progress. 
 
6.1.1 A Need for TSS in Malawi 
 
Taking a historical perspective, the findings in this study, have identified 
several factors which make TSS of particular relevance to Malawi.  The 
dynamics of security institutions during the colonial, post-independence, one 
party state and to the present reveal a need for a radical shift.  It requires an 
aggressive stance by the political leadership particularly the legislature as 
articulated in the literature review. 
 
6.1.2  Concept of TSS for Malawi 
 
The study alerts the political leadership and policymakers to the fact that the 
country‟s concept of Transformation of the Security Sector (TSS) or Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) has not been discussed by the executive, parliament and 
civil society, and this could be problematic.  The bottom line is that this has not 
been in the mindset of political authorities, opposition political parties and the 
civil society for debate.  The concept of TSS should begin to find its way into 
the discourse of all sectors of government, non-governmental organisations 
and civil society in Malawi for good security governance.  The SSR policy 
framework by the African Union (2010) clearly indicates that the security 
sector does not only refer to the military or police. 
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A country like Malawi having had a typical authoritarian regime for thirty 
years where the security institutions were identified with the regime itself, 
poses a threat to good governance of the security sector.  However, in order to 
protect new democratic achievements, transformation of the security sector 
must be a coordinated effort.  This should include the executive, legislature, 
civil society and academics.  Similarly this reform cannot be achieved in 
isolation from the experiences of other African states for instance the Republic 
of South Africa and Sierra Leone that have already undergone these 
transformations and are still doing so.  They offer Malawi the opportunity to 
learn and benefit from their best practices and achievements in the process of 
TSS. 
 
The South African experience is a successful example that shows how the 
political elite and different political working groups, civil society and 
academics have resolved many problems during the post-apartheid era.   
 
The current structure of the entire security sector in Malawi may not cope with 
present and future threats.  Threats include; terrorism, human trafficking, risk 
assessment, budget considerations just to mention a few.  The findings have 
shown that due to lack of coordination and expertise at senior levels in the 
security organisations and security management bodies, mandates have 
overlapped, consequently wasting manpower and finances.  Such threats pose 
challenges. For instance an incident occurred at the borders between Tanzania 
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and Malawi whereby there was an influx of immigrants into Malawi.  Every 
security institution sent officers to investigate and report back, instead of 
sending one particular security institution whose mandate is to collect 
information and send it to the appropriate authorities. 
 
6.1.3 Assessment of the Conceptual Framework 
 
The value of the conceptual framework in figure 5 offers the researcher two 
general claims:  Firstly, it describes the theoretical commitment of 
transformation theory that gives a much wider understanding of TSS process 
than provided by SSR approach as articulated in Chapter 3 Section 3.2. 
 
Secondly, it broadens the TSS agenda tying the concept with political 
dimension with the hope to develop a political orientation (transition to 
democracy).  The assessment indicates that TSS has failed during the period 
under review.  This is because each government which came to power from 
1994, during their tenure in office met with internal threats: economic crisis, 
social divisions, political instability and corruption practices among others.  
Supporting this view Collins (2010:191) asserts that “the whole socio-
economic political entity has been inapplicable.” 
 
The conceptual framework helped to determine key aspects of the 
transformation process: the conflicting roles of politics, culture, human and 
organisations effectiveness must play if they are to help the security sector 
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transform and to attain the goals and maintain viable security systems. The 
analytical frameworks provided conceptual categories that may be used by the 
practicing security managers to apply their knowledge of transformation 
management. This may also help security managers assess the problems they 
encounter and how to respond to them (Tompkins 2005).  
 
The framework was based on the premise that it recognises the competing 
nature of the four clusters of transformation; human, cultural, political and 
organisational processes, the inter–relationship to each other is about 
effectiveness.  Studying the functional and dysfunctional effects of structure on 
human behaviour, the emphasis was on strategic importance of employee 
relations to organisational performance and the role of trust, commitment and 
social cohesion in building and maintaining positive relations.  Furthermore the 
conceptual framework sought to reveal the transformation that has taken place 
in the security sector if any at all. The security organisations may therefore 
build on the functions of formal aspects of structures, oversight, policies, goals, 
financial resources, accountability, leadership and management style in the 
institutions on the one hand and the organisation‟s external variables such as 
the influence of political changes, cultural, human and economic factors on the 
other.  In the section below, the researcher recommends further research on 
SSR policy and conducting a Security Sector Reform Needs Assessment in 
Malawi. The rationale is that the policy framework should mandate those in 
authority to develop instruments for the purpose of operationalizing the 
framework.  The policy framework will encourage the political authorities, 
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security practitioners and the civil society to engage in TSS to carry out a 
needs assessment to enable appropriate action in respect of each element of the 
security sector.   
 
The conceptual framework (figure 5) makes an important contribution to a 
body of knowledge: TSS will not take place in partial democracies. Partial 
democracy is a government system in which elections take place, however 
citizens are cut off from knowledge about the activities of those in power.  In 
such kind of hybrid regime civil liberties are ignored and the elites abuse use 
of power. (Epstein et al 2004).  To put it simply, Malawi is one of the partial 
regimes and as such it will be impossible to have effective Transformation of 
the Security Sector accepted by the elites as a legitimate tool to managing 
civil-military relations due to the fact that there is limited political participatory 
process and the absence of collective ownership. 
6.2. Recommendations 
 
Results from this study suggest that the current democratic process calls for the 
immediate reform of the entire security sector in Malawi that will positively 
contribute to the effectiveness and implementation of security priorities of the 
State in order to benefit the Malawian society.  This will reduce misconception 
and ignorance amongst the executive and parliament on the issue of democratic 
control of the security services.  It is a matter of fact that the security services 
in Malawi, particularly the police and intelligence services in the new 
democratic dispensation, have become targets of criticism for applying 
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procedures that have been considered to constitute violations of human rights 
and liberties. 
 
Results from the study suggest that the TSS process should reinforce the 
adjustment of the role and missions of the different security actors and to 
ensure proper oversight, improvement and amendments of the existing legal 
frameworks.    The study further suggests that the government should reinforce 
policy action across security institutions and security management bodies.  As 
a result a number of specific recommendations have emerged from the study. 
 
6.2.1 Restructure the Hierarchy of the Security Architecture 
 
Create and appoint a national security body with appropriate terms of reference 
that is capable of advising the executive and the president in addressing the full 
spectrum of security needs with an appropriate mix of technical and 
policy/strategic skills of personnel. 
 
6.2.2 Improvement of the Legal Framework on Security 
 
Given the essential changes that have influenced the security environment, it is 
an immediate necessity that the body of legislation concerning security 
institutions and security management requires either profound amendments or 
the creation of new Acts.  The new legal frameworks must be sufficiently 
robust to overcome the mistakes and errors committed during the authoritarian 
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rule and must anticipate future developments and changes in the security 
architecture. 
 
The legal and constitutional framework should be clear regarding the different 
roles and responsibilities of the security actors. For instance, the escort and 
protection of the Head of State should be the function of only one security 
actor rather than of more than one actor as is the situation at the moment 
(Police, Military and Intelligence Services).  This may pose challenges in terms 
of duplication of work, mandates and lack of public clarity on the roles and 
responsibilities. The requirement to support and strengthen the legal and 
constitutional framework is therefore of key importance in enhancing 
democratic control of the security sector.  For this to take place there must be 
secure political commitment by the executive and the legislature in Malawi 
(Holden 2012). 
 
6.2.3 Executive Democratic Control and Oversight of the Security Sector 
 
Transformation of the security sector was not planned during the political 
transition that led to democracy in 1994.  This suggests that there was limited 
visionary and mature political leadership regarding the security needs of the 
Malawian society.  Given the direct dependency of the security sector upon the 
government, the latter has an indispensable role regarding control and 
oversight.  However, presently on record there is no National Security Strategy 
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(NSS) in place that elucidates the overall role of the security services in 
Malawi. 
 
Against this background of democratic control and of the specific division of 
political power, related to the security organisations, the following content of 
the “security sector” should be addressed:  The Military should be 
subordinated to the Minister of Defence, including Military Police and Counter 
Intelligence and Military Information Service subordinated to the Minister of 
Interior and Home Affairs, Malawi Police Service, Malawi Police Mobile 
Force, Malawi Police Service for combating organised crime and National 
Service of Fire and Emergency Safety.  The national Intelligence Bureau, and 
Presidential Guard Service should be subordinated to the President of the 
Republic.(Tagarev 2010). 
 
It is therefore recommended that a Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs be 
established under the auspices of the Office of the President and Cabinet 
(OPC).  Further, this committee should be provided with the authority to 
coordinate the activities and efforts of security institutions, and the 
responsibility for oversight.  This new structure will contribute to the executive 
democratic control and supervision of the security sector.  Likewise this 
committee would serve as a body between the policy makers and the security 
organisations and would be the centre for the coordination of all security 
matters in the country.  The role and the mission of this body should be defined 
by law. 
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6.2.4 Reinvigorating Parliamentary Oversight 
 
Parliament‟s role should be enhanced in the current constitution so as to make 
it have several committees for oversight of various security institutions rather 
than having one only for the entire security sector. Parliament should form  at 
least the following committees; Intelligence Committee, Defence Committee 
and Security and Public Safety Committee.  Likewise, Parliament should 
approve strategic policy on national security and the budgets of each security 
institutions and should exert parliamentary control over activities connected to 
each security institution.  In agreement with Born (2002:5) the powers of 
parliamentary oversight can be grouped into the following issues:-  
 
“General Powers: these include powers which are, in principle, 
applicable to all fields of government.  In most countries these powers 
include: the right to initiate or amend laws, to raise questions, to 
summon members of the executive and their staff to testify, to summon 
members of civil society, to obtain desired information from the 
executive, to carry out parliamentary inquiries and right to hold public 
hearings 
 
Budget Control:  the right to allocate and amend defence and security 
budget funds – at the level of programmes, projects and separate line-
items and the right to approve or disapprove any supplementary 
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defence and security budget proposals and having access to all relevant 
defence and security budget documents. 
 
Peace Support Operations: the right to approve or disapprove the 
sending of troops abroad, the mandate, the budget risks to 
military/security personnel involved , rules of engagement, 
command/control, duration of the mission and the right to visit troops 
on missions abroad. 
 
Defence and Security Procurement:  involvement of the parliament in 
the government‟s decisions concerning contracts, specifying needs for 
new equipment, selection of manufacturer and assessing offers for 
compensation and off-set; 
 
Security Policies (National, Defence, Public Safety) and planning 
documents:  the right to amend or approve/disapprove the security 
policy concept, defence concept, crisis management concept, force 
structure/planning and the national or military strategies. 
Military/Security/Civilian Personnel: the power of the parliament to 
approve or disapprove Defence and Security human resources 
management and plan, maximum number of personnel employed by the 
MoD and military, and Mo1, approval of high ranking security 
commanding directors and the right to be consulted by the ministers 
responsible about high ranking positions.” (Born 2002:5) 
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In many cases members of parliament involved in the oversight committees are 
no experts in the security sector field, therefore, members appointed to take 
posts in the committees should undergo induction courses.  The oversight of 
the security sector requires that mechanisms be in place to enable security 
institutions to engage in a dialogue with advocacy bodies, and the media, 
which have an important role to play in overseeing the security sector. 
 
6.2.5 Urgent Need to Constitute the New Intelligence Services 
 
The Intelligence services should have been the first of the security services to 
be reconstituted after the elections in 1994.  The existing intelligence structures 
are operating in an unconstitutional and illegal vacuum and their accountability 
to civilian authorities is not clearly defined.  There is an urgent need that 
intelligence services bill be enacted and approved by parliament.  Among other 
responsibilities for new intelligence services in the upholding of individual 
rights enunciated in the constitution‟s Bill of Rights Chapter of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
 
This section of chapter seven concludes with recommendation responding to 
the specific objectives set out in the study.  The recommendations are based on 
the sequence of events observed during the period under review. 
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6.2.6 Political Relationships with Elected Authorities and Organisational 
Structure 
 
Taking steps towards removing the legacy of the totalitarian regime, and 
aiming at building contemporary professional security sector, cordial   
relationship should exist among different security actors.  An important factor 
of transformation is positive change in the level of responsiveness by the state 
to the rights, views and demands of its citizens.  The executive and legislature 
should demonstrate political will to support transformation despite political 
sensitivity on issues pertaining to security and resource limitations.  The 
political leadership needs to accommodate all actors in the security sector. 
 
Likewise, the national ownership of TSS primarily resides at the highest state 
government level.  Similarly the Malawian society needs to take note of all 
changes that have occurred during the transitional period, and also learn from 
the experience of other countries,  for instance learn from the Republic of 
South Africa on how they have successfully conducted TSS process. 
 
Regarding the role of power structures and relations on security   policies, it is 
recommended that the entire cabinet should strongly support policies to 
progress the reform process, in order to reflect both the eagerness and desire to 
attain the ultimate goal of the Malawian people, to reform all institutions in 
accordance with democratic principles, for example to get rid of the legacy of 
the abuse and atrocities committed by the security institutions in the past.  The 
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politicisation of the security services in the past negatively impacted the 
transformation process.  It is also recommended that intellectual capacity is the 
utmost requirement.   
 
(i) Reorientation and Reorganisation of the Security Sector 
 
Regarding the composition and structure of the Malawian Security 
Sector, the transformation or reformation must consider the best fit   
circumstances in the present security environment.  The study results 
suggest that due to lack of coordination at senior levels the mandates of 
some security institutions have overlapped.  Experience has shown  
three or four different security institutions performing the same 
function.   
 
6.2.7 Human Practices and Cultural Make up 
 
(i) Government Support to Security Institutions to Reform 
Maintaining momentum for continuing to reform the security sector 
with the objective of consolidating democratic values requires total 
government support. The reform has the objective of balancing the 
need for the entire security sector to meet new threats and challenges to 
national and international security as well as aligning the security 
institutions to democratic values.  It is crucial for government to ensure 
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democratic governance of the security by implementing effective 
reforms in all security institutions. 
 
(ii) A Body on National Security Process 
The state needs an appropriate national security orientation that should 
be guided by the following recommendations for improvement; 
 
An integrated, codified NSPF for the contextualisation of Malawi‟s 
national values, interests and security, so that the government addresses 
all threats; by coordinating the security systems so that it optimises 
contributions from all security agencies and foster national consensus 
through public debate and research on national security, public safety 
and defence. 
 
In the case of security policies, most importantly, the government must 
provide an Integrated Policy Framework through which the transformation 
of the security sector would be managed.  In this document the following 
must be included:  policy statements, security environment assessments, 
strategic defence and internal security reviews, concept documents and 
transformation strategies. 
 
It is also important to note that such an integrated policy framework 
document will provide the Malawi nation through which the government 
will be able to continue to appraise, implement, monitor and evaluate the 
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country‟s national interest and security agenda. A National Security 
Committee to be constituted as an overall overseeing and monitoring body 
with the President as chairperson.  For instance, of the composition of the 
NSC see figure 20 below. 
Figure 20:  Composition of NSC 
 
 
 
 
President 
 
                                                       Vice President   NSA Staff 
 
Minister of State 
 
Minister of Defence 
 
      Senior review..........................................................................  Inter agency          
      Groups                Committees 
         Director National Intelligence Beaureau 
Chairperson and Joint Chief of Security Services 
 
Source :  Sarkesian (2002) modified 
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First the NSC should be established by an Act of Parliament, which must 
define its mandate and composition as well as its possible relations with the 
security institutions to be provided for in the constitution.  Second, the 
NSC should be assisted by a secretariat that will serve as the primary 
agency to advise.  It must be noted that the “President by law and of 
necessity has the central role in national security policy.  Third, the inter 
action among the Ministers of State and Defence and the National Security 
Advisor should strongly influence the way policy is formulated and the 
kind of advice given to the president (Sarkesian et al 2002). 
 
(iii) Strengthen the Role and Capacity of Civil Society 
As observed in the study funding the civil society lacks sufficient 
knowledge about the security institutions and their functions.  In such cases 
research institutes and colleges such as the Centre for Security Studies 
Mzuzu University could be of assistance by assisting security expert – 
formation through training and advances seminars and providing 
alternative expert opinion on security and defence policies.  Likewise the 
media may also assist government and legislature to explain their decisions 
and actions to the citizens. 
 
Supporting this view Holden (2012), asserts that it is important therefore to 
“engage civil society on security issues because this enables the 
perspectives of general population to be factored into SSR policy, security 
policy-making and governance processes.  Likewise consultations should 
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include diverse stakeholders such as academics, religious organisations, 
civil society organisations and the public at national and sub-natural 
levels”. 
 
(v) Government Support to Security Sector to Reform – Education and 
      Training 
      The key to democratic control of the security sector is education and       
      training in order to promote democratic attitudes and proper integration of  
      the security institutions and management bodies in society.  Education and  
     training in democratic norms will make security practitioners not to pose a  
     threat to democracy. 
 
(vi)  Education 
Most Security personnel have low levels of formal education that impede 
many individuals to understand and respect for instance international 
humanitarian law and human rights.  The most common and formidable 
barrier to understanding democratic norms is the ability to communicate 
and exchange information, social awareness and readiness to accept 
responsibility.  The education of security personnel should be a continuous 
process that should be in their whole career.  The courses on democracy 
should include constitutional, international and humanitarian law. 
6.2.8 Suggestions for Future Research 
Transformation of the Security Sector is crucial for any democratic 
country and must reflect what a country wants to do in terms of protecting 
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the people and the state.  The study has focussed on an important 
component of need for Malawi to have a realistic TSS assessment.  The 
implication is that not enough has been done in this area and future 
research is essential to establish why it has never happened. 
 
The researchers‟ concluding thought is that government should learn from 
past practice and better harmonize security and the TSS agenda.  It is 
important to investigate the major difficulties that led to failure to 
recognise the drawbacks and start from there as an entry point.  The major 
problem observed however is that there has been too little dialogue on the 
issue of the entire security system to be reviewed after authoritarian rule.  
The situation can turn around if the political leadership, security 
practitioners and civil society commit themselves to a proper alignment of 
SSR policy goals, research and stronger communication among different 
actors involved. 
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8.  Appendices 
 
8.1 Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
Title of research project: Transformation of the Security Sector; in Malawi 
from 1994-2011  
 
My name is Brigadier General Misheck Colyns Chirwa (rtd) and I am a 
lecturer at Mzuzu University at the Centre for Security Studies.  Currently I am 
a part-time student planning to read for a research degree (PhD) through the 
University of Witwatersrand Johannesburg RSA. 
 
I would like to take few minutes of your time to ask you some questions on my 
research. The terminology “Security Sector” in the title means all the 
institutions of state responsible for security of the state and its population from 
fear of violence.  In my research, the security sector consists of the Military, 
Police, Intelligence, Immigration, Prison Services, related ministries and 
departments (Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs  and Justice) 
paramilitary forces (Militia) and governmental oversight organisations 
(Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, Defence  Council, Police 
Commission etc). 
 
Transformation of the Security Sector (TSS) is another terminology used to 
mean Security Sector Reform (SSR) of the security apparatus in a democratic 
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state.  This is rather to change in the behaviour, attitudes, roles, responsibilities 
and actions, working together in a coordinated security system in a manner that 
is consistent with democratic norms and principles of security governance in a 
modern world. 
 
Please feel free to answer all or some of the questions as you can.  I appreciate 
your willingness to answer the questions below.  Write your responses in the 
spaces provided by crossing          the number, in the box that closely satisfies 
your answer. 
  
Interview No:...................................................................................................... 
 
Place of Interview:............................................................................................... 
 
Date of Interview:................................................................................................. 
 
Time of Interview:...............................................................................................
X 
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Demographic data  
     
 Research Question  Interview Question Response 
     
  (a) Your age 18 – 25 
     
    26 - 30 
     
    31 - 40 
     
    41 – 45 
     
    46 – 55 
     
    55 and 
over 
     
     
  (b) Gender   
     
   Male  1 
     
   Female  2 
    
 
 
  (c) Former/present title  
     
   Politician  1 
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   Civil servant 2 
     
   Academician  3 
     
   Civil society  4 
     
   Non-governmental organisation 5 
    
 
 
  (d) Level of Education 
 
 
   Malawi Junior Certificate 1 
     
   Malawi School Certificate 2 
     
   Diploma  3 
     
   University degree 4 
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Questionnaire 
 
Objective 1 
To determine political relationships between the elected authorities and 
organisational character of the security actors for enabling 
transformation process in Malawi from 1994 to 20112. 
 
The questions are designed to using the six point scale by agreeing or 
disagreeing in crossing             the number, in the box  that closely satisfies 
your answer in the following statements: 
 
1 
Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree  
3 
Agree 
slightly  
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
 
 PolitiPolitical andOrganisational 
TtttttTransformation Perspective 
 
Tt 
 
1.1 Authoritarian rule political 
system dominated and still 
dominating the country.                   
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
1.2 The separation of powers 
among the legislature, 
executive and judiciary is 
working well in Malawi.  
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
    
 
 
 
 
 
     
X 
224 
   
1.3 The state of the economy has 
sharp changes in the 
macroeconomic climate which 
is leading to the growth of 
hiddencorruption and illicit 
transactions. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly 
        
         
2.1  There is role of power 
structures and relations on 
security policy of the 
country. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
2.2 There are different values 
and perceptions across 
players regarding key 
security policies and 
objectives. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
  
3.1 There is influential space 
for civil society to freely 
exercise political rights on 
security. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
  
3.2 The media operates freely 
without interference from 
state. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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3.3 Civil society structures 
support the state for 
democratisation in 
Malawi.  
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
    
 
     
4.1 The state plays a 
stabilising role in the 
region. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
4.2 There are powerful 
influences over the ruling 
elite. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
5.1 The state does not face any 
security threats e.g. civil 
war.  
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
5.2 There are no internal 
conflicts in the country 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
 
 
        
5.3 There is no major threats 
to human security in 
Malawi. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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Objective 2 
To assess human resource practices and cultural norms of the security 
sector in Malawi for enabling transformation process. 
 
Human Resource and Cultural Perspective 
 
1.1 There is a body of 
national security 
policy making 
process in Malawi. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.2 Adequate internal and 
external oversight 
mechanisms are in 
place. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.3 Officials, members of the 
executive, members of 
parliament are adequately 
equipped and trained for 
the roles and tasks 
assigned to them on 
security 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.4 There are existing 
development 
frameworks in 
Malawi to embark on 
TSS process 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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1.5 There are a number of 
political programmes 
the government is 
involved that could 
provide an entry point 
to TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
2.1 The government has 
strong desire to 
support the security 
institutions to reform 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
 
2.3 The government has a 
strong need for a 
clear case for TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
3.1 The government 
should initiate the 
programme for TSS 
at all costs 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
   
3.2 Training is a pre-
requite for members 
of parliament, senior 
officials and civil 
society to understand 
TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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Objective 3 
To determine the main constraints to transformation of the security sector in 
Malawi. 
 
Constraints to transformation 
 
1.1 There are 
development 
frameworks currently 
to embark on TSS 
process 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.2 There is a programme 
of civil service 
reform in Malawi. 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.3 The Security sector, 
civil society service and 
executive officials have 
a joint assistance 
programme in Malawi 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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1.4 Government is 
providing financial 
support to security 
institutions to reform 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
Objective 4 
 
To establish strategies that can be developed for the implementation of 
effective transformation process. 
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1.1 Malawi needs a clear 
case for TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.2 The executive should 
initiate the 
programme for TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
         
         
1.3 The executive, 
members of 
Parliament and senior 
security officials 
require training to 
understand TSS 
 1 Agree 
strongly 
2 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
slightly 
4 
Disagree 
slightly 
5 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
strongly  
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8.2  Appendix 2: Individual in depth interviews 
 
Title of research project:  Transformation of Security Sector in Malawi 
 
My name is Brigadier General Misheck Colyns Chirwa (Rtd) and I am a 
lecturer at Mzuzu University at the Centre for Security Studies.  Currently I am 
a part-time student planning to read for a research degree (PhD) with the 
University of Witwatersrand Johannesburg R.S.A. 
 
I would like to take few minutes of your time to ask you some questions on my 
research titled “Transformation of the Security Sector in Malawi since the 
Advent of Multiparty Democracy in 1994.”  The “security sector” 
encompasses all institutions of the state that protects it and its population from 
fear or violence.  In my research therefore the security sector is consisting of 
the Military, Police, Intelligence, Immigration, Prison Services,  related 
ministries and departments (Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and 
Justice) para-military forces (Militia) and governmental oversight 
organisations (Parliamentary committee on Defence and Security, Defence 
Council, Police Commission etc.) 
 
Please feel free to answer all or some of the questions as you may see 
appropriate.  I appreciate your willingness to respond to the questions I am 
going to ask you. 
 
Interview No:...................................................................................................... 
 
Place of Interview:............................................................................................... 
 
Date of Interview:................................................................................................. 
 
Time of Interview.................................................................................................
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INDIVIDUAL IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Objective 1.  
 
To determine political relationship between elected civil authorities and 
organisational character for enabling transformation process of the security 
institutions in Malawi from 1994 to 2011. 
 
Question 1 
 
a) What is the historical context of security in Malawi? 
b) What type of political system dominated the country; multiparty or 
dictatorship? 
c) Is separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary 
working? 
d) How does corruption affect the government? 
e) What is the state of the economy?  
f) Do sharp changes in the macroeconomic climate lead to the growth of 
the hidden economy or corruption and illicit transaction? 
 
Question 2 
a) What is the role of power structures and relations on security policy? 
b) Is this due to historical causes? 
c) What are the different values, ideologies and perceptions (across 
players regarding key security policies and objectives? 
 
Question 3 
 
a) How influential is the role positions of opposition political parties in 
security? 
b) Do the media operate freely in this country? 
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c) Is there arbitrary application of legal social or human rights? 
d) Do the civil society structures challenge or support the state? 
 
Question 4 
 
a) Does the state play a stabilising or destabilising role in the region? 
b) Are there any powerful influences over the ruling elite? 
 
Question 5 
a) What security threats does the state face (international wars, civil war 
or arms trafficking?) 
b) Are there internal conflicts? 
c) What is the nature? 
d) What are the underlying causes? 
 
Question 6 
 
a) What are the major threats to human security? 
b) Are there tensions between social groups? 
c) What are the triggers that could inflame tensions? 
 
Question 7 
 
a) How would you evaluate the culture within security institutions? 
b) Do you think they provide true service to the public? 
c) Do they have equal opportunity policies? 
d) What is the participation of minority groups (African, Indians, 
Coloured and Whites)? 
e) What is the participation of women in the security sector? 
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Objective 2 
To assess human resource practices and cultural norms of the security sector in 
Malawi from 1994 to 2012 for enabling transformation process. 
 
Question 1 
 
a) Is the current legal and constitutional framework for the security sector 
adequate? 
b) Is there a national security policy making process? 
c) Are there adequate internal and external oversight mechanisms 
d) Are officials, members of the executive, members of parliament, 
adequately equipped and trained for the roles and tasks assigned to 
them to oversee security institutions? 
 
 
Question 2 
a) What is the level of support in the government and security institutions 
to reform? 
b) What security development activities are already underway on TSS? 
 
Question 3 
 
Is there sufficient space for civil society to freely exercise political rights?  
 
Objective 3 
 
To determine the main constraints to transformation process of the security 
sector in Malawi. 
 
Question 1 
 
What development frameworks exist currently to embark on TSS process? 
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What political programmes are the government involved in that it could 
provide an entry point to TSS? 
Is there a programme of civil service reform? 
Is there scope for the executive officials, the security sector and civil society to 
develop joint assistance programmes n transformation process? 
Are the security providers ready to welcome the programme and embark on 
TSS process? 
Is government providing adequate financial resources to the security sector for 
them to play their roles effectively? 
Are there mechanisms for institutional reform? 
 
Objective 4 
To establish strategies that can be developed for the implementation of 
effective transformation process. 
Question 1 
 
Does Malawi need a clear case for TSS? 
How and who should initiate the programme for TSS? 
Do the Executive, members of Parliament and senior officials require training 
to understand TSS?
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8.3  Appendix 3:  Consent Form 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Request to participate in a research project 
 
I am a student presently planning to read for a research degree through the 
University of Witwatersrand South Africa. I am required to carry out research 
to write a thesis.  The title of the research is „Transformation of the Security 
Sector in Democratic Malawi.‟  The aim of the study is to investigate why 
there has been less progress in the transformation of the security sector.  With 
your experience, the information that you will provide, will address and 
perhaps improve the roles and missions of the security sector. It is the intention 
of the study to collect primary and secondary data through individual 
interviews with a few high profile people who might have played a role in the 
implementation of policies for the security sector.  The interview will be 
transcribed verbatim, and I promise to handle all information collected with 
utmost privacy.  Your participation in the study is voluntary and will be 
appreciated.  Each session will last between 45 to 60 minutes and conducted in 
a place and time most sustainable to you.  For further information, I have 
enclosed herein the contacts of my supervisor. 
I trust that this request is acceptable. 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Brig. Chirwa Misheck C. (rtd) 
Centre for Security Studies 
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Mzuzu University 
Private Bag 201  
Luwinga, Mzuzu 2 E-mail: micchirwa@mzuni.ac.mw/micchirwa@yahoo.com 
 
 
Supervisor  
 
Prof. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk  
Centre for Defence and Security Management (CDSM) 
University of Witwatersrand 
P.O. Box 601, 
Wits 2050, South Africa 
 
Thank you, 
 
I accept participation 
 
Participant‟s Signature:………………………      Date:……………………. 
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8.4  Appendix 4: Selected list of participants 
 
INTERVIEWEE  SECTOR DESIGNATION  
   
 Government   
   
   
A-1 Ministry of Defence – Lilongwe Principal Secretary 
   
A-2 Ministry of Home Affairs – Lilongwe Deputy Principal Secretary 
   
A-3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Lilongwe Desk Officer International 
Relations 
   
A-4 Ministry of Justice – Lilongwe The Attorney General Office 
   
A-5 Ministry of Finance – Lilongwe  Budget Officer 
   
A-6 Ministry of Finance - Lilongwe Auditor General Office 
   
  
Legislature  
 
   
B-1 Office of Defence and Security 
Parliamentary Committee – Lilongwe 
Chairperson – Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
   
B-2 Office of Defence and Security 
Parliamentary Committee – Lilongwe 
Committee Member – Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
   
   
B-3 Parliament  - Lilongwe Chairperson opposition – Member 
of Parliament (MP) 
   
 
 Academia  
   
C-1 Chancellor College – Zomba Department of Political Science  
   
C-2 Mzuzu University – Mzuzu Director of Distance Learning 
   
C-3 Mzuzu University – Mzuzu The Deputy Vice Chancellor 
   
C-4 Chancellor College - Zomba Principal‟s Office 
   
 Military   
   
D-1 Malawi Defence Force - Lilongwe Deputy Commander 
   
D-2 Malawi Defence Force - Lilongwe Chief of Staff 
   
D-3 Malawi Armed Forces College – Salima Commandant 
   
D-4 Parachute Battalion – Salima Commanding Officer 
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D-5 
 
D-6 
 
D-7 
 
Malawi Defence Force – Mzuzu 
 
Malawi Defence Force – Lilongwe 
 
Malawi Defence Force – Zomba 
 
 
Commanding Officer 
 
Senior Officer 
 
Junior Officer 
 
 
 
E-1 
 
Intelligence  
 
Regional Intelligence – Lilongwe 
 
 
 
Intelligence Officer 
   
E-2 
 
E-3 
 
E-4 
Regional  Intelligence – Mzuzu 
 
Intelligence – Blantyre 
 
Intelligence - Lilongwe 
Intelligence Officer 
 
Intelligence Officer 
 
National Security Advisor 
   
 Law Enforcement  
   
F-1 Law Enforcement – Lilongwe Commissioner of Police 
Administration 
   
F-2 Law enforcement - Lilongwe Commissioner – Central  
 
 
 
Judiciary  
 
   
G-1 Judiciary - Mzuzu Judge High Court  
   
G-2 Law Society - Lilongwe Chairman 
   
 Immigration   
   
H-1 Immigration – Mzuzu Immigration Officer – North 
   
H-2 Immigration - Lilongwe Immigration Officer – Central  
   
 
I-1 
 
I-2 
 
I-3 
 
Prisons  
 
Zomba Prison  
 
Mzimba Prison 
 
The Chief Training Officer 
 
Prison Officer 
 
Prison Officer 
   
   
 Non-Governmental Organisations  
   
J-1 Zodiac Radio Station - Lilongwe Managing Director 
   
J-2 Centre for Human Rights Malawi - Lilongwe Commissioner  
   
J-3 Catholic Diocese – CCJP – Lilongwe Chairman 
   
J-4 Centre for Human Rights - Lilongwe Commissioner  
   
J-5 Livingstonia Synod Church and Society - 
Mzuzu 
Deputy Director 
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8.5  Appendix 5:  Research Time Scale 
No Task to be achieved Target Time No of 
months  
PHASE 1 
 
1 
 
Registration of the program 
 
January 2009 
 
- 
 
2 
 
Work on research problem 
 
March to April, 2009 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Background to research problem 
 
May to June 2009 
 
2 
 
4 
 
Literature review of short Research Proposal  
 
June to July 2009 
 
2 
 
5 
 
Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
August  2009 
 
1 
 
6 
 
Research design and methodology 
 
September to October 2009 
 
2 
 
7 
 
Refining short research proposal 
 
November  2009 
 
1 
 
8 
 
Submission of research proposal  
 
November 2009 
 
_ 
 
9 
 
Final refining of research proposal  
 
January  2010 
 
1 
PHASE 2 
 
10 
 
Writing long proposal 
 
February to April  2010 
 
3 
 
11 
 
Drafting of chapter 1 and 2 
 
May  to September 2010 
 
5 
 
12 
 
Submission of long proposal 
 
October 2010 
 
- 
 
13 
 
Submitting chapter 1 and 2 
 
September  2010 to January 2011 
 
2 
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14 
 
Refining chapter 1 and 2 
 
February to July 2011 
 
4 
 
15 
 
Data collection 
 
December 2011 
 
6 
 
16 
 
Draft chapters .3 and 4 
 
 
January 2013 to June 2013 
 
4 
 
17 
 
Refining chapter 3 and 4 
 
July 2012  to August 2013 
 
2 
 
18 
 
Drafting Chapter 5 and 6 
 
September  to November 2013 
 
3 
 
19 
 
Refining Chapter 5 and 6 
 
January to March 2014 
 
3 
PHASE 3 
 
20 
 
Drafting Chapter 7 
 
April to May 2014 
 
2 
 
21 
 
Refining Chapter 7 
 
June to July 2014 
 
2 
 
22 
 
Submission of copy of thesis 
 
August 2014 
 
1  
 
23 
 
Corrections of thesis copies 
 
February 2015 
 
1 
 
24 
 
Final Submission of thesis 
 
March 2015 
 
- 
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8.6  Appendix 6:  Geographical location of participants 
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8.7  Appendix 7: Letter of Permission for data collection 
 
Director of Research   
Mzuzu University 
Private Bag 201 
Luwinga, Mzuzu  
 
September, 2010. 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Permission to visit Security Sector Institutions Thesis writing Programme - 
January to June 2011– Brig. M.C. Chirwa Rtd  
 
I write on behalf of Mzuzu University research department to provide a 
statement on retired Brig. M.C. Chirwa‟s thesis writing programme.  Brig. 
M.C. Chirwa is currently working with Mzuzu University, Centre for Security 
Studies as Senior Lecturer.  He has been with the Centre since its 
establishment in 2005, teaching various courses and supervising students‟ 
research. 
 
Brig. M.C. Chirwa is currently planning to read for a research degree (PhD) 
through the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg R.S.A.  As such he is 
required to write a thesis.  The title of the research is Transformation of the 
Security Sector in Malawi.  In this research, the security sector consist of the 
Military, Police, Intelligence and Immigration services together with bodies  
responsible for administration; Ministries of Defence, Home and Foreign 
Affairs, Parliamentary and Justice systems. 
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The main aim of the research is to determine the progression of transformation 
of the security organizations and oversight bodies in the adoption of new 
concepts of security system governance in a democratic state of Malawi.  The 
study is expected to be the first initiative to explore and awareness of the gap 
that may exist to determine security governance, transformation and capacity 
for effective planning and security policy development in Malawi.  The 
research project started in 2009 and expected to finish in 2012.  Currently the 
research is into second phase of data collection hence the request to visit 
security institutions between January and June 2011. 
 
The information generated from the study should serve as a reservoir of 
knowledge on management and governance of security organizations and 
should assist government policy makers, senior security officers and the civil 
society for greater democratic accountability, transparency and control. 
 
Findings of the study can be used to develop new strategies for common 
security in response to needs in Malawi and the SADC region. 
 
Enclosed herein find selected list of participants to be visited by sector and 
designation. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
O.V. Msiska, Associate Professor  
Deputy Vice Chancellor 
 
cc: University Registrar 
 National Research Council of Malawi 
 Brig. M.C. Chirwa 
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8.8 Appendix 8:   Regulations and laws that impede good practice of  
                                    TSS in Malawi 
 
 
Statute 
 
Provision that acts as Barriers to access 
 
Banking Act (1989) 
 
 Except when in the performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions, or when required to do so by 
an court or under any law, neither any inspector 
appointed under section 12 or 22 nor any person 
appointed as advisor under section 31 (1) (d) nor any 
director, manager, officer or employee of the Reserve 
Bank, shall disclose any information relating to the 
business of any bank or financial institution which he 
has acquired in the performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions. 
 
 The Reserve Bank may publish in whole or in part in 
such form and at such time as it may deem fit, any 
information or data furnished or collected under this 
Act:  Provided that no information or data which might 
disclose the particulars of a bank or financial institution 
or a customer of such bank or financial institution, shall 
be published unless the consent of such bank, financial 
institution or customer, as the case, has been obtained. 
 
 
Capital Market Development 
(1990) 
 
 Officials and personnel of a self-regulatory organization 
shall maintain secrecy regarding any information which 
they have obtained as a result of performance of their 
functions or otherwise, and shall not use the knowledge 
of such information for themselves personally or for 
others, whether in anyway related or totally unrelated to 
the capital market. 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Code (1967) 
 
 If any person affected by any judgement or order passed 
in any proceedings under this Code desires to have a 
copy of the judgement or order or any deposition or 
other part of the record, he shall on applying for such 
copy be furnished therewith upon payment of such fee 
as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice from time to 
time. 
 
Defence Force Act (2004) 
 
 No person subject to military law under this Act who 
lacks authority, shall disclose any information which is 
or appears to be “information useful to the enemy either 
directly or indirectly” 
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National Assembly (Powers and 
Privileges) Act (1957) 
 
 No stranger shall be entitled, as of right, to enter or 
remain within the precincts of the Assembly and the 
Speaker may at any time order him or her to withdraw 
from the precincts of the Assembly 
 
Official Secrets Act (1913) 
 
 It is a criminal offence to disclose (i) any secret official 
code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model , 
article, note, document, or information which relates to 
or is used in a “prohibited place” or (ii) anything in such 
a place, or which has been made or obtained in 
contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in 
confidence to him by any person holding office under 
the Government or (v) which he has obtained or to 
which he has access owing to his position as a person 
who holds or has held office under the Government. 
 
Preservation of Public Security 
Act (1960) 
 
 The Minister is empowered to prohibit the publication 
and dissemination of any matter which appears to him to 
be prejudicial to public security, and to authorise the 
regulation and control of the production, publishing, 
sale, supply, distribution and possession of publications; 
 
Protected Places and Areas Act 
(1960) 
 
 The Minister, in his discretion, may, require an occupier 
of any place declared by the Minister  to be a “protected 
place or area” to take such steps as the Minister, in his 
discretion , may deem necessary in the public interest 
for the safeguarding of information relating to such 
place or area, or for the security of any classified 
information or document which may be furnished to 
such occupier in his capacity as such, by any public 
officer. 
 
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 
(1989) 
 
 Except when in performance of his duties, no director, 
officer or employee of the Bank shall disclose any 
information relating to the affairs of the Bank or of any 
bank, financial institution, company or individual which 
he acquired in the performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions under this Act 
 
Treaties and Conventions 
Publication Act (1984) 
 
 Treaties and other international agreements shall be 
officially published in English and only the English 
version shall be regarded to be the authoritative version 
of the treaty or agreement in question. 
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Corrupt Practices Act (1995) 
 
 Any person in the service of the Bureau as an employee, 
an agent or a consultant or in any other capacity take an 
oath of secrecy and are prohibited from directly or 
indirectly providing or disclosing to any unauthorised 
person the nature or contents of any document, 
communication or information whatsoever are which 
has come to his knowledge in the course of his duties in 
relation to the Bureau. 
 
 
Employment Act (2000) 
 
 No labour officer shall, while in office or subsequently, 
reveal any manufacturing or commercial secret or 
working process which comes to his knowledge in the 
course of his duties. 
 
 A labour officer shall treat as absolutely confidential the 
source of any complaint bringing to his notice a 
contravention of this Act and shall not reveal to the 
employer or the employer‟s representative that 
inspection was made in consequence of the receipt of a 
complaint that a breach of this Act appeared to have 
been committed 
 
 
Malawi Revenue Authority Act 
(2000) 
 
 Every member of the Board, revenue commissioner or 
any other person employed by the Authority in the 
carrying out of the provisions of this Act, shall regard 
and deal with as secret to any unauthorized person all 
documents and information relating to the income, 
expenditure or other financial dealings or status of any 
tax payer or other person involved in any operations in 
furtherance of the purposes of this Act, and all 
confidential instructions in respect of the administration 
of this Act which may come into his possession or to his 
knowledge  in the course of his duties. 
 
 
Malawi Bureau of Standards Act 
(1972) 
 
 A member of the Board or of any committee thereof, the 
General Manager, a  member of the staff of the Bureau, 
an inspector or other person who is, or was engaged in 
the administration of this Act, shall not disclose to any 
other person, except to the Minister or for the purposes 
of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his 
powers or except when required to do so before a court 
or under an law, any information acquired by his in the 
performance of his duties or in exercising his powers 
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Mental Treatment Act (1948) 
 
 Any person who when publishing in any newspaper any 
matter referring to any proceedings under this Act 
mentions by name any of the parties thereto shall be 
guilty of an offence against this Act. 
 
 
Money Laundering, Proceeds of 
Serious Crime and Terrorist 
Financing Act (2006) 
 No person or institution shall disclose to any person 
information that shows that a report to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit has been or may be made, or that a 
financial institution has formed a suspicion of an 
offence under the Act. 
 
 It is a criminal offence to disclose to another person 
information which is likely to prejudice any 
investigation of an offence or possible offence of money 
laundering or terrorist financing 
 
 
Political Parties (Registration and 
Regulation) Act  (1993) 
 
 The Registrar of Political Parties shall not disclose any 
information (other than the name of a registered political 
party; the address of the registered office of a registered 
political party; or the particulars of the office bearers of 
a registered political party) obtained in the course of the 
exercise of his functions.  The exception is where such 
disclosure is required by any other law 
 
 
Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections Act (1993) 
 
 At the end of its functions, the Electoral Commission 
shall deposit all documents forming the official record 
of an election (including voters registers, ballot papers, 
records from districts and polling stations and 
summaries thereof and the record and summary of the 
national result) with the Clerk of Parliament who shall 
retain and preserve such documents in safe and secure 
custody without destruction for a period of twelve 
months 
 
 
Public Audit Act (2003) 
 
 Except that in the performance of the duties, functions 
and powers conferred by this Act or by any other written 
law on the Auditor General or employee of the National 
Audit Office, the Auditor General or any employee shall 
not disclose to any person any information that shall 
come to the attention of the Auditor General or 
employee of the National Audit Office pursuant to this 
Act, and all such information shall remain confidential 
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Science and Technology Act 
(2003) 
 
 No person may publish or disclose to any person, 
otherwise than in the course of his duties, contents of 
any document, communication or information which 
relates to, and which has come to his knowledge in the 
course of, duties under this Act. 
 
Veterinary and Para-Veterinary 
Practitioners Act (2001) 
 
 No person shall, without the consent in writing given by 
or on behalf of the Board, publish or disclose to any 
person, otherwise than in the course of his duties, 
contents of any document, communication or 
information which relates to, and which has come to his 
knowledge in the course of his duties under this Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
